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CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
SURVEY
JULY 1990 - DECEMBER 1990
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme cour4 as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW .................................... 1053
A. The public Utilities Commission has the power to
make factual findings regarding interests in
property incident to its legislative power, with
limited review by the courts: Camp Meeker Water
System v. Public Utilities Comm'n ..................... 1053
B. Attorney's fees are available on appeal pursuant to
section 31536 of the Government Code because to
hold otherwise would frustrate the legislative
purpose behind the statute, which is to remedy the
financial disparity between the county employee
and the government agency in a contest for benefits:
Morcos v. Board of Retirement ........................ 1060
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................ 1063
A. A litigant's failure to object to a trial court's
statement of decision constitutes a waiver and the
appellate court may infer findings favoring the
prevailing party: In re Marriage of Arceneaux ....... 1063
B. State courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate issues of ownership or possession in
connection with Indian property, and Indian tribal
officials, who generally enjoy broad sovereign
immunity, may be subject to tort liability for
committing acts outside of territorial boundaries:
Boisclair v. Superior Court ............................ 1066
C. The filing of a timely claim against one public
entity does not preclude an incapacitated plaintiff
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from filing late claims against other public entities:
Draper v. City of Los Angeles ......................... 1069
D. A settlement offer made pursuant to section 998 of
the California Civil Procedure Code is not revoked
by a counteroffer, and if the offer is served by mail,
the 30-day period for acceptance of the settlement
offer is extended pursuant to section 1013 of the
Code of Civil Procedure: Poster v. Southern California
Rapid Transit District ................................. 1074
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................... 1078
A. The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
Act, codified at section 3303(D of the Government
Code, grants discovery rights to a peace officer who
is the subject of an internal affairs investigation
only after the initial interrogation of that officer:
Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of
Pasadena ............................................. 1078
B. The Proposition 115 victims rights initiative is
partially valid: although section three of the
initiative constitutes an invalid revision of the
California constitution, it is severable, and the
remaining provisions of the initiative are valid, as
they satisfy the single subject rule: Raven v.
Deukmejian ........................................... 1084
C. When two propositions containing materially
conflicting provisions are passed at the same
election, only the initiative receiving the greater
majority of votes will become operative: Taxpayers to
Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Commission ........................................... 1090
IV. CRIMINAL LAW ........................................... 1104
Materiality is an element of a perjury prosecution
under the Political Reform Act that is property
submitted to the jury; and the trial court has the
discretionary power to order an evidentiary
hearing, regarding jury misconduct allegations,
wherein jurors may be called to testify: People v.
H edgecock ........................................... 1104
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ................................... 1116
A. Collateral estoppel does not attach to issues decided
in probation revocation hearing: Lucido v. Superior
C ourt ................................................ 1116
B. An indigent criminal defendant may not be
required to demonstrate inadequate representation
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by his retained counsel before the defendant's
timely motion to discharge his retained attorney
will be granted by the trial court: People v. Ortiz .... 1130
C. The proper standard of proof in a probation
revocation hearing is a preponderance of the
evidence standard: People v. Rodriguez ............... 1135
VI. DEATH PENALTY LAW ................................... 1138
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases
imposing the death penalty. Rather than a case-by-
case approach, this section focuses on the key issues
under review by the court and identifies trends and
shifts in the court's rationale ....................... 1138
VII. ELECTION LAW ........................................... 1169
An initiative is invalid if at the time it is adopted,
it is inconsistent with a city's general plan: Lesher
Communications v. City of Walnut Creek .............. 1169
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ................................... 1175
Under the California Environmental Quality Act, a
reviewing court shall deem an environmental
impact report to be sufficient when it analyzes all
feasible alternatives; in certain circumstances, the
administrative record or the local coastal plan may
be the basis for a feasibility determination: Citizens
of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors ............... 1175
IX . FAMILY LAW ............................................. 1183
Where a wife's petition for dissolution fails to
request child support, and the notice received by the
husband also lacks such a request, a default
judgment ordering the husband to pay such support
is invalid as a denial of due process under section
580 of the California Code of Civil Procedure: In re
M arriage of Lippel .................................... 1183
X. INSURANCE LAW ......................................... 1186
In first party progressive loss cases, the one-year
limitation on actions begins to run upon the
discovery of the damage or when a reasonable
person would have discovered the loss, the one-year
period is equitably tolled between notification of the
loss and the insurer's formal denial of the claim,
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and the insurer currently covering the risk upon
the manifestation of the damage is solely liable for
the loss: Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v.
Superior Court ....................................... 1186
X I. LABOR LAW .............................................. 1199
The wrongful termination claims of a policy-
making or confidential union employee, who is not
a member of the union, are preempted by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act's
underlying purpose of insuring the responsiveness
of elected union officials to the will of the
membership: Screen Extras Guild v. Superior Court... 1199
XII. PROPERTY LAW .......................................... 1206
A bank's improper setoff against a depositor's
account in partial satisfaction of the depositor's
debt without first foreclosing its security interest in
the depositor's property results in a waiver of the
bank's security interest, but not a waiver of the
underlying debt: Security Pacific National Bank v.
W ozab ............................................... 1206
XIII. SALES LAW .............................................. 1211
A provision in a sales contract which imposes an
eighteen percent annual interest fee for late
payments does not violate the California usury law:
Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction
Corporation .......................................... 1211
XIV. TORT LAW ............................................... 1216
A complaint that a physician failed to disclose
research and economic interests in a patient's cells
before obtaining the patient's consent to medical
procedures by which cells were extracted for
commercial purposes states a cause of action for
breach of the physician's fiduciary duty, but not for
conversion: Moore v. Regents of the University of
California ............................................ 1216
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Public Utilities Commission has the power to make
findings of fact regarding interests in property with
limited review by the courts: Camp Meeker Water System,
Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion,' the California Supreme Court recognized the broad power
given to the Public Utility Commission (the "Commission") by the
legislature. The court held that: (1) incident to its legislative power
to rule on rate increases, the Commission could make determinations
about interests in property as findings of fact;2 (2) such factual find-
ings must be afforded great deference by the courts;3 and (3) the
Commission had sufficient evidence to find that the original owners
of neighboring property had given Camp Meeker Water System, Inc.
("CMWSI") an express easement to water sources on their adjoining
property.4 However, the court placed limits on the res judicata effect
of such factual findings.
This action began when CMWSI filed a petition with the Commis-
sion seeking authorization for a rate increase.5 CMWSI claimed that
the rate increase was needed so it could lease wells from the Che-
noweth family, the current owners of the property adjacent to
CMWSI.6 The Commission held, on rehearing,7 that the rate in-
1. 51 Cal. 3d 845, 799 P.2d 758, 274 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990). The unanimous opinion
was written by Justice Eagleson. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard,
Panelli, Kennard and Arabian all concurred.
2. Id, at 868, 799 P.2d at 772, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
3. Id. at 863-65, 799 P.2d at 769-70, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
4. Id. at 865-67, 799 P.2d at 770-71, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
5. Article XII of the California Constitution gives the Commission control over
"[p]rivate corporations and persons that own, operate, control or manage a... system
for. . . furnishing of ... water." CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3. "[Ihe Legislature has ple-
nary power... to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the commission, to
establish the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court of record,
and to enable it to fix just compensation for utility property taken in eminent do-
main." CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5. In accordance with this authority, the legislature
granted the Commission the power to enforce section 451 of the Public Utilities Code,
which provides that "[a]ll charges demanded or received by any public utility, or by
any two or more public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be fur-
nished or any service rendered or to be rendered shall be just and reasonable." CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (Deering 1990).
6. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 850-51, 799 P.2d at 760-61, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81.
The Chenoweth family purchased the Camp Meeker Water System and the private
lands owned by the Meeker family in 1951. In 1959, the Chenoweths incorporated the
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crease was not warranted because the deed conveying the system
granted CMWSI an easement for water rights on the adjacent Che-
noweth property.8 As a result of this finding, the Commission or-
dered CMWSI: "(1) to enforce those water rights against the record
titleholders; [and] (2) to record a notice of intent to preserve its ease-
ments pursuant to Civil Code section 887.060."9 Subsequently,
CMWSI petitioned the supreme court for review of the Commission's
order.10
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The first issue examined by the court was the extent of CMWSI's
standing. The court found that CMWSI could petition for review
under section 1756 of the Public Utilities Code"l to the extent that
the factual findings impacted the Commission's decision denying the
rate increase.1 2 However, the court alleviated the underlying con-
cerns, which caused CMWSI to raise these issues, in a footnote stat-
water system that the Meeker family had established on its land for service to the
community.
7. In its first examination of the cause of action, the Commission found that the
system did not have easements over the private Chenoweth property, but that the deed
to the Chenoweth's was void because it was not approved by the Commission in ac-
cordance with section 851 of the Public Utilities Code. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 1731 (Deering 1990) (allowing any party to a Commission action to petition for re-
hearing on any matter decided in that action).
8. The deed conveying the water system property was executed on November 29,
1951. Only 16 acres of land were actually transferred through the deed, however, the
deed also conveyed:
all of the right, title, and interest of the said grantors in that certain property
... including... all rights, and privileges, and easements had, used, and en-
joyed in the operation of said System and also all water and water rights ap-
purtenant to said System and used and useful in its operation."
Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 855, 799 P.2d at 764, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (emphasis in
original).
9. Id. at 851, 799 P.2d at 761, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 681. Section 887.060 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of an easement may at any time record a notice of in-
tent to preserve the easement." CAL. CIV. CODE § 887.060 (Deering 1990).
10. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 851, 799 P.2d at 761, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The
Commission argued that CMWSI's petition for review should have been denied since
CMWSI was not an aggrieved party, however, the court held that it had jurisdiction
under section 1756 of the Public Utilities Cede. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1756 (Deering
1990).
11. Section 1756 states in pertinent part:
Within 30 days after the commission issues its decision denying the application
for a rehearing, or if the application was granted, then within 30 days after
the commission issues its decision on rehearing, the applicant may apply to
the Supreme Court of this state for a writ of certiorari or review for the pur-
pose of having the lawfulness of the original order or decision or of the order
or decision on rehearing inquired into and determined.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1756 (Deering 1990).
12. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 851-52, 799 P.2d at 761, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The
Commission argued that CMWSI could not challenge its finding that the deed granted
an easement because CMWSI was not aggrieved by the decision. CMWSI attempted to
raise claims that "by determining CMWSI's interests in the Chenoweth parcel the
1054
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ing that the factual findings about the Chenoweth's property
interests would not have res judicata effect.13 Therefore, the court
only reached the merits of CMWSI's claim that the Commission
erred in finding that they owned rights to the surface water and
wells on the private Chenoweth parcel. 14
Not only did the court take a limited view of its jurisdiction, it ap-
plied a very limited level of review. The standard of review for Com-
mission decisions is established by section 1757 of the Public Utilities
Code.15 In accordance with this section, the court's "review of Com-
mission decisions 'is generally limited to a determination whether the
Commission has regularly pursued its authority.' "16 However, the
court noted that it did have some authority to examine the factual
findings of the Commission, since any such findings not properly sup-
ported would imply that the Commission was acting outside its au-
thority.17 At first, this seems contradictory to the language of section
1757, which requires that findings of fact by the Commission be fi-
nal.18 However, the "support" required is sufficiency of uncontro-
verted evidence. The Commission's judgment on conflicting evidence
commIssion denied due process to members of the Chenoweth family" and exceeded
its jurisdiction. Id, See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 760.020, 760.040 (Deering 1990).
13. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 852 n.3, 799 P.2d at 761 n.3, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 681
n.3. "This court has recognized that when the commission exercised its judicial power,
its orders or decisions have 'the conclusive effect of res judicata as to the issues in-
volved where they are again brought into question in subsequent proceedings between
the same parties.'" Id. (quoting People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 630,
268 P.2d 723, 728 (1954)). However, the court insisted, "the commission exercises its
legislative power, not its judicial power, when it fixes rates. Therefore, its determina-
tion of the property rights is subject to relitigation in any court of law which is asked
to determine these interests." Id. (citations omitted).
14. Id at 852, 799 P.2d at 762, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
15. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757 (Deering 1990). Section 1757 provides in full:
No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Supreme Court,
but the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified by it.
The review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the com-
mission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the peti-
tioner under the Constitution of the United States or of this State.
The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be
final and shall not be subject to review except as provided in this article.
Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclu-
sions of the commission on reasonableness and discrimination.
IL
16. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 44 Cal. 3d 870,
880, 750 P.2d 787, 793, 245 Cal. Rptr. 8, 14 (1988).
17. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 864, 799 P.2d at 793, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 689. "A deci-
sion that affects the rights of a party, but has no factual support, would not be one
made in the regular pursuit of commission authority and could deny due process." Id.
18. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757 (Deering 1990). See also 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
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that would allow more than one reasonable inference is final. If the
evidence is uncontroverted, and only one reasonable inference can be
drawn that is at odds with the decision of the Commission, the deci-
sion may be overturned by the court.19
The only exception to this deferential level of review arises when
the Commission's decision is challenged on constitutional grounds.
Under those circumstances, section 1760 of the Public Utilities Code
gives the court "power to exercise its independent judgment on the
law and the facts." 20 However, the court insisted that all constitu-
tional claims raised by CMWSI were not properly before the court.
Since the Commission merely construed the deed to CMWSI when it
recognized the easement, the Chenoweth's were not denied due pro-
cess, nor was their property taken without compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment.21 In addition, CMWSI had no standing to
bring these claims.22 Therefore, the court reviewed the Commis-
sion's decision only to insure that there was sufficient uncontroverted
evidence to support the finding that the deed granted the easement
over the Chenoweth property.
In determining the validity of this decision, the court first looked
to the specific language of the 1951 deed conveying the Meeker's
water system property to the Camp Meeker Water System. The deed
conveyed only sixteen acres of real property and included all "ease-
ments had, used, and enjoyed in the operation of said System, and
also all water and water rights appurtenant to said System and used
or useful in its operations." 23 Logically, this language must refer to
water rights over a separate tenement.24 Since the CMWSI land was
not and had never been burdened by any dominant tenement, an in-
ference that the language in the deed was limited to easements over
the 16 acres on which the system stood would be unfounded. There-
fore, the court found that the deed adequately supported the Com-
NIA PROCEDURE Judgment § 221 (3d ed. 1985 ); 8 B. WrrKiN, CALFORNIA PROCEDURE
Extraordinary Writs § 249 (3d ed. 1985).
19. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 354, 362, 260 P.2d 70,
75 (1953); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 647, 401 P.2d
353, 360, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1965).
20. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1760 (Deering 1990). See also 8 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 913 (9th ed. 1988); 53 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Utili-
ties § 97 (1979).
21. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 864, 799 P.2d at 770, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 689. See also
U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 865, 799 P.3d at 770, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 690. (quoting
the deed, dated November 26, 1951, which transferred the water system to the
Chenoweths).
24. See Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 381, 121 P.2d 702, 710 (1942) "To the crea-
tion of an appurtenant easement, two tenements are necessary, a dominant one in
favor of which the obligation exists, and a servient one upon which the obligation
rests." Id.
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mission's finding that an easement was conveyed over property other
than the property then occupied by the water system.25
Next, the court found that the easements referred to in the deed
burdened the Chenoweth's private property. Section 1104 of the Civil
Code provides that:
A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates
in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose
estate is transferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such prop-
erty was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is trans-
ferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon
or completed.
2 6
When the November 26 deed was executed, the Meekers, as grantor,
also owned the adjacent land which now makes up the private Che-
noweth estate. Therefore, the easements referred to may be inferred
to be those in use over the Meekers other property.27 This inference
is especially warranted given the absence of any claimed or recog-
nized easements over any other neighboring property.28
Having determined that the private property was in fact burdened
by the easements mentioned in the deed, the court reviewed the evi-
dence certified by the Commission as adequate support for its finding
that all of the water sources on the Chenoweth property were in-
cluded. The scope of the express easement was dependent upon the
scope of the quasi-easement that the Meekers had over their own
property when they owned the system. 29 To make this determina-
tion, the court looked to the rules of easements by implication.30
Thus, as expressed by the California courts in prior cases, the scope
of such easements are not limited to the use authorized at the time of
25. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 865, 799 P.2d at 770, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1104 (Deering 1990). See generally 28 CAL. JUR. 3D § 13
(1986); 4 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Real Pr t § 452 (9th ed. 1987).
27. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 866, 799 P.2d at 770, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
28. Id. at 866 n.17, 799 P.2d at 770 n.17, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 690 n.17.
29. 28 CAL. JUR. 3D Easements and Licenses § 21 (1986). "Where the owner of two
tenements sells one of them, or the owner of an entire estate sells a portion of it, the
purchaser takes the tenement or portion sold with all the benefits and burdens that
appear at the time of sale to belong to it, as between it and the property retained by
the vendor." Id.
30. Comment b in section 484 of the Restatement of Property states:
The extent of an easement created by implication is to be inferred from the
circumstances which exist at the time of the conveyance .... Yet it does not
follow that the use authorized is to be limited to such use as was required by
the dominant tenement at that time. It is to be measured rather by such uses
as the parties might reasonably have expected from the future uses of the
dominant tenement.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 484 cmt. b (1944).
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the conveyance. 31 The court found that it was reasonable for the par-
ties to contemplate any and all uses necessary for the continued abil-
ity of the water system to serve the community.3 2 There is evidence
in the record that the Meekers were aware that their current sources
of water were inadequate for the needs of the community, even at
the time the land was conveyed.33 Therefore, there were reasonably
foreseeable uses for the entire Meeker estate beyond the then cur-
rent water sources of the system.
The parties argued that the conveyance should be limited to the
parties' intent. The Administrative Law Judge, presiding over an evi-
dentiary hearing prior to rehearing by the Commission, found sub-
stantial evidence that the parties intended to transfer only those
interests included in the sixteen acre parcel of real property.3 4 He
relied upon the testimony of the attorney who had represented the
Chenoweths in the transaction, Mr. L.G. Hitchcock, who testified
that he had met with a Commission staff member before the deed
was executed to ensure that there were no encumbrances on the pri-
vate land by the utility other than the acreage expressly owned by
CMWSI. The Commissioner assured him that this was the case, and
the parties executed the deed based upon this representation.35
Therefore, the ALJ found that the "easements used and useful in the
operation of the system," referred to in the November 26 deed, were
intended to include only those on the property actually owned by
CMWSI.36 However, the Commission and the court found that this
intent was negated by the plain language of the deed and the law of
public utilities and easements. 37 They reasoned that either an ex-
31. Fristoe v. Drapeau, 35 Cal. 2d 5, 9, 215 P.2d 729, 732 (1950). See also Faus v. Los
Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 350, 431 P.2d 849, 62 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1967) (easement assumed to
accommodate future use); Norris v. California, 261 Cal. App. 2d 41, 67 Cal. Rptr. 595
(1968) (easement construed liberally in favor of grantee).
32. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 866-67, 799 P.2d at 771, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 691. The
Commission found that the public utility had a quasi-easement onto the private land
before the conveyances "because as owners, (the Meekers] already possessed the right
to explore for and develop new water sources [on the private part of their land]." Id.
at 858-59, 799 P.2d at 766, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
33. Three months prior to the execution of the sale agreement between the
Meekers and the Chenoweths, the Commission had issued a decision where it "found
that CMWSI had inadequate water sources to serve existing and future customers, and
ordered that numerous improvements in the water supply be made." Id. at 860, 799
P.2d at 767, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
34. Id. at 857, 799 P.2d at 765, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
35. Id. There is some implication that this Commission staff member did not have
the authority to make such assurances, yet the court never discussed the parties' right
to rely on the assurances.
36. Id. at 857-58, 799 P.2d at 765, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
37. Id. at 860 n.13, 799 P.2d at 766 n.13, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 686 n.13. "The commis-
sion found the deeds to be sufficiently ambiguous to warrant consideration of some...
extrinsic evidence . . . but found the deeds themselves to be the best evidence of [the
intent of the parties]." Id.
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press or an implied easement must be read to include reasonably
foreseeable future use by the dominant tenement.38 Furthermore,
without Commission approval, the second deed, which conveyed the
private land to the Chenoweth's, could not have been valid since it
purported to convey property useful to the water system.39 After
consideration of all the evidence before the Commission, the court
found that its decision was amply supported by the record.40
III. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Camp Meeker is far less extraordinary sub-
stantively than it is procedurally. The Commission's decision regard-
ing the presence of an easement over the Chenoweth property seems
in line with both statutory and common law property principles.
However, by recognizing the Commission's jurisdiction to make such
a decision, the court significantly increased the power of the Commis-
sion beyond previously accepted limits. The Commission's power
over rate-making decisions has been considered "quasi-legislative"
and recognized as extremely broad.41 However, even these decisions
were subject to supreme court review of varying degrees depending
upon the presence of constitutional claims.42 Furthermore, these
powers have been interpreted broadly because they are viewed as
power to "regulate the relationship of the utility to the consumer."43
In Camp Meeker, the court applies this broad power to a matter be-
tween private parties because the determination of the private matter
38. Comment a in section 484 of the Restatement of Property states:
The meaning of a conveyance is fixed by the conditions surrounding its execu-
tion. That meaning cannot be added to or altered by subsequently discovered
needs. Yet the very creation of such an interest as an easement implies a con-
templation of the future by those participating in the creation .... In the
absence of language specifically negativing it, it will be assumed that the par-
ties contemplated changes in the use of the servient tenement made necessary
by the normal development in the use of the dominant tenement.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 484 cmt. a (1944).
39. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (Deering 1990) (requiring that property necessary
or useful to the public utility by disposed of only with Commission the approval of the
Public Utilities Commission). See also 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Constitutional Law § 907(b) (9th ed. 1988).
40. Camp Meeker, 51 Cal. 3d at 868, 799 P.2d at 772, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 692. "The
inferences drawn from that evidence are reasonable. The findings and conclusions are
not subject to further review." Id,
41. See 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law §§ 903-904
(9th ed. 1988).
42. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1756 (Deering 1990).
43. 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 907(a) (9th
ed. 1988).
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is merely a finding of fact incident to a rate-making decision. The
bottom line is that private parties may find an administrative agency
making final determinations regarding their private rights and inter-
ests subject only to a very limited review by the courts.
The court's implication that under these circumstances the agency
decision would not be res judicata is also a significant departure from
the law governing the Commission. Previously, all agency decisions
were considered reviewable only by petition to the California
Supreme Court.44 In the absence of that court overruling the deci-
sion, the res judicata effect was considered absolute.45 Now, how-
ever, the implication of the court's opinion is that the Chenoweths
could institute a collateral attack on the Commission's decision on
constitutional grounds. This effectively nullifies the thirty day limit
to petition for review by the supreme court. The problem in this case
was that review was sought, but by the wrong party. Because the
court did not have jurisdiction to review the constitutional claims of a
party other than the petitioner, they chose to provide an alternative
mode of redress for the interest of the private parties. However, if
this right is expressly recognized in subsequent decisions, it will sig-
nificantly undercut efforts by the legislature to make Commission
decisions final and binding.
KAREN M. EISENHAUER
B. Attorney's fees are available for representation on appeal
pursuant to section 31536 of the Government Code in
order to effect the legislative purpose behind the statute
- to remedy the financial disparity between the county
employee and the government agency in a contest for
benefits: Morcos v. Board of Retirement.
In Morcos v. Board of Retirement,' the California Supreme Court
44. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1756 (Deering 1990).
45. See 8 B. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Constitutional Law § 911 (9th
ed. 1988).
1. 51 Cal. 3d 924, 800 P.2d 543, 275 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1990). Justice Broussard wrote
the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Ea-
gleson, Arabian, and White, siting pro tern. Id. at 930, 800 P.2d at 547, 275 Cal. Rptr. at
191. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion. Md (Mosk, J., concurring).
The court heard the case of Morcos, a county employee, who applied for service-ire-
lated disability retirement after a ceiling tile fell on him while he was sitting at his
accounting desk. Id, at 926, 800 P.2d at 544, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 188. The Board of Retire-
ment of the County of Los Angeles (hereinafter the "Board") denied his application,
and Morcos' appeal to the superior court was successful. Id. The Board appealed to
the court of appeal, which held for Morcos on the merits, but refused to award him
attorney's fees. Id. at 926, 800 P.2d at 544-45, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. The supreme
court granted review to consider whether fees incurred by Morcos on appeal could be
recovered under section 31536 of the Government Code. Id at 926, 800 P.2d at 545, 275
Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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held that section 31536 of the Government Code2 provides for attor-
ney's fees3 for representation on appeal, in addition to fees incurred
at the trial court level.4 Despite a lack of state supreme court case
law on the issue,5 the court reviewed the germane lower court deci-
sions and then propagated a general rule allowing courts to6 award
attorney's fees on appeal.7 The court applied this general rule in
Morcos even though section 31536 does not explicitly provide the su-
perior court with discretionary power 8 to award attorney's fees. 9
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31536 (West 1988). Section 31536 provides in pertinent
part: "If a superior court reverses the denial by the board of an application for a retire-
ment allowance .. . or benefit, the superior court in its discretion may award reason-
able attorney's fees as costs to the [employee] who successfully appealed the denial of
such application." Id. See generally Van Hook v. Board of Retirement, 148 Cal. App.
3d 714, 196 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1983) (finding award of attorney's fees under Government
Code uniquely within court's discretion).'
3. See generally Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries. Introduc-
ing the Problem, 1986 DuKE L.J. 435 (general discussion of attorney's fees); 7 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgment § 159 (3d ed. 1985) (listing other California
statutes providing for attorney's fees); Annotation, Allowance of Attorney's Fees in
Mandamus Proceedings, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 457, 481-85 (1984) (discussing "statutes author-
izing attorney's fees pursuant to judicial review of administrative rulings"); 16 CAL.
JUR. 3D, Costs § 101 (1983); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 72 (1965).
4. Morcos, 51 Cal. 3d at 926, 800 P.2d at 544, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
5. There are no other supreme court decisions construing section 31536 as evi-
denced by the court's reliance on lower court decisions. Id. at 928, 800 P.2d at 545-46,
275 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90. The court did, however, cite a supreme court opinion award-
ing attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to section 1021.5 of the Civil Procedure Cede.
Id. at 928 n.5, 800 P.2d at 545 n.5, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 190 n.5. See generally Serrano v.
Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1982). But see Holtz v. San Francisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit Dist., 17 Cal. 3d 648, 658-59, 552 P.2d 430, 437, 131 Cal. Rptr. 646,
653 (1976) (denying attorney's fees on appeal under former section 1246.3 (now section
1036) of the of the Civil Procedure Code.
6. Winick Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1502, 232 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1986)
(interpreting Civil Cede Section 3250); Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater,
165 Cal. App. 3d 378, 211 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1985) (interpreting Civil Code Section 3496),
cert denied, 474 U.S. 1077 (1986); San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App.
3d 762, 192 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1983) (interpreting Government Code Section 54960.5)); Mu-
nicipal Court v. Bloodgood, 137 Cal. App. 3d 29, 186 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1982) (interpreting
Government Code Section 27648); Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enters., Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d
215, 168 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1980) (interpreting Corporations Code Section 317); Leaf v. Phil
Rauch, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 371, 120 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1975) (interpreting Civil Code Sec-
tion 2983.4); T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 910 (1974) (interpreting Civil Cede Section 1717); Morcos 51 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 800
P.2d at 545-46, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90 (citing Roberts v. Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 427, 106
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1973) (interpreting Welfare & Institutions Code § 10962).
7. Morcos, 51 Cal. 3d at 929, 800 P.2d at 547, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191. See generally
20 C.J.S. Costs § 181 (1990) (discussing substantive laws, statutes, and rules authorizing
attorney's fees on appeal); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Costs § 101 (1983) (same).
8. See generally 20 C.J.S. Costs § 181 (1990) (discussing principle that court discre-
tion to award attorney's fees creates eligibility rather than entitlement to fees).
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The court also held that barring recovery of attorney's fees on ap-
peal under section 31536 would contravene the intent of the legisla-
ture10 and the purpose of the statute.' The legislature's express
intent was to narrow the disparity in litigation resources between
employees on fixed incomes seeking retirement benefits,12 and gov-
ernment agencies13 employing "house counsel."14 The court con-
cluded that the purpose of the statute "would be lost if the
government were free to pursue appellate review with its own coun-
sel while the applicant is forced to incur nonrecoverable fees in de-
fending the trial court's decision."15 Appealing to express legislative
intent, the court awarded attorney's fees to Morcos for costs incurred
on appeal despite the statute's silence on this issue.' 6
The court's decision is in accord with legislative intent to reduce
the financial disparity between those seeking to procure benefits and
government agencies opposing such recovery. By allowing an em-
ployee to recover attorney's fees on appeal, the court precludes the
government agency from exhausting the employee's resources
through the appellate process and thereby securing government vic-
tory by default. This ability to recover attorney's fees may encourage
a county employee to pursue earned benefits to which he is entitled
where he would otherwise be financially unable to do so. 17
Furthermore, the decision is not inconsistent with the statutory
language of section 31536. The statute allows "the superior court in
its discretion [to] award reasonable attorney's fees.., to the member
... who successfully appealed the denial of such application."' 8 Cer-
tainly a denial of an application for benefits is not successfully ap-
pealed until the appellate process is exhausted and the benefits are
awarded to the employee.19 Employees seeking benefits should not
9. "IT]he superior court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees
." CAL. GOV'T CODE'§ 31536 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
10. Morcos, 51 Cal. 3d at 926, 800 P.2d at 544, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
11. Id.
12. See generally 20 C.J.S. Counties § 119 (1990) (discussing county pension and re-
tirement programs).
13. Morcos, 51 Cal. 3d at 929, 800 P.2d at 546, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
14. Black's Law Dictionary defines "house counsel" as a "[lawyer who acts as at-
torney for business though carried as an employee of that business and not as an in-
dependent lawyer." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 666 (5th ed. 1979).
15. Morcos, 51 Cal. 3d at 929, 800 P.2d at 547, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
16. Id. at 929-30, 800 P.2d at 547, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
17. See generally Nicyper, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: Dis-
couraging Citizens From Challenging Administrative Agency Decisions, 33 AM. U.L.
REV. 775 (1984) (requiring success on the merits to qualify for attorney's fees provides
less incentive for a citizen to challenge agency regulations).
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31536 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
19. This was also the opinion of Justice Johnson in the appellate court decision.
See Morcos v. Board of Retirement, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1095, 259 Cal. Rptr. 106, 115
(1989) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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be financially penalized because an agency wrongly contests the ben-
efit. The court's decision in Morcos prevents such a penalty and may
well provide strong support for awarding attorney's fees on appeal
with respect to various other statutory sections.
DARREN M. CAMPF
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. A litigant's failure to object to a trial court's statement of
decision constitutes a waiver and the appellate court
may infer findings favoring the prevailing party: In re
Marriage of Arceneaux.
The California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Arceneaux,'
announced that failure to bring alleged defects in the court's state-
ment of decision to the attention of the trial court constitutes a
waiver of the defect on appeal.2 Therefore, the appellate court may
make implied findings as to those issues in favor of the party who
prevailed at the trial level.3 In Arceneaux, the supreme court inter-
preted the statutory language of sections 632 and 634 of the Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure as defining a two part process which
must be satisfied to prevent a waiver: (1) the litigant must request a
1. 51 Cal. 3d 1130, 800 P.2d 1227, 275 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1990). Justice Mosk wrote
the unanimous opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Brous-
sard, Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard and Arabian concurred.
2. Id. at 1132, 800 P.2d at 1227, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 797. Appellant husband in a dis-
solution action requested a statement of decision from the trial court. The court al-
lowed the wife to prepare a proposed statement and serve it upon the husband. The
court signed a modified copy of the statement. The husband did not object to either of
the statements.
On appeal, the husband claimed that the statement of decision had not decided two
controverted matters and was inadequate in three additional ways. The court of ap-
peal held that the appellant waived his right to raise these matters because he did not
object to the statement of decision at the trial level and failed to move for a new trial
or to vacate judgment. Therefore, the court of appeal inferred that the trial court de-
cided these issues in favor of the wife because she was the prevailing party. The
supreme court granted review.
3. 1& at 1133-34, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The court asserted that
"[a] judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all ...
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness." I& at 1133, 800 P.2d at 1228, 275
Cal. Rptr. at 798 (citing Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 507, 595 P.2d
619, 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1979) (court views and resolves factual matters in favor
of prevailing party)); Munoz v. Olin, 24 Cal. 3d 629, 635-36, 596 P.2d 1143, 1147, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 727, 731 (1979) (ruling that all legitimate and reasonable inferences [must be] in-
dulged in to uphold the verdict if possible").
1063
statement of decision as to specific issues, 4 and (2) the litigant must
bring to the court's attention any deficiencies within the statement to
"avoid implied findings on appeal favorable to the judgment."5 The
husband in Arceneaux satisfied only the first requirement and
thereby waived his right to object to the deficiencies in the statement
of decision upon appeal. 6 Thus, the court of appeal correctly inferred
that the trial court decided in favor of the wife on all issues not ex-
plicitly dealt with in the statement of decision.7
4. This half of the test was extracted from section 632 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. In pertinent part, section 632 reads:
In superior, municipal, and justice courts, upon the trial of a question of fact
by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be re-
quired. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual
and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at
trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial.... After a party
has requested such a statement, any party may make proposals as to the con-
tent of the statement of decision.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1991). See generally CAL. R. CT. 232(b) (re-
garding proposals following request for statement of decision); 7 B. WrrKIN, CALIFoR-
NIA PROCEDURE Drial § 396 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (a party may request a
statement of decision specifying the controverted issues); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 43
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (duties of the appellate court).
5. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1134, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 799. This por-
tion of the rule derives from section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In pertinent
part, section 634 states:
When a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue, or if the
statement is ambiguous and the record shows that the omission or ambiguity
was brought to the attention of the trial court either prior to entry of judg-
ment or in conjunction with a motion under Section 657 [motion for a new
trial] or 663 [motion to vacate the judgment], it shall not be inferred on appeal
or upon a motion under Section 657 or 663 that the trial court decided in favor
of the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1991). See generally 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE Appeal § 311 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (where an objection could have
been made but was, not, appellate court will ordinarily not consider defects); 7 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Trial § 399 (3d ed. 1985); CAL. R. CT. 232(d) (objec-
tions must be made within. 15 days after service of proposed statement of decision and
judgment).
In 1959, section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended to abrogate the doc-
trine of "implied findings," which had allowed inferences to be made by the reviewing
court in favor of the prevailing party upon material issues which had not been decided
by the trial court. The amendment to the statute allowed the appellant to make a
written request for a specific finding on a particular issue, thereby circumventing the
inference that all issues had been decided in favor of the prevailing party.
This same theory was adopted in later versions of section 634. Currently, this sec-
tion allows the party to use any method to bring the defect to the trial court's atten-
tion including a request for a specific finding. 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
Trial § 389 (3d ed. 1985); See also id. at § 388.
In the instant case, the appellant attempted to equate his request for a statement of
decision to a request for a special or specific finding. The court struck down this con-
tention. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1135-36, 800 P.2d at 1230, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
6. Id. at 1132, 800 P.2d at 1227-28, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98.
7. Id. at 1133, 800 P.2d at 1228, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 798. See also In re Marriage of
Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1984) (without a showing that an omis-
sion in the statement of decision was pointed out to the trial court, inference arises
that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to omitted issues).
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Relying on old case law and former versions of the applicable stat-
utes, the appellant contended that a party may either request a state-
ment of decision as to issues in the case or bring the deficiencies in
the statement of decision to the trial court's attention in order to
avoid implied findings in favor of the judgment.8 Section 632 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, however, explicitly requires the court to is-
sue a statement of decision if requested to do so by a party at trial,9
and section 634 mandates that a party bring to the attention of the
trial court any ambiguity or omission within the statement.10 The
supreme court concluded that taken together, these statutes require
notice of any deficiencies be brought to the attention of the trial
court as a prerequisite to appellate review of the particular issues."
Without such notice, a party is barred from arguing these points for
the first time on appeal,12 and the appellate court may assume that
8. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1134, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 799. Some of
the cases the appellant cited included references to an archaic version of section 634 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This version had no provision mandating that objections
be made to any particular finding to avoid an inference on appeal in favor of the judg-
ment. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1137, 800 P.2d at 1231, 275 Cal. Rptr at 801.'
Other cases cited relied upon pre-1981 versions of Sections 632 and 634. Prior to
1981, section 632 required that findings of fact and conclusions of law be made. Id at
1134-35, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 799. See generally 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate
Review § 460 (1973 & Supp. 1991); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 609 (1955 & Supp. 1991) (defining
findings of fact and conclusions of law).
At the same time, section 634 required that any omission, ambiguity or conflict
within the finding be brought to the attention of the trial court. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d
at 1134-35, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 799. Thus, the litigant still had the duty
to bring these deficiencies to the attention of the trial court, and any conclusion other-
wise would have been a misreading of the statute. Finally, the appellant cited post-
1981 cases which inferred that an objection was not necessary. The supreme court dis-
missed these cases as an incorrect reading of the statute. Id. at 1137-38, 800 P.2d at
1231, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 4 for text of the
statute.
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 5 for text of the
statute.
11. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1134, 800 P.2d at 1229, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
12. See generally McKeon v. Hastings College of Law, 185 Cal. App. 3d 877, 230
Cal. Rptr. 176 (1986); 4 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 135 (1973 & Supp. 1991) ("Ob-
jection to a misnomer cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."); 4 CAL. JUR. 3D
Appellate Review § 136 (1973) (technical irregularities not objected to at trial will not
be reviewed on appeal, unless they affect substantial rights); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trial
§ 1267 (1975) (objections not considered on appeal unless presented to trial court); 5
AM. JUR. 2D Appeal & Error §§ 545, 635 (1962 & Supp. 1991) (reviewing court generally
only considers issues on appeal which the trial court considered).
See also State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio St. 2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975); State v. Morris, 42
Ohio St. 2d 307, 329 N.E.2d 85 (1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976) (appellate court
will not consider error when it could have been, but was not, called to the attention of
the trial court).
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all pertinent facts or issues were decided in favor of the prevailing
party at the trial court level. The court reasoned that any ruling not
requiring this notice would render section 634 a "nullity."'13
At the cost of discounting valid contentions by the husband-appel-
lant, the Arceneaux court strictly adhered to the language of the stat-
utes. The court premised its decision upon the need to direct lower
courts on this matter and upon a desire to promote fair advocacy.
The court suspected that the appellant's attorney knew of the defects
in the statement of decision prior to the judgment and planned to
take advantage of them on appeal.14 This tactic seriously hindered
the trial court from correcting the error. The court feared that such
a practice would allow parties to appeal first on procedural issues and
then again later upon substantive issues.15 Allowing this type of
double appeal would further congest the courts, wasting judicial re-
sources and tax dollars. The Arceneaux ruling furthers society's in-
terest in "expeditious determination of appeals,"'16 by creating an
incentive for both clients and attorneys to remedy problems at the
trial court level.
CYNTHIA EMRY
B. State courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
issues of ownership or possession in connection with
Indian property, and Indian tribal officials, who
generally enjoy broad sovereign immunity, may be
subject to tort liability for committing acts outside of
territorial boundaries: Boisclair v. Superior Court.
In Boisclair v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered two issues: 1) whether a state court may assume jurisdiction
to adjudicate a claim involving the issue of ownership or possession of
13. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1136, 800 P.2d at 1230, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
14. See generally 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 311 (3d ed. 1985
& Supp. 1990) ("[Ilt is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party [to allow an
appellant's attorney] to take advantage of an error on appeal."); Sommer v. Martin, 55
Cal. App. 603, 204 P. 33 (1921) (ruling that it is appellant's duty to bring any allegedly
violated legal principle to trial court's attention).
According to rule 232(f) of the California Rules of Court, the potential appellant
may make proposals to the proposed statement of decision, and the court may grant a
hearing to discuss such proposals. Thus, many problems may be remedied at this level
through the use of such built-in procedural safeguards.
15. Arceneaux, 51 Cal. 3d at 1138, 800 P.2d at 1232, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
16. Id.
1. Boisclair v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 1140, 801 P.2d 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1990). Justice Mosk wrote the unanimous opinion of the court. The dispute con-
cerned a granite company's claim for declaratory relief alleging that a particular road
traversing defendant's land was either public or subject to an easement possessed by
the company. The granite company also sought damages and injunctive relief because
the defendant allegedly obstructed access to the road. Id.
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Indian tribal property,2 and 2) whether Indian tribal officers are sub-
ject to tort liability when acting outside of Indian territorial bounda-
ries.3 The court held section 1360(b) of the United States Code4 bars
a state from adjudicating claims involving the ownership of Indian
trust land, therefore, the superior court's assumption of jurisdiction
was improper.5 Furthermore, the court held that tribal Indians may
be subject to tort liability for acts committed outside of territorial
boundaries because sovereign immunity applies only to acts commit-
ted within tribal boundaries.6
Although six state courts,7 including California's, have jurisdiction
over civil conflicts emanating from Indian territory and involving In-
dian litigants,8 section 1360(b) expressly precludes state jurisdiction
to adjudicate the ownership of Indian trust land.9 Section 1360(b)
provides in pertinent part that nothing in the federal statute "shall
confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceed-
ings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of [Indian]
property or any interest therein."'1o The court interpreted 1360(b) to
preclude state jurisdiction where one possible result of impending lit-
igation would be that the property at issue was indeed Indian trust
property." Authoritative support for the court's interpretation in-
cluded: generally accepted canons of construction for Indian statutes
and treaties, applicable statutory language, and the purpose of the
statute.' 2 The court reasoned that because Congress enacted section
1360(b) to protect Indian interests, the statute should be liberally
2. Indian tribal property is defined as "[p]roperty in which an Indian tribe has a
legally enforceable interest. Such term refers to real property, the title to which is
vested in the United States but held in trust for the Indian tribe." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 395 (5th ed. 1983). See generally 42 C.J.S. Indians § 29 (1944) (discussing In-
dian reservations and grants to tribes); Ulmer, Tribal Property: Defining the
Parameters of the Federal Trust Relationship Under the Non-Intercourse Act: Catawba
Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 12 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 101 (1985).
3. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1144-45, 801 P.2d at 307, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976).
5. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1146, 801 P.2d at 308, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 65. See generally
Royster & Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal
Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989).
6. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1158, 801 P.2d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
7. The six states include: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1976).
8. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1146, 801 P.2d at 308, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
9. Id. See generally Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1984).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976).
11. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1152, 801 P.2d at 312, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
12. Id.
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construed in favor of Indian litigants.' 3 Furthermore, if Indian prop-
erty interests were not protected from state jurisdiction, legal
processes such as taxation and civil judgments would ultimately oper-
ate to exhaust Indian realty ownership and possession.14 After decid-
ing that the "complete preemption doctrine" was applicable in
Boisclair, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was a federal
claim arising under federal law.15
Although Indian tribes possess broad sovereign immunity from
lawsuits initiated in state courts, tribal officials may be subject to
civil liability for committing acts outside Indian territorial bounda-
ries.16 The Boisclair court stated that if the acts of the Indian de-
fendants "were nothing more than those appropriate for excluding
[persons] from tribal territory, and were taken within tribal bounda-
ries, the Indian defendants acted with[in] the scope of their sovereign
immunity."' 7 After stating that the facts before the court were insuf-
ficient to determine whether the Indian defendants had exceeded the
scope of their sovereign immunity, the court remanded the case for
further elaboration of the facts in connection with the plaintiff's alle-
gations of Indian misconduct.s
The court's decision in Boisclair that the state superior court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory lan-
guage of section 1360(b). Adjudication of the easement or plaintiff's
alleged public right to the road would be improper because section
1360(b) precludes states from determining "the ownership or right to
possession of [Indian trust] property or any interest therein."19
Although no such bar is presented to a plaintiff in federal court,20 it
is likely that such a plaintiff will be required to make a stronger evi-
dentiary showing than would be necessary in state court. This con-
clusion follows logically from two premises: (1) the federal
government's relationship with the Indians and their trust land is a
fiduciary one,21 and (2) pursuant to generally accepted statutory con-
13. Id at 1153, 801 P.2d at 312, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
14. Id. at 1154, 801 P.2d at 313, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
15. Id at 1156, 801 P.2d at 315, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 72 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)).
16. Id. at 1158, 801 P.2d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 73. See generally 38 CAL. JUR. 3D
Indians § (1977).
17. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1158, 801 P.2d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (emphasis ad-
ded). It is clear from the language used by the court, that the only acts by Indians that
will be protected by sovereign immunity are those committed within the boundaries of
the tribal reservation; regardless of whether acts committed outside of tribal bounda-
ries could be construed as being necessary to the best interests of the reservation.
18. Id, at 1158, 801 P.2d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976).
20. See generally 65 A.L.R. FED. 649 § 4 (1983) (discussing federal jurisdiction over
Indians in general).
21. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1149, 801 P.2d at 310, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (citing Semi-
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struction, statutes dealing with such Indian matters are to be "liber-
ally construed" in favor of the Indians.22
The court's ruling that tribal officials may be subject to tort liabil-
ity for acts committed outside of Indian tribal boundaries comports
with previous case authority2 3 and sound public policy. If Indian offi-
cials or members are free to commit acts on non-Indian lands under
the protection of sovereign immunity, the public would be vulnerable
to a plethora of civil damages without any recourse. The court's
holding prevents this possibility by effectively foreclosing the defense
of sovereign immunity for acts committed outside of Indian tribal
boundaries. The court's holding creates a bright line rule by deter-
mining the applicability of sovereign immunity based on whether the
Indian acts were committed within or outside of Indian tribal bound-
aries. Indian officials, who dare to engage in activities outside of In-
dian Territory, must bear the risk of litigious, America and the
possibility of tort liability.
DARREN M. CAMPF
C. The filing of a timely claim against one public entity
does not preclude an incapacitated plaintif from filing
late claims against other public entities: Draper v. City of
Los Angeles.
In Draper v. City of Los Angeles,' the supreme court granted a per-
sonal injury plaintiff relief from a claim filing requirement against a
municipal defendant. Draper is significant to practicing attorneys for
the drastically different approaches the justices took to resolve the is-
sue, and the attitudes expressed regarding the conduct of the lawyers
involved.2
On June 11, 1987, a car driven by a high school student struck and
nole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)). See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D
Indians § 5 (1968) (discussing the Indian's relationship to the federal government).
22. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1153, 801 P.2d at 312, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 69. See, e.g., Me-
nominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 n.2 (1968).
23. Boisclair, 51 Cal. 3d at 1157, 801 P.2d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (citing Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337
U.S. 682 (1949)).
1. 52 Cal. 3d 502, 802 P.2d 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1990) (en banc).
2. No majority of the court concurred in either the lead or dissenting opinions.
Justice Broussard joined in Justice Mosk's lead opinion, while Justices Kennard and
Arabian concurred only in the judgment reached. Chief Justice Lucas and Justice
Panelli concurred with Justice Eagleson's dissenting opinion.
Draper makes for poor precedent because the decision rests largely on the facts of
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seriously injured nineteen year old Gayle Draper as she crossed the
street using a crosswalk. 3 Draper remained in a coma over a month
after the collision, and could not meaningfully communicate when
she finally emerged from the coma. 4 Asserting that flaws in the in-
tersection led to the accident, an attorney filed suit on Draper's be-
half against the Los Angeles Unified School District in August of
1987.5 The published facts do not reveal if Draper ever authorized
the filing of this claim, which was rejected the following month.6
On November 4, 1987, new counsel retained by Draper filed suit
against the City of Los Angeles and other municipal entities, includ-
ing the school district.7 However, the statute of limitations for this
type of tort claim had expired nearly two months earlier.8 Draper
argued that her severe brain injuries and extensive hospitalization
excused her tardiness, but the superior court denied her claim be-
cause the time limit to petition for such a late claim had also
expired.9
the case, which the majority opinion characterizes as both "peculiar" and "unusual."
Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 504, 507, 802 P.2d at 368, 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866, 868.
Justice Eagleson, in his dissenting opinion, concludes: "This case [Draper] is an ab-
erration and should remain one." Id at 517, 802 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (Ea-
gleson, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Eagleson "caution[s] against any future
reliance on this case." Id
3. Id at 504, 802 P.2d at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866. The accident occurred in Pan-
orama City, a district in the City of Los Angeles. Id
4. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion indicates -precisely how long
Draper could not talk. The majority opinion describes her emerging from the coma
immobile and thus totally dependent upon others to perform essential physical activi-
ties. Her only conversation abilities were comprised of "'yes-no responses' with 'lap
board conununication,'" and the identification of common objects. Id at 504, 802 P.2d
at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
5. The published opinions do not clearly explain the relationship between the at-
torney, George L. Hecker, and Draper. It is unclear whether Hecker was ever actually
retained to file the claims. Id at 508, 802 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 868. Hecker
filed the suit on August 3, 1987, five months before Draper's discharge from the hospi-
tal. Id at 505-06, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
6. Hecker's suit was rejected on September 11, 1987. Neither published opinion
states the reason for this rejection. Id at 505-06, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
7. Id at 505, 802 P.2d at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Draper retained counsel on
October 23, 1987. Id at 516, 802 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (Eagleson, J.,
dissenting).
8. The applicable statute of limitations allowed Draper one hundred days from
the date of the accident within which to file a personal injury claim against municipal
entities. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.2 (West 1987). This period expired September 17,
1987, approximately one and one half months before Draper filed suit.
The court noted that the state legislature has lengthened this statute of limitations
to six months for accidents arising on or after January 1, 1988. Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at
505, 802 P.2d at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866. 1987 Cal. Stat. 1208. See 3 B. WITKIN, CAL.
PROCEDURE, Actions §§ 187, 204-06 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990); C.E.B., CAL. GOV'T TORT
LIABILITY PRACTICE §§ 5.51-5.62 (Supp. 1990).
9. Draper missed the one hundred day statute of limitations for her tort claim, as
well as the forty-five day statute of limitations available to petition for the presenta-
tion of a late claim. Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 505, 802 P.2d at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.6(c) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
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In January 1988, pursuant to section 946.6(c)(3) of the Government
Code,10 Draper petitioned the court to allow late filing in her case."
The defendants countered that this motion was not adequately sup-
ported by the evidence offered.12 In March 1988, the hearing was
continued to allow Draper to collect sufficient medical evidence of
her incapacity.13 At the request of Draper's counsel, trial was to re-
convene June 6, 1988.14 However, Draper's counsel submitted no new
evidence before this date, and on June 6, Draper's counsel failed to
appear in court. Accordingly, the court denied her petition.15
One week later,16 Draper filed for reconsideration of the denial
claiming relief due to excusable mistake and neglect, pursuant to sec-
tion 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17 The superior court denied
the motion, holding that the first claim filed against the school dis-
trict proved that Draper's medical condition did not prevent her pur-
suit of legal action, and thus her incapacitation could not have caused
the late filing.' 8 In August 1988, Draper appealed the denial of her
section 946.6(c)(3) and 473 motions.19 Finding no abuse of discretion
by the superior court, the court of appeal affirmed both denials.20
10. Government Code section 946.6(c)(3) states in pertinent part that the court
shall grant relief if "[tihe person who sustained the alleged injury ... was physically or
mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presen-
tation of the claim and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 946.6(c)(3) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
11. Draper supported her petition with a declaration from her attorney that the
accident seriously damaged her brain and that she remained hospitalized throughout
the entire filing time period. In response to the charge that the petition required qual-
ified medical support, she submitted a declaration by one of her physicians. Draper, 52
Cal. 3d at 505, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
12. Id. Justice Eagleson agreed with the defendant's attack on the evidence
presented, describing it as a non-medical, "bare assertion" in a "self-serving declara-
tion." Id, at 510, 802 P.2d at 372, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70 (Eagleson, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Mosk conceded that the evidence presented "was somewhat conclusory," though
minimally acceptable. I& at 507-08, 802 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
13. Id, at 505, 802 P.2d.at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67.
14. The date for the resumption of trial was initially set for June 17, 1988, but
Draper's counsel requested the hearing date be moved up to June 6, 1988. I& at 510,
802 P.2d at 372, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
15. Id, at 506, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
16. The precise date was June 15, 1987. I at 506, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
867.
17. Id, Section 473 allows a court to grant relief to a party from a judgment aris-
ing from "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 473 (West 1990). ,
18. Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 506, 802 P.2d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
19. Id,
20. Id.
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Consequently, Draper requested review by the supreme court.2 '
The supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision and
granted Draper relief from the filing deadline requirement.22 The
lead opinion, authored by Justice Mosk, held that Draper's post-acci-
dent condition had incapacitated her during the. filing period,
preventing the filing of a timely claim. 23
Justice Mosk's opinion focused on section 946.6(c)(3) of the Gov-
ernment Code. He framed the issue as whether Draper was incapaci-
tated by the accident and whether her injuries caused her failure to
file on time, and answers both questions affirmatively.24 To best en-
sure the ability of disabled victims to exercise their right to pursue
valid claims in the courts, Justice Mosk contended that remedial stat-
utes deserve broad interpretation.25
In sharp contrast, Justice Eagleson's dissenting opinion centered on
very different issues. Foremost, his dissent stressed that in an appeal
on a procedural matter the proper level of review is not de novo, but
abuse of discretion.26 Emphasizing the inadequacy of the evidence
before the trial court,27 Justice Eagleson found no indication of abuse
of discretion, and thus advocated affirming the court of appeal's
decision.28
21. The supreme court granted review on November 16, 1989. 90 Cal. Tort Rptr. 5
(Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1990).
22. Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 509, 802 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
23. Id, at 508-09, 802 P.2d at 370-71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
24. Id. at 506-07, 802 P.2d at 370, 376 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
25. Id at 507, 802 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 867. To support his holding, Justice
Mosk cited to Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist., 42 Cal. 3d 270, 273-74,
721 P.2d 71, 73, 228 Cal. Rptr. 190, 192 (1986); Viles v. California, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 32-33,
423 P.2d 818, 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 672 (1967); and Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66
Cal. 2d 468, 479-80, 426 P.2d 753, 760-61, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249, 256-57 (1967) (referring to
the policy of liberal interpretation of statutory language to protect minors and to grant
relief whenever possible).
26. Justice Eagleson laments that "the standard of review is not even mentioned
in the lead opinion." Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 511, 802 P.2d at 372, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 870
(Eagleson, J., dissenting). Further, he writes:
The only way the lead opinion can reach its result is to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court. Of course, doing so requires disregard for the long-
established rule that a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court on petitions to file late claims .... The lead opinion sub
silentio ignores decades of California law and proposes the radical new rule
that trial court determinations under section 946.6(c)(3) are subject in every
case to de novo review in the appellate courts.
Id. at 511, 802 P.2d at 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
27. As part of his attack on Justice Mosk's opinion, Justice Eagleson announced:
"The lead opinion also errs by relying in large part on the facts not before the trial
court." I& at 511, 802 P.2d at 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
Hence, the dissent portrays the lead opinion as unfairly criticizing the trial judge for
not considering facts not yet a part of the record. Id (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
28. "The evidence does not remotely support the conclusion that the trial court
abused its discretion." Id at 517, 802 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (Eagleson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Eagleson resolutely stated: "We should not substitute our judg-
ment for that of the trial court. We should uphold the trial court's determination
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Moreover, the dissenting opinion closely examined and castigated
the conduct of Draper's attorneys. Justice Eagleson eviscerated the
excuses that Draper's lawyers offered for failing to appear on the
date they requested for the continued hearing,29 and for the delays in
obtaining medical evidence.3 0 Thus, with respect to Draper's asser-
tion of excusable neglect in filing late, Justice Eagleson responded
that "the facts tell a tale of sloppy practice. There was no excusable
neglect, just neglect." 31
By supporting the judgment in Draper's favor without filing con-
curring opinions, Justices Kennard and Arabian did not disclose their
reasoning. However, it seems fair to speculate that the severity of
Draper's injuries swayed these two justices to rule in her favor.
Likewise, in a footnote, Justice Mosk hinted that the tragic facts sur-
rounding the accident strongly influenced the outcome of the case.32
However, the dissent avows, "If an ounce of the milk of human kind-
ness courses in anyone's veins, it flows in sympathy toward this
grievously injured plaintiff. She is a victim, however, not of the judi-
cial process, but of incompetent counsel."33
BENJAMIN GROSS SHATZ
under Code of Civil Procedure section 973 as did the Court of Appeal." Id. at 515, 802
P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
29. Justice Eagleson does not allow the attorneys to shift the blame to their "cal-
endar clerk," charging that "ample indications [existed] in the record that counsel
knew the correct hearing date ...." Id, at 512-13, 802 P.2d at 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 871
(Eagleson, J., dissenting).
30. Justice Eagleson carefully scrutinizes the contentions made by the attorneys,
their administrative assistant, and their law clerk. Finding no way to harmonize these
with their previous statements, with the messenger service delivery slips, or with local
traffic patterns, he concludes "counsel gambled on rushing to meet a deadline and he
failed." Id. at 513-14, 802 P.2d at 374-75, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72 (Eagleson, J.,
dissenting).
31. Draper, 52 Cal. 3d at 515, 802 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (Eagleson, J.,
dissenting). "It is contrary to common notions of law practice to conclude that plain-
tiff's counsel acted with the prudence of a reasonable attorney. 'It is not the purpose
of remedial statutes to grant relief from defaults which are the result of inexcusable
neglect of parties or their attorneys ....' " Id at 515, 802 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
873 (Eagleson, J., dissenting) (citing Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 3d 468,
478, 426 P.2d 753, 759, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249, 255 (1967)).
32. Justice Mosk "reiterate[s] that the evidence in support of the motion for relief
from the claim-filing requirements was the minimum acceptable, and in less peculiar
and compelling circumstances might well not suffice." Id at 508 n.5, 802 P.2d 370 n.5,
276 Cal. Rptr. 868 n.5.
33. Id. at 510, 802 P.2d at 371-72, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
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D. A settlement offer made pursuant to section 998 of the
California Civil Procedure Code is not revoked by a
counteroffer, and if the offer is served by mail, the 30-day
period for acceptance of the settlement offer is extended
pursuant to section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Poster v. Southern California Rapid Transit District.
In Poster v. Southern California Rapid Transit District,' the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was presented with two issues arising out of a
settlement offer 2 made pursuant to section 998 of the California Civil
Procedure Code.3 First, the court considered whether a section 998
offer is revoked by a counter-offer, 4 and secondly, whether section
1. 52 Cal. 3d 266, 801 P.2d 1072, 276 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1990). While a passenger on
the defendant's bus, Gregory Poster, the plaintiff, was beaten, thrown off the bus and
run over by the vehicle. He filed a personal injury lawsuit and, on December 11, 1987,
sent the defendant an offer by mail to settle the case for $150,000. The defendant con-
tinued its attempts to negotiate with the plaintiff, submitting two counter offers which
the plaintiff did not accept. Finally on January 12, 1988, 32 days after the plaintiff's
initial settlement offer, the defendant agreed to accept. At first the plaintiff acknowl-
edged the acceptance as effective, but he soon notified the defendant that he would not
honor the agreement. After the defendant submitted a motion to enforce the settle-
ment agreement, the question was presented for hearing before the trial court. The
plaintiff's key argument was that the defendant's continued negotiations after the set-
tlement offer constituted counter offers which revoked the plaintiff's offer. The trial
court found that the defendant properly accepted the offer, stating that the defend-
ant's continued bargaining was merely settlement negotiation, not a counter offers
which would revoke the original offer. The court of appeal held that counter offers do
not automatically revoke settlement offers made pursuant to section 998 of the Civil
Procedure Code, but that the defendant's acceptance was too late because it was made
after the 30-day statutory period for acceptance had expired. The court of appeal
found that section 1013 of the Civil Procedure Code which concerns service by mail
and extends response periods by five days, does not apply to section 998 offers. The
supreme court subsequently granted review. Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 781 P.2d 1, 263 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1989). Justice Broussard authored the opinion of
the unanimous court, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard, and Arabian.
2. For a discussion of the formation of compromise agreements, see 15A AM. JUR.
2d Compromise & Settlement §§ 7-11 (1976 & Supp. 1991); 15A C.J.S. Compromise &
Settlement § 7 (1967).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998(b) (West Supp. 1991). Section 998(b) states in per-
tinent part:
Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial, any party may serve an
offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be
taken in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. . . . If
the offer is not accepted prior to trial or within 30 days after it is made,
whichever occurs first, it shall be deemed withdrawn ....
Id. For a general overview of section 998 offers, see B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE Proceedings Without Trial §§ 57-65 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D
Compromise, Settlement & Release §§ 65-66 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
4. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 268, 801 P.2d at 1072, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 321. For a discus-
sion of revocation of settlement offers, see 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pro-
ceedings Without Trial § 61 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise
& Settlement § 9 (1976 & Supp. 1991); 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 8 (1967);
Note, Revocation of Section 998 Offers: TM Cobb v. Superior Court, 19 U.S.F. L. REV.
1074
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
1013 of the California Civil Procedure Code5 is applicable to a section
998 offer that is served by mail, thereby extending the 30-day statu-
tory acceptance period for section 998 offers by five days?6 Justice
Broussard, writing for the unanimous court, declared that a section
998 offer is not revoked by a counter offer, but remains open for ac-
ceptance until deemed withdrawn under the statute or withdrawn by
the offeror.7 Additionally, the court ruled that section 1013 applies to
section 998 offers that are served by mail, thus in the instant case ex-
tending the statutory 30-day acceptance period to 35 days.8 Because
the plaintiff's mailed settlement offer had not been revoked or with-
drawn, and the defendants had accepted the offer 32 days after re-
ceiving it, the supreme court declared that the settlement agreement
should be enforced.9
By concluding that counter offers do not revoke section 998 offers,
the Poster court believed it was acting consistently with the legisla-
tive purpose behind the enactment of the statute-the important
state policy of encouraging settlements. According to the court, per-
283 (1985); Posner, Conflicting Appellate Decisions: Confusion Over 998 Revocability,
L.A. Daily J., June 17, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1013(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). Section 1013(a) states in
pertinent part:
In case of service by mail ... [t]he service is complete at the time of the de-
posit, but any prescribed period of notice and any right or duty to do any act
or make any response within any prescribed period or on a date certain after
the service of such document served by mail shall be extended five days if the
place of address is within the State of California ....
Id. The defendant's address was located within the State of California.
6. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 272, 801 P.2d at 1075, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324. This article
will refer to the period of extension granted by section 1013 asfive days because in the
case at hand the offer was mailed to an address in California. If the offer had been
mailed to an address outside of the state, the period of extension would have been
longer. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1013(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). For a general dis-
cussion of section 1013 and the extension of time for response where a notice or paper
is served by mail, see 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Process, Notices and Subpoenas § 88 (1979 &
Supp. 1991); 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 769 (3d ed. 1985); 6 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Proceedings Without Trial § 25 (3d ed. 1985).
Although the defendant objected to the court of appeal's consideration of the section
1013 issue because the plaintiff failed to question the timeliness of the defendant's ac-
ceptance at trial, the supreme court agreed to address the question because the court
of appeal had "thrown into doubt" the applicability of section 1013 to section 998 of-
fers. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 273 n.3, 801 P.2d at 1076 n.3, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 325 n.3. Be-
cause the court ruled to uphold the agreement, the Poster court did not believe it
necessary to discuss whether the plaintiff would have been able to assert this defense
if the court had ruled that section 1013 did not apply. Id.
7. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 272, 801 P.2d at 1075, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
8. Id. at 274, 801 P.2d at 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
9. Id.
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mitting negotiations (including counter offers) to continue during the
statutory 30-day acceptance period would facilitate settlement, while
declaring that counter offers terminate section 998 offers could have
a negative effect on the process of compromise. 10 Although tradi-
tional contract law states that counter offers revoke offers, 1 the
court refused to follow that principle due to the court's earlier ruling
in TM. Cobb Company, Inc. v. Superior Court 12 that traditional con-
tract law principles should only be applied to section 998 offers where
the application would be consistent with the legislative purpose be-
hind the statute.' 3 In reaching their decision, the Poster court specif-
ically disaffirmed Glende Motor Company v. Superior Court,14 in
which the appeals court had relied on traditional contract law to de-
clare that nonstatutory counter offers terminate section 998 offers. 15
While the Glende Motor court had attempted to preserve the oppor-
tunity for compromise during the 30-day acceptance period by em-
phasizing that not all negotiations constitute counter offers,16 the
Poster court believed that if the Glende Motor decision were followed
it would discourage settlement and promote uncertainty concerning
which communications do in fact constitute counter offers.17
In determining that section 1013 is applicable to section 998 offers
and extends the statutory period of acceptance by five days, the court
10. Id. at 271, 801 P.2d at 1075, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1981). See also 1 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 51 (3d ed. 1957) (stating that a counter offer
"operates as a rejection of the original offer"); J. CAL.AMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§§ 2-23(d) (2d ed. 1977) (declaring that "an offeree's power of acceptance is terminated
by a rejection or a counter offer unless the offeror or offeree manifests a contrary in-
tention"). For a discussion of the effect of counter-offers, see 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 89 (1963 & Supp. 1980).
12. 36 Cal. 3d 273, 682 P.2d 338, 204 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1984).
13. Id. at 280, 682 P.2d at 342, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The TM. Cobb court utilized
traditional contract law principles to hold that a 998 offer is revocable by the offeror
prior to the end of the 30-day acceptance period. Id. at 278, 682 P.2d at 340-41, 204 Cal.
Rptr. at 145-46.
14. 159 Cal. App. 3d 389, 205 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
15. Id, at 396, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
16. Attempting to preserve some ability to negotiate during the 30-day acceptance
period for section 998 offers, the Glende Motor court declared that "'[a] mere inquiry
regarding the possibility of different terms, a request for a better offer, or a comment
upon the terms of the offer, is ordinarily not a counter-offer.'" Id. at 398, 205 Cal.
Rptr. at 688 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment b (1979)).
17. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 801 P.2d at 1075, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324. Referring to
the Glende Motor court's statement that not all negotiations constitute counter offers,
the Poster Court declared,
This aspect of the Glende Motor decision... introduces a significant and unde-
sirable uncertainty into the section 998 procedure, and will inevitably spawn
numerous disputes over whether a communication from an offeree is a
counteroffer which operates to revoke the statutory offer or merely an "in-
quiry regarding the possibility of different terms" which leaves the offeree
free to accept the outstanding section 998 offer.
Id. at 272, 801 P.2d at 1075, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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observed that section 1013 has been broadly construed to apply to
many types of documents and notices.18 The court noted that by its
language section 1013 deals with a "notice or other paper"' 9 that is
served by mail, which would appear to include section 998 offers.
While section 1013 is not applicable to jurisdictional limitations,20 the
court found that the 30-day limit for acceptance under section 998
was not a jurisdictional limitation.21 Additionally, the court refused
to find that the section 998 30-day limit upon acceptance was an ex-
ception to section 1013's rule of extending the response period for no-
tices or papers served by mail 2 2
The Poster decision is a reflection of the supreme court's great de-
sire to encourage settlements. By allowing an offeree greater flexi-
bility to negotiate after the section 998 offer has been made, it is
more likely that the process of compromise will continue until some
agreement has been reached. Because an offeror retains the power to
revoke his offer at any time,23 a party's decision to make a section
998 offer will be unaffected by the offeree's freedom to negotiate. 24
Ultimately, Poster is an important decision because it helps clear
18. Id at 273, 801 P.2d at 1076, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (citing California Accounts,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 483, 123 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1975) (stating that sec-
tion 1013 extends time for bringing motions for further answers to interrogatories));
Sinclair v. Baker, 219 Cal. App. 2d 817, 33 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1963) (declaring that section
1013 extends time for filing a petition pursuant to section 1094.5 for administrative
mandamus); Montgomery v. Norman, 120 Cal. App. 2d 855, 262 P.2d 360 (1953) (stating
that section 1013 extended the time for answering a complaint after a demurrer was
overruled). As the Poster court noted, "In general, adding five days for mailing pursu-
ant to section 1013 has become a part of the mental calculations of most litigating at-
torneys." Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 273, 801 P.2d at 1076, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1013 (Deering Supp. 1991).
20. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 274, 801 P.2d at 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citing County
of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 58, 208 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1984)). See
also 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 769 (3d ed. 1985) (stating that sec-
tion 1013 "deals only with motions and similar proceedings, not with jurisdictional
.process").
21. Poster, 52 Cal. 3d at 274, 801 P.2d at 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
22. 1d at 275, 801 P.2d at 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The court stated:
The Court of Appeal also relied on the general proposition that where there
are two conflicting statutes, one a general procedural statute and the other a
statute dealing with more specific rights and procedures, the specific statute is
regarded as an exception to the general statute. Section 998, however, is not
part of a specific procedural scheme that conflicts with section 1013.... We
see no conflict between them that would support excepting section 998 from
the general operation of section 1013.
Id.
23. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24. The Poster court refused to accept the Glende Motor court's reasoning that if
counter offers do not revoke section 998 offers, a party may hesitate to make a section
998 offer for fear of being bombarded by counter offers. As the court stated, an offeror
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some of the confusion that has arisen in the courts over the operation
of section 998.
MARY KAY ROGERS
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act,
codified at section 3303(f) of the Government Code,
grants discovery rights to a peace officer who is the
subject of an internal affairs investigation only after the
initial interrogation of that officer: Pasadena Police
Officers Association v. City of Pasadena.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court in Pasadena Police Officers Associa-
tion v. City of Pasadena' ruled that, in limited circumstances, the
state's interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the po-
lice force may outweigh an individual peace officer's right to due pro-
cess protection under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of
Rights Act (the "Act"). 2
The court held that a peace officer, who is the subject of an inter-
nal affairs investigation, does not acquire discovery rights until after
his initial interrogation by the Police Department.3 Justice Kennard's
may revoke an offer at any time and, thus, escape such "bombardment." Poster, 52
Cal. 3d at 272 n.2, 801 P.2d at 1075 n.2, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 324 n.2.
1. 51 Cal. 3d 564, 797 P.2d 608, 273 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1990) [hereinafter Pasadena
Police Officers Ass'n II.
2. Id. at 569, 797 P.2d at 609, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
3. In early 1986, the Pasadena Police Department (the "Department") and the
Pasadena Police Officer's Association (the "PPOA") were involved in a labor dispute
which culminated in an impasse in negotiations concerning a wage agreement. As a
result, the vice president of the PPOA requested a computer printout of the list of
block captains in the Pasadena Neighborhood Watch Program from a divisional super-
visor of the Department. The PPOA wished to use the list to solicit support for the
PPOA's resolution of the wage dispute. The request, however, was denied based on
the alleged confidentiality of the materials. Id at 569-70, 797 P.2d at 609-10, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 585-86.
In May 1986, the Department discovered that the plaintiff, Officer Dennis Diaz,
president of the PPOA, had procured an unauthorized copy of the neighborhood watch
list and had used it to send the proposed solicitation letters. Consequently, the inter-
nal affairs division began an investigation. The plaintiff was notified of the investiga-
tion and its purpose, in compliance with California Government Code section 3303, and
was requested to attend an administrative hearing. Prior to the plaintiff's interroga-
tion, the vice president of PPOA was interrogated. Although the plaintiff appeared at
his own administrative hearing with counsel, he refused to answer any questions until
given access to the notes taken during the interview of the vice president. Id.
The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit to enjoin the police department from continuing
his interrogation until his discovery request for the notes was granted. He relied on
Government Code section 3303, subdivision (f), as the basis for his claim, alleging it
permitted pre-interrogation discovery. He also claimed that the department had a
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majority opinion 4 attempted to discern the legislative intent behind
the operative statute, a portion of the Act codified as section 3303(f)
of the California Government Code.5 In pertinent part, the statute
states that "[t]he public safety officer shall be entitled to a tran-
scribed copy of any notes [of his interrogation] made by a stenogra-
pher or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other
persons, except those which are deemed to be confidential."6 The
trial court and the court of appeal concluded that this language ne-
cessitated the issuance of reports and complaints prior to the public
safety officer's interrogation.7 Based upon its in-depth analysis of the
legislature's intent, the supreme court reversed the appellate court's
decision and concluded that discovery was not permissible until after
the initial interrogation of the peace officer.8
II. TREATMENT
The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act was en-
acted in 1976 to provide peace officers with procedural rights and pro-
tections.9 Such rights were intended to ensure stable employer-
practice of providing such notes or reports. Finally, Diaz asserted that the investiga-
tion was a statutorily prohibited interference with the labor activity of an individual
public employee. The superior court granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The court of appeal affirmed, although it rejected the police department's claim that
the requested notes were confidential. The supreme court granted review. Id. at 570-
71, 797 P.2d at 610-11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87.
4. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard, Eagleson and Arabian con-
curred in the majority opinion by Justice Kennard. Justice Panelli wrote a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion.
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3303(f) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). See infra note 11 (text
of the statute).
6. Id. (emphasis added),
7. See Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pasadena, 217 Cal. App. 3d 506,
509, 251 Cal. Rptr. 865, 870 (1988), rev'd, 51 Cal. 3d 564, 797 P.2d 608, 273 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1990) [hereinafter Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n 1]. See also Williams v. City of Los
Angeles, 47 Cal. 3d 195, 763 P.2d 480, 252 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988) (holding that California
Government Code section 3309.5 allows public safety officers to address appropriate
grievances in superior court), appeal after remand, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1212, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 869 (1990).
8. Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 568-69, 797 P.2d at 609, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 585. The case was remanded to the superior court to decide whether the
plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief based upon the Department's past practice of
preinterrogation disclosure. Id. at 580, 797 P.2d at 617, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
9. Id. at 572, 797 P.2d at 611, 273 Cal. Rptr.. at 587. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3300-3301
(West 1980 & Supp. 1991). The Act provides the public safety officer with numerous
rights, including the following:
[T]he Act secures for peace officers - when off duty and not in uniform -
the right to engage, or refrain from engaging, in political activity (§ 3302); it
protects against punitive action or denial of promotion for the exercise of pro-
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employee relationsO between the officers and their respective law
enforcement agencies. Specifically, section 3303 of the Act acknowl-
edges the protection available to a peace officer when interrogated
during an internal affairs investigation which may subject the officer
to punitive action including "dismissal, demotion, [or] suspension.""
cedural rights granted under its own terms or under an existing grievance
procedure (§ 3304, subd. (a)); it provides that no adverse comment be entered
in an officer's personnel file until the officer has been given an opportunity to
read and sign the, comment (§ 3305); it mandates that when an adverse com-
ment is entered in a personnel file, the officer shall have 30 days to file a writ-
ten response to be attached to the adverse comment in the file (§ 3306); and it
protects against compelled disclosure, except in limited circumstances, of an
officer's financial status (Q 3308).
Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 572, 797 P.2d at 611, 273 Cal. Rptr. at
587-88. See also Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982)
(observing that the Act secures rights to public safety officers which they may be un-
able to secure for themselves); White v. County of Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d 676, 646 P.2d
191, 183 Cal. Rptr: 520 (1982) (holding that public safety officers are entitled to proce-
dural rights during proceedings which may lead to punitive actions against the of-
ficers); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 541 (1962 & Supp. 1991) (dealing with
right of administrative appeal); 18 CAL. DIGEsT 3D Law Enforcement OfJicers § 11 (Mc-
Kinney 1990) (general survey of disciplinary proceedings); see generally 42 CAL. JuR.
3D Law Enforcement Offcers § 23 (1978 & Supp. 1991) (noting that restraints imposed
on police officer's constitutional rights must satisfy the compelling state interest test);
42 CAL. JUR. 3D Law Enforcement Officers § 33 (1978 & Supp. 1991); Note, White v.
County of Sacramento and Baggett v. Gates: Administrative Due Process for Public
Sofety Officers, 15 U. WEST L.A.L. REv. 181 (1983) (discussing the extended right to an
"administrative appeal" for peace officers); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of
Public Employees'- A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16
UCLA L. REv. 751 (1969) (stating that constitutional rights are bestowed upon public
employees). But see Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221
Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985) (ruling that police officers have no right to remain silent without
threat of administrative discipline).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3301 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). The Act also represents a
legislative understanding that fairness to police officers must be balanced against the
"[l]egislature's recognition of the necessity for internal affairs investigations to main-
tain the efficiency and integrity of the police force serving the community." Pasadena
Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 573, 797 P.2d at 612, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
11. California Government Code § 3303 provides the following:
When any public safety officer is under investigation and subjected to inter-
rogation by his commanding officer, or any other member of the employing
public safety department, which could lead to punitive action, such interroga-
tion shall be conducted under the following conditions. For the purpose of
this chapter, punitive action is defined as any action which may lead to dismis-
sal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer
for purposes of punishment.
(a) The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at
a time when the public safety officer is on duty, or during normal waking
hours for the public safety officer, unless the seriousness of the investigation
requires otherwise. If such interrogation does occur during off-duty time of
the public safety officer being interrogated, the public safety officer shall be
compensated for off-duty time in accordance with regular department proce-
dures, and the public safety officer shall not be released from employment for
any work missed.
(b) The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed prior to
such interrogation of the rank, name and command of the officer in charge of
the interrogation, the interrogating officers, and all other persons to be pres-
ent during the interrogation. All questions directed to the public safety of-
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Section 3303(f) provides the officer with an opportunity to tape rec-
ficer under interrogation shall be asked by and through no more than two
interrogators at one time.
(c) The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed of the na-
ture of the investigation prior to any interrogation.
(d) The interrogating session shall be for a reasonable period taking into
consideration gravity and complexity of the issue being investigated. The per-
son under interrogation shall be allowed to attend his own personal physical
necessities.
(e) The public safety officer under interrogation shall not be subjected to
offensive language or threatened with punitive action, except that an officer
refusing to respond to questions or submit to interrogations shall be informed
that failure to answer questions directly related to the investigation or inter-
rogation may result in punitive action. No promise of reward shall be made as
an inducement to answering any question. The employer shall not cause the
public safety officer under interrogation to be subjected to visits by the press
or news media without his express consent nor shall his home address or pho-
tograph be given to the press or news media without his express consent.
(f) The complete interrogation of a public safety officer may be recorded. If
a tape recording is made of the interrogation, the public safety officer shall
have access to the tape if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to
any further interrogation at a subsequent time. The public sofety officer shall
be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to
any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those
which are deemed by the investigating agency to be conjfidential. No notes or
reports which are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer's
personnel file. The public safety officer being interrogated shall have the
right to bring his own recording device and record any and all aspects of the
interrogation.
(g) If prior* to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is
deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immedi-
ately informed of his constitutional rights.
(h) Upon the filing of a formal written statement of charges, or whenever
an interrogation focuses on matters which are likely to result in punitive ac-
tion against the public safety officer, that officer, at his request, shall have the
right to be represented by a representative of his choice who may be present
at all times during such interrogation. The representative shall not be a per-
son subject to the same investigation. The representative shall not be re-
quired to disclose, nor be subject to any punitive action for refusing to
disclose, any information received from the officer under investigation for
noncriminal matters.
This section shall not apply to any interrogation of a public safety officer in
the normal course of duty, counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admon-
ishment by, or other routine or unplanned contact with, a supervisor or any
other public safety officer, nor shall this section apply to an investigation con-
cerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities.
(i) No public safety officer shall be loaned or temporarily reassigned to a
location or duty assignment if a sworn member of his department would not
normally be sent to that location or would not normally be given that duty
assignment under similar circumstances.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3303 (West 1980 & Supp 1991) (emphasis added). See also White v.
County of Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d 676, 646 P.2d 191, 183 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1982) (ruling
that dismissal, suspension, reduction in salary, or written reprimand. are punitive ac-
tions); McManigal v. City of Seal Beach, 166 Cal. App. 3d 975, 212 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1985)
(where court acknowledged that legislature intended dismissals, demotions, suspen-
sions, reductions in salary, and written reprimands to be per se disciplinary); Hopson v.
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ord his or her interrogation and the right to have access to that or
any other recording of the interrogation. 12 Section 3303(f) also gives
an officer the right to a "transcribed copy of any notes made by a ste-
nographer or to any [nonconfidential] reports or complaints made by
investigators or other persons."'13 Nowhere in the Act, however, is
the timing of the disclosure of the reports and complaints specified.
Thus, the California Supreme Court attempted to ascertain whether
the legislature intended the right to disclosure to attach before or af-
ter interrogation. 14
The court pointed out the juxtaposition of the "notes made by a
stenographer" provision and the "reports or complaints" provision
within the same sentence and ruled that the proximity' 5 of the two
provisions indicated legislative intent that the "discovery rights in
each instance [are] coextensive."1 6 Thus, the court concluded that be-
cause the tape or transcription of any notes made by the stenogra-
pher during the interrogation must be obtained after the
interrogation, as they are a record of that interrogation, the re-
quested reports and complaints must be acquired after the interroga-
tion as well.17
The court determined that preinterrogation discovery was neither
explicitly required by the statute, nor crucial to the fair disposition of
an internal affairs investigation.'S Moreover, the court feared that
such discovery might even "jeopardize public confidence"19 in the po-
lice force by leaving the system open to the threat of collusion.20
City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 347, 188 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1983) (report by a board
of police commissioners reprimanding officer for violating Department policy consid-
ered punitive action).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3303(f) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 11 (full
text of section 3303).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 575, 797 P.2d at 614, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 590.
15. Id. at 576, 797 P.2d at 614, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
16. Id
17. Id. at 576-77, 797 P.2d at 614, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 590-91. The court supported this
conclusion by acknowledging that the legislature used "prior to" in other portions of
the statute to indicate its intent. Id. The court then analogized the instant case to a
criminal procedure situation, but concluded that a peace officer is entitled to a lower
level of protection than a criminal defendant. Id.
18. Id. at 578, 797 P.2d at 615-16, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 591-92.
19. Id. The court discussed the plaintiff's claims regarding the alleged confidenti-
ality of the report and the Department's break from past practice, but declined to ad-
dress either issue. The case was remanded for a determination as to the past practice
of the Department. Id. at 579-80, 797 P.2d at 616-17, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93.
20. "Disclosure before interrogation might color the recollection of the person to
be questioned or lead that person to conform his or her version of an event to that
given by witnesses already questioned." Id. at 579, 797 P.2d at 616, 273 Cal. Rptr. at
592. See also Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n I, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
869 (where defendant Department contended that "the only way to obtain a spontane-
ous, unfettered version of the facts by Diaz is for the interrogation to proceed without
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Justice Panelli concurred that the case should be remanded on the
issue of whether the Department's past procedure favored preinter-
rogation. 21 He dissented, however, because he supports the right of
an accused officer to preinterrogation discovery.22 He reasoned that
the other provisions of section 3303 refer to events which are to occur
before or during the interrogation and, thus, subsection (f) should
follow.2 3 Justice Panelli also disclaimed the majority's fear of collu-
sion, arguing that the investigating agency has a built-in protection
against such misconduct because it retains control over the resources
and timing of the interrogation. 24 Furthermore, he contended that
preinterrogation may actually facilitate subsequent interrogations by
refreshing the officer's memory.2 5
III. CONCLUSION
Affording a peace officer due process and maintaining the integrity
of and public confidence in the police force are important state con-
cerns.26 The court, in attempting to balance these interests, seems to
have limited the rights of a peace officer. However, the court ambig-
uously held that the statute neither compels nor prohibits pre-inter-
rogation discovery. 27 It also appears that the past practice of the
Department is important, as this case was remanded to examine that
his access to the notes of the interview of Ford [PPOA's vice president]. Assuming
that Diaz intends to tell the truth... there is no advantage or disadvantage to him in
not having Ford's statement").
21. Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 581, 797 P.2d at 617, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 593 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 586, 797 P.2d at 621, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
24. Id. at 584, 797 P.2d at 619, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
25. Id at 584, 797 P.2d at 619, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 596 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
26. Id. at 569, 797 P.2d at 609, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 585. The appellate court argued
that the uniqueness of a public safety officer's social service position caused his reputa-
tion within the public safety community to be very important to his future career. For
that reason, the court concluded that the officer has a "special interest in nipping any
allegations of misconduct in the bud before those charges blossom into a full-fledged
disciplinary hearing." Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n I, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 870. What the court seemed to have discounted was that the initial interroga-
tion of the public safety officer would take place prior to any formal charges being
filed against the officer. Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 578, 797 P.2d
at 616, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
27. Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n II, 51 Cal. 3d at 579, 797 P.2d at 616, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 593.
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consideration. 28 Thus, although the lower courts and police depart-
ments will have direction as to the court's preference and interpreta-
tion of the legislature's intent, the timing of the officer's discovery
rights may still be at the discretion of each individual department.
This will result in further litigation to determine whether the past
practice of the departments is controlling.
CYNTHIA J. EMRY
B. The Proposition 115 victims rights initiative is partially
valid: although section three of the initiative constitutes
an invalid revision of the California constitution, it is
severable, and the remaining provisions of the initiative
are valid, as they satisfy the single subject rule: Raven v.
Deukmejian
I. INTRODUCTION
In a surprising decision, the California Supreme Court in Raven v.
Deukmejian'L upheld the validity of all but one provision of Proposi-
tion 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," which was ap-
proved by the California electorate in June of 1990.2 Petitioners, who
requested a writ of mandate to prohibit the enforcement of Proposi-
tion 115, challenged the crime victims initiative3 based upon its al-
28. Id. at 579-80, 797 P.2d at 616-17, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93.
1. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
2. Id. at 355-56, 801 P.2d at 1089-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39. Proposition 115
hoped to provide "comprehensive reforms.., in order to restore balance and fairness
to the criminal justice system." Proposition 115, § 1(a) (1990).
Proposition 115 was passed by California voters on June 5, 1990 at the Primary Elec-
tion. This initiative, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," attempted to modify the
California Constitution to ensure crime victims greater protection. These changes in-
cluded: (1) eliminating postindictment preliminary hearings when a felony is prose-
cuted by indictment, (2) allowing hearsay evidence to be admitted at preliminary
hearings, (3) allowing reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, (4) expanding the crimes
covered by the felony murder statute, and (5) adding a newly defined crime of torture.
Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 342-45, 801 P.2d at 1080-83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 329-32. Petitioners, as
taxpayers and voters, sought writs of mandate or prohibition to prohibit respondents,
as public officials and the courts responsible for execution of Proposition 115, from im-
plementing the initiative. The petitioners claimed that (1) the initiative violated the
single subject rule, and (2) section three of the proposition was a qualitative revision of
the California Constitution and, therefore, invalid. Although the petition was origi-
nally filed with the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court exercised original
jurisdiction because of the issue's "great public importance" and ensuing need for ex-
peditious resolution. Id. at 340, 801 P.2d at 1079, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
3. Article IV, section 1, of the California Constitution declares that "[tihe legisla-
tive power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the
Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For an analysis of the initiative process in
California, see generally 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional
Law §§ 120-21 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990); 15 CAL. DIGEST 3D Initiative and Referen-
dum §§ 3, 6 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990); Comment, Lousy Lawmaking: Question-
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leged violation of the single subject rule and the rule requiring
constitutional "revisions" to be governed by more formal procedures
than the initiative process.4 In addressing the petitioners' challenges,
Chief Justice Lucas's majority opinion 5 held that Proposition 115 sat-
isfies the single subject rule, which requires that an initiative em-
brace only one subject in order to be submitted to the voters.6 The
court agreed with the petitioners, however, declaring section three of
the measure invalid because it constituted a revision rather than a
mere amendment to the California Constitution, violating California
constitutional law.7 The remaining provisions of the proposition
were salvaged under a severance clause in the initiative.8 The
supreme court, therefore, granted the requested writ of mandate
compelling respondents not to enforce section three of Proposition
115.9
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The supreme court carefully analyzed the two issues set before it.
The court first determined whether the proposition satisfied the sin-
ing the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 733 (1988); Comment, New Limits on the California Initiative: An Analysis and
Crtique, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1045 (1986); Comment, The California Initiative Process:
A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922 (1975).
4. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346-48, 801 P.2d at 1083-84, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33. For a
discussion of the single subject rule, see infra notes 6 and 11. For a discussion of the
processes necessary to invoke a constitutional revision see infra notes 7 and 25.
5. Justices Broussard, Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard and Arabian concurred in the
majority opinion. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
6. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346-48, 801 P.2d at 1083-84, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33. The
single subject rule is set forth in article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution.
It declares that "[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be
submitted to the electors or have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
7. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The California
Constitution requires that a "revision" of the constitution be accomplished by conven-
ing a constitutional convention and ratification by popular vote. Id. at 349, 801 P.2d at
1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2). For a more comprehen-
sive analysis, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
8. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The severance
clause set forth in section 29 of Proposition 115 provides:
If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of the measure which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this measure are
severable.
See also 12 B. HoLzMAN, M. LANDIS, D. COFFEE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRAC-
TICE, CALIFORNIA CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT: PROPOSITION 115 (1990) [here-
inafter CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE].
9. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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gle subject rule.1o
A. Single Subject Rule
Article II, section 8(d), of the California Constitution states that
"[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be
submitted to the electors or have any effect."11 Although Proposition
115 included provisions dealing with a wide array of topics such as
postindictment preliminary hearings, joinder and severance of cases,
reciprocal discovery procedures, and modification of the felony-mur-
der rule,12 the supreme court found that the provisions were "reason-
ably germane"'13 to one another and to the initiative as a whole,
satisfying the single subject rule.l4
Comparing the instant case to Brosnahan v. Brown,15 which dealt
with another criminal justice reform initiative, the supreme court
held that the provisions of Proposition 115 united to form a "compre-
hensive criminal justice reform package."'16 The proposition at-
tempted to bolster the procedural and substantive safeguards for
crime victims.17 Thus, the court concluded that the "single subject"
was the protection of crime victims' rights.' 8
To support its holding, the court noted that an auxiliary "unifying
theme"19 of the proposition was to invalidate particular supreme
10. Id. at 346, 801 P.2d at 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
11. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). See 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 103 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (describing the single subject
rule); CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE AFTER PROPOSITION 115, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
THE BAR 255-57 (1990) (quoting J. VAN DE KAMP, PROPOSITION 115 MANUAL (1990))
(same); Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 936 (1983) (in-depth analysis of the single subject rule's origins and shortcom-
ings); see also Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equali-
zation, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (holding that one purpose
of the single subject rule is to eliminate voter confusion); Insurance Indus. Initiative
Campaign Comm. v. Eu, 203 Cal. App. 3d 961, 250 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1988) (stating that
insurance reform initiative does not violate the single subject rule because its aim en-
compasses insurance industry practices which are potentially unfair to consumers).
12. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 342-46, 801 P.2d at 1080-83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 329-32.
13. Id. at 346, 801 P.2d at 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332. For the development of the
"reasonably germane" standard, see Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 8 P.2d 467
(1932); Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949); Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239; Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274,
186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982); Tinsley v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 90, 197 Cal. Rptr.
643 (1983) (ruling that initiative should have "one general object," or a "single
scheme," but may deal with more than one constitutional issue); California Trial Law-
yers Ass'n v. Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988) (stating that provisions
must be reasonably germane to the general subject of the initiative's title).
14. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
15. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
16. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347, 801 P.2d at 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
17. Id. at 347, 801 P.2d at 1083-84, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 347, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d 236,
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court decisions which had expanded criminal defendant's rights. 20
The court also disclaimed the petitioners' contention that the respon-
dents had attempted to include matters which would not have gained
support by themselves.21 Finally, the court denied that the initiative
was too complex for the average voter to understand.22 To refute the
complexity claim, the court relied upon the measure summary and
the Legislative Analyst's report included in the official voters' pam-
phlet.23 After deciding Proposition 115 as a whole satisfied the single
subject rule, the court considered whether section three of the initia-
tive constituted a revision or an amendment to the California
Constitution.
B. Constitutional Revision or Amendment
Article XVIII of the California Constitution allows the electorate
to amend the constitution through the use of the initiative process. 24
Revision of the constitution, however, may come about only by the
convening of a constitutional convention or through other legislative
action.25 Section three of Proposition 115 sought to add a new second
651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (finding that a similar general supplemental theme sat-
isfied the single subject rule).
20. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
21. Id. at 348, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333. This procedure is often re-
ferred to as "logrolling." Id.
22. Id. at 349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
23. Id. See Legislature of California v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (holding that ballot summaries and arguments may be considered
when discerning voter understanding of an initiative).
24. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. See also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 10
(1989 & Supp. 1990) (noting that amendments to the California Constitution may be
achieved by either a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature or an initiative peti-
tion); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 11 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (stating that
amendments of the California Constitution must be submitted to the voters for ratifi-
cation); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 54 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1990) (procedure for amendment to the California Constitution); Com-
ment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendment, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
461 (1980) (survey of judicial decisions involving challenges to compliance with initia-
tive process).
25. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. See also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 10
(1989 & Supp. 1990) (noting that revisions of California Constitution may be proposed
by a two-thirds majority of the legislature or by convening a constitutional conven-
tion); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 11 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (stating that consti-
tutional revision must be submitted to the voters); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law
§ 12 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (revision of constitution by convention called for that purpose
or by legislature only); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law § 54 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (noting that convention to revise constitution
must be called by two-thirds vote of the legislature and obtain voter approval); 16
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paragraph to article I, section 24, of the California Constitution.26
The new paragraph was directly inapposite to the existing portion of
section 24, which states that "[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution
are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution."27 The new paragraph would have mandated that the Califor-
nia Constitution not be interpreted to afford greater rights to
criminal defendants than the United States Constitution.28 To deter-
mine the effect of this addition, the court used a two step test. First,
the court considered the quantitative effect of Proposition 115.29 The
court determined that the quantitative changes would be no more ex-
tensive than those of prior cases, as the measure would delete no con-
stitutional provisions and would affect merely one major article of
the constitution.3 0
Second, the court looked to the qualitative effect of the measure
and concluded that new article I, section 24, "would vest all judicial
interpretative power, as to fundamental criminal defense rights, in
the United States Supreme Court" 31 because the California courts
would no longer be able to interpret the California Constitution to be
more protective of rights than the federal courts in interpreting the
United States Constitution. 32 The new article would thus divest the
C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 8 (1984) (revision of state constitution by a constitutional
convention).
26. The new paragraph stated:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to
due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with
counsel, to speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to
confront witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or
herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not
suffer the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed by
the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the
United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford
greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution
of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to mi-
nors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.
Proposition 115, § 3 (1990) (proposed CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24).
27. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
28. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336. Such an abro-
gation of states' rights would be in direct conflict with the doctrine of federalism. At
the "heart of the system of federalism" is the state courts' right to interpret state con-
stitutions differently from federal court interpretation of the federal constitution. See
CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE AFTER PROPOSITION 115, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR
126-27 (1990) (quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF
CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1989)); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRAC-
TICE, supra note 8; Blum, Toward a Radical Middle: Has a Great Court Become Medio-
cre?, 77 A.B.A. J. 48 (Jan. 1991) (survey of California Supreme Court decisions
following the liberal Bird Court). ,
29. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351, 801 P.2d at 1086-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
32. Id. See CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE AFTER PROPOSITION 115, CONTINUING EDUCA-
1088
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
California Constitution of its "independent force and effect."33
Although the California Supreme Court recognized its policy of
deference to the United States Supreme Court, it also noted the in-
dependent judgment it has in interpreting the California Constitu-
tion.3 4 The court, therefore, concluded that section three of
Proposition 115 would invalidly revise the California Constitution.35
In an effort to save the proposition, however, the court found that
the severance clause within the initiative allowed the remaining pro-
visions to be grammatically, functionally and volitionally severable
from the invalid portion.3 6 The remaining provisions of the proposi-
tion were thus considered valid.37
Justice Mosk in his concurring and dissenting opinion agreed with
the majority on the issue of revision, but differed with respect to the
single subject issue.38 He interpreted the "reasonably germane" test
to require an internal consistency and interrelation of provisions.39
Thus, the substance of the initiative must concern a single subject,
not merely fit under a particular label.4 0 He found the single subject
propounded by the majority4 to be a label of "indefinite scope."42
Justice Mosk concluded that the initiative was merely a "grabbag"43
of unrelated issues and therefore violative of the single subject rule.44
TION OF THE BAR 11 (1990) (quoting J. VESPER, PROPOSITION 115: THE CRIME VICTIMS
REFORM ACT (1990)). The effect of this section would have been far-reaching. Some
commentators feared that abortion rights in California could be threatened by adopt-
ing the initiative. See CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE AFTER PROPOSITION 115, CONTINUING
EDUCATION OF THE BAR 130 (1990) (quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICI-
ARY, ANALYSIS OF CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1989)) (noting that by specifi-
cally mentioning a right to privacy, the California Constitution provides greater
protection to abortion rights than the United States Constitution). If this section were
maintained, California courts might be forced to ignore the right of privacy because it
is not found in the United States Constitution.
33. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353, 801 P.2d at 1088, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
34. Id.
35. Id, at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
36. Id at 355-56, 801 P.2d at 1089-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
37. Id.
38. Id, at 356, 801 P.2d at 1090, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
39. Id. at 360, 801 P.2d at 1092, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
40. Id at 360-63, 801 P.2d at 1093-94, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
41. The single subject was the "promotion of the rights of actual and potential
crime victims." Id. at 347, 801. P.2d at 1083-84, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
42. Id. at 365, 801 P.2d at 1096, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (Mosk, J., concurring. and
dissenting).
43. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
44. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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III. CONCLUSION
As Justice Mosk feared, the majority's holding will very likely
send a message to the courts and to those who develop and advocate
the initiative process that an initiative may encompass a number of
issues so long as these issues fit neatly under one title or label.45
This divestiture of the single subject rule's strength and validity is
not overtly displayed in the decision, but is evidenced by the diversity
of the provisions found in Proposition 115.4
Fortunately, the supreme court did acknowledge that section three
of Proposition 115 was a revision of the constitution rather than a
mere amendment. This revision would have substantially changed
the California Supreme Court's role in interpreting a criminal de-
fendant's rights under the California Constitution. By striking down
this portion of the initiative, the court identified a limitation on the
voters' initiative power over California courts.47 This limitation may
deter future initiatives from attempting to deprive the court of its
historical power to interpret the state constitution.
CYNTHIA J. EMRY
C. When two propositions containing materially conflicting
provisions are passed at the same election, only the
initiative receiving the greater majority of votes will
become operative: Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v.
Fair Political Practices Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Constitution has long provided that "the people re-
serve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum."1 Pur-
suant to this reserved power of direct democracy,2 the people of
45. See id at 360-63, 801 P.2d at 1093-94, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. See Blum, Mixed Ruling on Crime Initiative: California Supreme Court
Strikes Down Portion of Far-reaching Ballot Measure, 77 A.B.A. J. 23 (March 1991).
Santa Clara Law School Dean Gerald Uelmen, describing the court's ruling as a vic-
tory for the criminal defense, proclaimed "[w]e have a tool now ... that puts some
limits on what an initiative can do to the state constitution." Id. Other commentators
have argued that "the ruling will restrict people's initiative power over the judicial
branch of government." Chiang, Court Rejects Key Section of Crime Victims Act but
State Justices Rule in Favor of Most of Proposition, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 25,
1990, at Al.
1. CAL. CONST. art IV, § 1.
2. California permits the enactment of statutes and amendments to the state con-
stitution by either initiative or referendum. CAL. CONST. art II, § 8(a).
An initiative is a proposed law or constitutional amendment that the electorate may
initiate independent of the legislature. The signatures of a fixed number or percentage
of the voting electorate are required for an initiative to be placed on a ballot. In corn-
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California enacted Propositions 68 and 73. Both propositions sought
to limit campaign contributions. 3 The 1988 passage of these two pro-
positions led the California Supreme Court to decide the case of Tax-
payers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Commission.4 A majority of the court determined that these initia-
tives contained competing regulatory schemes and that only the prop-
osition receiving the most votes could become operative.5 The court
rejected any melding of the two propositions. The majority based its
holding on its interpretation of article 2, section 10(b) of the Califor-
nia Constitution. This section states, "[i]f provisions of 2 or more
measures approved at the same election conflict, those of the mea-
sure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail."6 The ma-
jority relied heavily on past legislation to strengthen its
interpretation of section 10(b).7 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that voters would not have anticipated a hybrid regulation of the two
propositions; therefore, the judiciary's interpretation would best
serve the interests of the electorate.8
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 4, 1974, California voters adopted the Political Reform Act
of 1974.9 The Act created the Fair Political Practices Commission
(hereinafter FPPC) whose duty is to implement and administer title
9 of the Government Code.1O On June 7, 1988, the electorate affirma-
tively voted for two propositions, each of which provided a "differ-
ent" chapter 5 to title 9 of the Government Code.11 Both propositions
set limits on campaign contributions, but the limitations are signifi-
parison, a referendum is a law passed by the legislature that requires approval of a
fixed number or percentage of the voters before it can become effective. Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory
and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 508 n.4 (1982).
3. Full length duplications of the applicable propositions can be found in the ap-
pendix of Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n,
51 Cal. 3d 744, 784-98, 799 P.2d 1220, 1238-45, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787, 805-11 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Taxpayers v. FPPC].
4. 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
5. 1& at 771 n.12, 799 P.2d at 1236 n.12, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803 n.12.
6. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b).
7. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 765-68, 799 P.2d at 1233-35, 274 Cal. Rptr. at
800-02.
8. Id. at 769, 799 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-81016 (West 1987).
10. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 784, 799 P.2d at 1222, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 83100, 83111 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
11. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 748, 799 P.2d at 1222, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
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cantly different.12 Furthermore, Proposition 68 set forth additional
restrictions and penalties not contained in Proposition 73. Proposi-
tion 73 received a greater majority of the votes.13
A. Legislative Counsel Opinion
On June 22, 1988, the Legislative Counsel decided the first legal
opinion concerning enforcement of these measures. 14 The Counsel
utilized a provision by provision analysis and concluded that the elec-
torate could not adopt any of the provisions of Proposition 68 because
they expressly conflicted with provisions in Proposition 73.15 In addi-
tion, the Counsel determined that even the sections not in direct con-
flict were unenforceable because they were "logically inseparable." 16
The Counsel also pointed out that both propositions sought a "com-
prehensive and interrelated system of campaign finance."17 More-
over, Proposition 68 contemplated public funding without which
certain Proposition 68 provisions could not be valid.18 Proposition 73,
on the other hand, specifically prohibited any such public funding.19
This primary disparity prevented the Counsel from effectively sever-
ing provisions from Proposition 68.20 In short, the Counsel found
Proposition 73 enforceable in its entirety,2 1 and Proposition 68 com-
pletely without effect.
B. FPPC Opinion
The California Political Attorneys requested that the FPPC issue
an opinion to determine which, if any, provisions of Proposition 68
would become effective.22 The FPPC stated that section 10(b) of the
constitution applies if there is a conflict between provisions.23 After
12. See supra note 3.
13. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 748, 799 P.2d at 1222, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
Proposition 73 received 58% of the "yes" votes and 47% of the "no" votes. Proposition
68 received 53% of the "yes" votes and 42% of the "no" votes. Id. at 760 n.7, 799 P.2d
at 1230 n.7, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 797 n.7.
14. Id. at 755, 799 P.2d at 1226, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
15. Id. at 756, 799 P.2d at 1227, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 755, 799 P.2d at 1226, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
18. Id. at 755-56, 799 P.2d at 1226-27, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
19. Id. at 765, 799 P.2d at 1227, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. This fact came directly from the court of appeal opinion which has been omit-
ted from publication in the California Appellate Reports due to its reversal by the
supreme court. See 212 Cal. App. 3d 991, 260 Cal. Rptr. 898, 901 (1989), rev'd, 51 Cal. 3d
744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
23. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 759, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
The FPPC also relied on Estate of Gibson, 139 Cal. App. 3d 733, 736, 189 Cal. Rptr. 201,
203 (1983) where the court determined that proposition 6, which received the greater
majority of votes, would be given effect.
1092
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a provision-by-provision comparison, the FPPC decided that most
provisions of Proposition 68 conflicted with those of Proposition 73
and were not severable. 24 However, the FPPC listed several provi-
sions of Proposition 68 that did not conflict and that should be imple-
mented.25 Also, the FPPC concluded that Proposition 68's statement
of purpose was operative, despite the fact that few of its substantive
provisions were effective.2 6
As petitioners, the sponsors of Proposition 68 filed a petition for a
writ of mandate ordering the respondent, FPPC, to enforce certain
additional provisions that they had previously found invalid.27
C. Court of Appeal Decision
California's Second District Court of Appeal held that both initia-
tives should take effect because they were simultaneously approved
by the electorate. 28 Utilizing traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion and article 2, section 10(b) of the California Constitution, the
court of appeal reconciled or harmonized the conflicting provisions in
an effort to give effect to every provision.29 The court justified this
procedure by stating that it was the voters' intent that both proposi-
tions should take effect because each had received a majority of
votes. 30 This provision resulted in a hybrid regulation system wher-
ever provisions of each initiative could be adopted literally. For ex-
ample, Proposition 68 had a restriction that legislative candidates and
committees could not accept contributions in any odd-numbered year
(non-election year).3 ' Proposition 73 had no such limitation, but did
24. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 511 Cal. 3d at 759, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
25. Id at 758-59, 799 P,2d at 1228-29, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96. The FPPC decided
that the following list of provisions of Proposition 68 should become operative: section
68:85101 [findings and declarations]; section 68:85600 [disclaimer on mailings]; section
68:85604 [disclosures of independent expenditures over $10,000]; section 68:5700, subdi-
visions (b) & (c) [FPPC to prescribe forms, and prescribe and release studies on impact
of title]; section 68:83116 [amendment of existing section governing administrative pen-
alties]; section 68:84106 [identification of committees]; and section 68:84302.5 [defining
intermediary].
The court of appeal agreed that these sections should become effective along with
several additional provisions of Proposition 68. Id at 759-60, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 796.
26. Id at 759, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
27. See supra note 21 (260 Cal. Rptr. at 902; the court of appeal decision for the
principle case is not available in the California Appellate Reports).
28. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 760, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
29. Id, at 761, 799 P.2d at 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
30. Id
31. Id.
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limit the amount of contributions that could be made by persons,
political committees, and broadbased political committees in any fis-
cal year.3 2 Under Proposition 73, a senator could receive $4000 from
an individual during a four year period.3 3 The court of appeal com-
bined the two provisions, thus permitting a senatorial candidate to re-
ceive only $2000 from an individual in four years because Proposition
68 prohibits contributions in non-election years.34
Other Proposition 68 provisions that the court held to be reconcila-
ble with Proposition 73 included aggregate contribution limitations,
amendments to criminal and civil penalties, and certain definitions
and purpose statements.35 Thus, the petitioner's writ of mandate was
granted by the court of appeal which resulted in the partial adoption
of Proposition 68.36
III. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Majority Opinion
The supreme court's majority began its treatment of the case by
recognizing that article 2, section 10(b) of the California Constitution
was susceptible to two possible interpretations.37 The majority ex-
amined the provision-by-provision approach taken by the court of ap-
peal and deemed it inappropriate for a section 10(b) analysis.36 The
majority criticized the lower court's assumption that both initiatives
should become operative because they were approved by the voters.
Justice Eagleson explained that while some voters would have been
satisfied with the adoption of either proposition, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the people wanted to adopt both propositions.39 Ad-
ditionally, the same individuals may not have cast a majority of the
affirmative votes for each initiative.40 Based on these possible scena-
rios, the majority believed that the intent of the electorate is best
served by invalidating an entire initiative when it materially conflicts
with a similar initiative that received more votes. 4 '
32. Id.
33. Id,
34. Id.
35. Id at 760, 799 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
36. See supra note 21 (260 Cal. Rptr. at 900; the court of appeal decision for the
principle case is not available in California Appellate Reports).
37. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 765, 799 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
38. I&
39. Id. at 769, 799 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
40. Id,
41. Id. Voter intent can be difficult to ascertain because many voters do not read
or comprehend ballot measures. In fact, some people rely completely on advertise-
ments to provide them with proposition information. See King, Commercial Litmus
Test: Will TV Viewers Buy It?, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1984, pt. 1 at 28 col. 1; LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEG-
ACY LOST? 1-11 (1984); D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 5 (1984); Note, Lousy Law-
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The majority relied on past legislation to bolster its construction of
section 10(b). An initiative that amended article IV of the California
Constitution closely resembled the language of section 10(b).42 That
particular initiative stated, "[i]f any provision or provisions of two or
more measures, approved by the electors at the same election, con-
flict, the provision or provisions of the measure receiving the highest
affirmative vote shall prevail." 43 Recognizing this language as ambig-
uous, the ballot pamphlet for this amendment illustrated that usage
of "provision(s)" does not indicate that "all individual nonconflicting
provisions of both measures would become operative."4 4 It merely
suggested that measures may contain more than one provision.45 The
1911 amendment of the California Constitution, in which the above
initiative was added, furthered the majority's argument that section
10(b) was designed to void an entire conflicting measure. The perti-
nent part of this amendment states, "[i]f a conflict arise[s] between
provisions adopted and approved by the electors at the same election,
that receiving the highest vote shall prevail."40 The ballot pamphlet
for this amendment inferred that the usage of the word "that" is sin-
gular and therefore refers to the measure itself.47
The court also examined the language embraced within section
4058 of the former California Political Code, currently found in sec-
tion 3717 of the California Elections Code.48 This section directs
that, "[i]f the provisions of two or more ordinances adopted at the
same election conflict, then the ordinance receiving the highest
number of affirmative votes shall control."4 9 The language selected
for this section clearly states that an entire ordinance shall be void if
its provisions conflict with another. The majority utilized this code
section to demonstrate that the purpose of section 10(b), which con-
tains very similar language, is to effectively void any conflicting
making: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by
Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738-42 (1988).
42. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 766, 799 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
43. Id. (quoting the initiative provision that amended article IV of the California
Constitution in 1911). This amendment authorized the use of initiatives to enact state
and local laws and to amend the state constitution. Id
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id (citing Ballot Pamphlet, argument in favor of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 22,
Oct. 10, 1911).
47. Id
48. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 767, 799 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
49. Id.
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measure.50
The majority further asserted that when contrary ballot initiatives
are to be treated differently, language explicitly requiring an imple-
mentation of provisions of both measures will be utilized.51 For ex-
ample, provision (d) of the California Constitution specifically states
that if one proposition relating to county charters receives a larger
number of votes than other propositions receive, that proposition will
control as to all matters in conflict.52 The ballot pamphlet for this
amendment contended that its purpose was to create uniformity
among county and city charters.53 The majority concluded that arti-
cle XI, section 3(d), and article II, section 10(b) of the California Con-
stitution are similar in function because both allow only one measure
to control.5 4 Thus, section 10(b)'s language was not designed to per-
mit all nonconflicting provisions of competing initiatives to become
operative.
After considering the language of section 10(b), the majority fo-
cused its attention on the voters' intent.55 The majority pointed out
that because Propositions 68 and 73 were offered as competing meas-
ures on the ballot, the court could not assume that the same voters
selected both propositions.5 6 Furthermore, there is no case law that
dictates the appellate court's approach of implementing certain provi-
sions of one proposition into the regulatory scheme of another.57 The
supreme court determined that voters would not have expected the
"amalgam" created by the court of appeal.58 If this scheme was car-
ried out it could effectively thwart the voters' intent.5 9 Due to the
increasing complexity in statewide ballot initiatives, the majority
firmly asserted its construction of section 10(b) as necessary to avoid
judicial legislation.60
50. IM at 768, 799 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
51. IM at 768, 799 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
52. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(d).
53. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 768, 799 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
54. Id.
55. The supreme court wrote this opinion under the presumption that voters read
and understand ballot initiatives. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 252, 651 P.2d
274, 283-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39-40 (1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High School
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 243-44, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 239, 256-57 (1978); Wright v. Jordan, 192 Cal. 704, 713, 221 P. 915, 918-19 (1923).
56. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 769, 799 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id. The supreme court recognized that many voters rely almost exclusively on
the title or the summary of the initiative in making their decisions. I& at 770, 799 P.2d
at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803 (citing Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 99, 577 P.2d 652,
657, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 522 (1978)).
60. Id. at 769-70, 799 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk affirmed the majority's holding by determining that
when two regulatory schemes are competing, the one receiving the
highest number of votes should become effective.6 1 Justice Mosk em-
phasized that Propositions 68 and 73 are clearly alternative measures
because the ballot arguments submitted to the public urged voters to
cast their vote for one or the other.62 Furthermore, both initiatives
were identically numbered to become chapter 5 of title 9.63 Consider-
ing that both propositions could not become chapter 5, it is logical to
assume that they were competing regulations. Justice Mosk also sug-
gested that the majority should have used the language, "offered as
[competing measures]" to plainly illustrate that the electorate were
to choose between the two.64
Justice Mosk was not entirely supportive of the majority's ap-
proach. In fact, he was careful to point out that the majority's con-
struction will allow individuals to artfully disguise an initiative's
actual objective in order for it to receive an affirmative vote.65 Jus-
tice Mosk was concerned that whenever opposing initiatives are
presented, there exists the opportunity for someone to exploit the
voters' intent by making the ballot argument so incomprehensible
that the individual does not realize that there is a .competing mea-
sure. 66 Justice Mosk anticipated this scenario would become a prob-
lem, especially when dealing with complex legal issues where the
public does not have adequate knowledge of the topic and relies on
the ballot information to make their decision.67
Justice Mosk further criticized the majority for not properly ad-
dressing the case of Service Employees International Union v. Fair
61. Id. at 774, 799 P.2d at 1246, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
62. Id. at 772, 799 P.2d at 1245, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
63. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
64. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Many scholars have contended that
initiatives are purposefully written in ambiguous or confusing terms. See Fischer, Bal-
lot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 66 (1983) (ballot propositions are written by
individuals who secretly share a common objective); D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION
143-44 (1984) (landlords drafted misleading proposition regarding rent control).
67. 51 Cal. 3d at 772 n.1, 799 P.2d at 1246 n.1, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 813 n.1 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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Political Practices Commission.68 In that case, the federal district
court found Proposition 73 to be in violation of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution and issued a restraining order to
prevent its enforcement. 69 This restraining order was approved by
the United States Supreme Court.70 Justice Mosk contended that the
California Supreme Court rendered an advisory opinion prior to the
outcome of this case, because if Proposition 73 was held to be invalid
for violating the United States Constitution, then the state supreme
court's decision upholding it would be a "futility."71 However, Jus-
tice Mosk did not seem to take into account the primary result of the
majority's decision in Taxpayers v. FPPC, which was a creative inter-
pretation of section 10(b).72 In sum, Justice Mosk held Proposition 68
and 73 to be competing measures in which only the one receiving the
greater majority of votes should become operative.73 Moreover, this
principle should be limited to situations where both initiatives have
been found to be constitutional.74
C. Justice Kennard's Dissent
Justice Kennard accused the majority of shirking its "constitution-
ally assigned responsibility" by adopting an "all or nothing" analysis
of section 10(b).75 She argued that the complexity of reconciling the
many provisions of these two measures was not reason to draw on er-
roneous interpretation of section 10(b).76 Justice Kennard stated that
this section should be construed in its "natural and ordinary mean-
ing."77 Furthermore, she noted that, according to the rules of statu-
68. Id at 773, 799 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (citing Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 747
F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Cal. 1990)).
69. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 773, 799 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 813
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk considers this an advi-
sory opinion if the raison d'etre of Proposition 73 is found unconstitutional. "A statu-
tory initiative is subject to the same state and federal constitutional limitations as are
the legislature and the statutes which it enacts." Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34
Cal. 3d 658, 674, 669 P.2d 17, 26, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 790 (1983).
72. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 771 n.12, 799 P.2d at 1236-37 n.12, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 803-04 n.12.
73. Id. at 774, 799 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
74. Id. at 774, 799 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
75. Id. at 774, 799 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The
dissent reminded the majority of their recent holding that required administrative
agencies to perform statutorily assigned tasks, regardless of their difficultly. Id. at 774
n.1, 799 P.2d at 1247 n.1, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.1 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 774, 799 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 775, 799 P.2d 1247-48, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard acknowledged a line of cases that support her construction. See Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. City of L.A., 50 Cal. 3d 402, 407, 787 P.2d 996, 998-99, 267 Cal. Rptr.
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tory construction, every word in a piece of legislation should be given
some meaning,78 and no words should be considered surplusage. 79
Additionally, she pointed out that section 10(b) distinguishes between
"measures" and "provisions of measures," and that the phrase "provi-
sions of measures" appears to mean the entire initiative.8 0 Rather
than discarding the entire measure, Justice Kennard contended that
only "provisions of measures" that conflict with "provisions of meas-
ures" receiving the majority of votes should be deleted.8 She argued
that the majority's decision to examine the measure as a whole when
there is a competing initiative is misconstrued because the language
of section 10(b) unambiguously orders the court to conduct a provi-
sion-by-provision evaluation of the initiatives.
8 2
Next, Justice Kennard's dissent addressed the usage of the term
"prevail" in section 10(b). Legislative history indicates that when one
of two conflicting proposals is to "prevail," the other may still take
effect.8 3 The word "'prevail' connotes a comparatively higher degree
of rank or authority than a complete extirpation of rivals."84 Justice
Kennard referred to various sections of the Government Code to il-
lustrate her interpretation of "prevail."85 Further, she mentioned
that the city of San Francisco's charter stated that if propositions
were not presented as alternatives, the one receiving the highest
number of votes would prevail; however, if propositions were offered
589, 591-92 (1990); I'T World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 37 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 693 P.2d 811, 816, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (1985); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824).
78. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 776, 799 P.2d at 1248, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 815
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d
47, 54, 648 P.2d 935, 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1982)).
79. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 776-79, 799 P.2d at 1248, 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 815, 817 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 777, 799 P.2d at 1249, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9605 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991)).
84. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 778, 799 P.2d at 1249, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 816
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard's dissent has also interpreted "prevail" to
mean take precedence. See In re Thierry, 19 Cal. 3d 727, 738, 566 P.2d 610, 616, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 708, 714 (1977).
85. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9605 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 4530 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
Section 4530 "prevailed" over section 669. However, portions of section 669 that did
not conflict with section 4530 were found to be operative. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal.
3d at 778, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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as alternatives then one would fail to pass.86 She argued that this
charter demonstrated that explicit language will be utilized when the
legislature desires failure of a proposition.8 7 According to the dis-
sent, the importance of the usage of "prevail" in section 10(b) is that
if one proposition prevails, but is later found invalid, the other propo-
sition could still become enforceable.8 8 This is especially relevant be-
cause Proposition 73 has been determined invalid by the district
court.8 9
Justice Kennard next examined two sections of the California Con-
stitution which contain language similar to section 10(b). First, Jus-
tice Kennard compared article XI, section 3(d), which applies to
"conflicts in measures to adopt or amend city or county charters" to
section 10(b).90 She referred to the California Constitution Revision
Committee's report which provided that the provisions of the mea-
sure with the highest affirmative vote will prevail and only provi-
sions which were invalid shall fail.91  She argued that the
Committee's interpretation of article XI, section 3(d) requires that
conflicting measures on the same ballot should be reconciled and har-
monized whenever possible.92 Since both section 10(b) and article XI,
section 3(d) are currently identical in form, she urged that Proposi-
tion 68 should be harmonized with Proposition 73.93
Justice Kennard also compared section 10(b) to article XVIII, sec-
tion 4 of the California Constitution, which applies to "conflicts in
measures to amend the state Constitution."94 Similarly, the Revision
Committee commented on article XVIII, section 4, stating "[i]f one
portion of a measure fails because a conflicting measure receives
more votes, the remainder of the measure not in conflict remains in
effect."95
Justice Kennard's dissent then contended that "any measure can
86. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 777, 799 P.2d at 1249, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 816
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
87. Id at 776, 799 P.2d at 1248, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
88. Id at 778, 799 P.2d at 1249-50, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 778 n.4, 799 P.2d at 1250 n.4, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817 n.4 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
90. I. at 779, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(d)). It is interesting that both the majority and the dissent
relied on this section to affirm their opposing constructions of section 10(b).
91. The dissent argued that the California Constitution Revision Committee pro-
vides an official source in which to ascertain meanings of constitutional provisions. Id
at 779, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Cal.
Const. Revision Commission, Proposed Revision at 56 (1968)).
92. Id, at 780, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 781, 799 P.2d at 1251, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
94. d. at 779, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4).
95. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 780, 799 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 817
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Cal. Const. Revision Comm'n at 111 (1968)).
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establish conflict by express statement."96 Without a broad state-
ment of conflict within each provision, there is no irreconcilable con-
flict between measures.9 7 She suggested that a "poison pill" be
utilized to create conflict throughout a measure if irreconcilable con-
flict is the desired result. She determined that in the absence of a
"poison pill," the conflicting provisions may be harmonized. 98 Before
provisions can be considered reconcilable, however, they must first
pass a severability test.99
Finally, Justice Kennard introduced a three part severability test
to carry out the voters' intent: "(1) the provisions must be mechani-
cally and grammatically severable, (2) they must be functionally sev-
erable, and (3) it must appear that the electorate would likely have
adopted the provision had it foreseen the partial invalidity of the ini-
tiative."100 Since this severability test is commonly implemented to
determine if any provisions can remain operational when a measure
itself is found unconstitutional, Justice Kennard asserted that it
should be applied when conflicting initiatives have been approved by
the majority of voters in an election.1 0
IV. IMPACT
Regardless of whether Proposition 73 is determined to be unconsti-
tutional, the majority's interpretation of section 10(b) will have a
lasting impact on future elections. By adopting an all-or-nothing con-
struction when two competing initiatives are passed by the electorate,
the majority leaves the door open for committees and individuals to
skillfully disguise an initiative's real objective.102 Although initia-
96. d. at 782, 799 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
97. Id (Kennard, J., dissenting).
98. I& (Kennard, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Severability has been utilized to strike portions
of conflicting statutes. See Santa Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d
315, 330, 530 P.2d 605, 617-18, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637, 649-50 (1989); Calfarm Ins. Co. v.
Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 821, 771 P.2d 1247, 1268, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 180 (1989).
100. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 782, 799 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 819
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 783, 799 P.2d at 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 772, 799 P.2d at 1245, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
This decision may also prompt the formation of reviewing committees. These com-
mittees would have the ability to assess initiatives before they appear on the ballot.
Any criticisms or comments regarding an initiative would be included in its ballot
pamphlet. This process would provide voters with unbiased information regarding a
proposition's true objectives and would best effectuate the electorate's intent. It
should be noted that these committees would not have the ability to keep a measure
1101
tives have always been laden with complex and technical language,10 3
the decision of Taxpayers v. FPPC will further muddy the drafting
process. Many voters do not take the time to read the entire proposi-
tion, relying instead on the title or summary information in casting
their votes.104 As noted by Justice Mosk, "Trojan horse" initiatives
may be created, meaning that the title and summary may be drafted
in simple terms in order to gain votes, while the real objective of the
proposition will be obscured.105 This could result in a valid initiative
being defeated by an initiative which has no real competing regula-
tory scheme. This practice would thwart the intent of the voters, be-
cause the initiative they choose will not be what they expected.
Despite the possibility of confusing the electorate, this decision
may lead to clarity in initiatives to the extent that they may be
clearly labelled as competing.106 Drafters and advertisers of proposi-
tions will be careful to point out discrepancies between provisions of
initiatives in order to avoid the result of Taxpayers v. FPPC. By
clearly stating that provisions are conflicting, there will be no need to
reconcile any part of competing measures. On the other hand, if rec-
onciliation between the provisions of two initiatives is desired, draft-
ers will readily include such language in their measures to avoid the
results of the majority's all-or-nothing approach.
Taxpayers v. FPPC may also reduce the occurrence of judicial legis-
lation, because the majority's approach does not allow judges to har-
monize propositions when the measures themselves conflict.'0 7 This
is likely to carry out the electorate's intent because most voters
would not expect that two competing regulatory schemes could be-
come intertwined.108 Nevertheless, the majority's interpretation
off of the ballot or infringe upon the initiative power in any way. The only function of
these committees would be to serve as a source of impartial information. Telephone
interview with Justice Croskey, Second District, California Court of Appeal (Mar. 15,
1991).
103. See supra note 65.
104. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 770, 799 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
See also Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 592-93, 254 P. 946, 948 (1927).
105. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 773 n.2, 799 P.2d at 124 n.2, 274 Cal. Rptr. at
813 n.2 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk assumed that the major-
ity's statement about remedying the initiative process was merely a recommendation.
The majority suggested that there should be a "presentation at a subsequent election
of a new initiative measure which the voters can consider in light of the scheme estab-
lished by the measure that prevailed in the earlier election." Id. (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
106. The dissent argued that if measures were not expressly competing then the
provision-by-provision approach should be implemented. See supra notes 95-98 and ac-
companying text.
On the other hand, the majority held that if two significantly differing propositions
were* to regulate the same subject, then a conflict was automatically created. Taxpay-
ers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 765, 799 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
107. Taxpayers v. FPPC, 51 Cal. 3d at 765, 799 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
108. Id. at 769, 799 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
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defeats the plain language of section 10(b).109 The dissent's interpre-
tation and statutory construction seem to better carry out the legisla-
tive intent behind the section.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority's construction of section 10(b) has the effect of invali-
dating any competing regulatory measure receiving a lesser majority
of votes.'1 0 This view of disregarding an entire measure instead of
taking a provision-by-provision approach is met with great disfavor
by the dissent. The dissent prefers implementation of a three-part
severability test to protect voter intent.' Provisions passing this
test would be reconciled with conflicting provisions of the prevailing
measure. However, the majority determined that its interpretation
was supported by past and current legislation and therefore was the
most accurate application of section 10(b).112 Justice Mosk, although
agreeing with the majority, made an observation regarding future
elections. He predicted initiatives will be designed simply to defeat
their competitors, without any regulatory purpose. 1 3 Furthermore,
he stressed that the decision of Taxpayers v. FPPC is merely an advi-
sory opinion pending a constitutional determination in federal
court."14 The majority's holding will certainly have an impact on the
drafting of future initiatives, regardless of Proposition 73's validity,
109. Id. at 776, 799 P.2d at 1248, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 770-71, 799 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
111. Id. at 783, 799 P.2d at 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 765-68, 799 P.2d at 1233-34, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
113. Id. at 772-73, 799 P.2d at 1245-46, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
114. Proposition 73 was determined to be in violation of the first amendment of the
United States Constitution. Three court decisions have found statutory initiatives ad-
ding sections to the Political Reform Act to be unconstitutional. See Fair Political
Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980) (lobbyist conduct provisions ruled invalid);
Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547
P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. tptr. 106 (1976) (aggregate spending limits found unconstitutional);
Hardie v. Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 969 (1977) (limitations on circulation spending held void). Cf. Note, Statutory
Limitations on Corporate Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The Case for Con-
stitutionality, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (1985). This article suggests that corporate spend-
ing limits should be imposed in order for direct democracy to function properly.
Furthermore, this author asserts that there is no first amendment violation when the
initiative is designed to protect compelling government interests.
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because it firmly establishes that when two competing measures ap-
pear on a ballot, only one will become operative.
JODY L. GRAY
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
Materiality is an element of a perjury prosecution under
the Political Reform Act that is properly submitted to the
jury; and the trial court has the discretionary power to
order an evidentiary hearing, regarding jury misconduct
allegations, wherein jurors may be called to testify:
People v. Hedgecock.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Hedgecock,' the California Supreme Court addressed
two questions: (1) whether materiality in a perjury2 prosecution pur-
suant to the Political Reform Act 3 is an element properly considered
by the jury, and (2) whether the trial court has the discretion to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing4 pursuant to jury misconduct allegations
wherein jurors may be called to testify. The court held that material-
ity was indeed a separate element that the prosecution must prove as
part of its case.5 Furthermore, the court held that materiality was an
element that should be decided by the jury rather than the court.6
Failure to allow the issue to go before the jury was deemed prejudi-
cial because the issue of materiality was not conceded by the defense,
and the facts before the court were complex.7 The court also held
1. 51 Cal. 3d 395, 795 P.2d 1260, 272 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1990). Justice Kennard wrote
the majority opinion joined by Justices Mosk, Broussard and Arabian. Justice Panelli
wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Eagleson and Chief Justice Lucas
each wrote separate concurring and dissenting opinions.
2. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1139 (6th ed. 1990), defines perjury as:
the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made
by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath
or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such evi-
dence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion
being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to
be false. (emphasis added). See generally 70 C.J.S. Perjury § 22 (1987) (dis-
cussing perjury in connection with the filing of affidavits); 60A AM. JUR. 2D
Perjury §§ 7-37 (1988) (discussing the elements of perjury); Tiersma, The Lan-
guage of Perjury: "Literal Truth," Amibguity, and the False Statement Re-
quirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1990).
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81000 (West 1987) (commonly referred to as the Political
Reform Act of 1974). See generally 28 CAL. JuR. 3D Elections § 102 (1986); Diamond,
California's Political Reform Act" Greater Access to the Initiative Process, 7 Sw. U.L.
REV.. 453 (1975).
4. An evidentiary hearing would encompass a separate proceeding in which the
court would determine the validity of juror misconduct allegations.
5. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 409, 795 P.2d at 1267-68, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
6. Id
7. Id at 410, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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that it is within the discretion of the trial court to grant an eviden-
tiary hearing pursuant to a motion for a new trial that alleges jury
misconduct.8 Although the court is not required to grant such a
hearing, it may do so if it deems the allegations of misconduct have
sufficient merit.9 Moreover, jurors may be called to testify at the
hearing upon the request of the parties.' 0
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Political Reform Act of 1974 requires the disclosure of certain
financial information from an elected official or candidate." The pri-
mary purpose of the Act was to ensure that "[r]eceipts and expendi-
tures in election campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed
in order that the voters may be fully informed and improper prac-
tices may be inhibited."12 The Act requires that all public officials
disclose pertinent financial information by filing annual economic in-
terest statements.' 3 The Act also requires that officials and candi-
dates file periodic statements disclosing campaign contributions and
expenditures. 14 Section 81004 of the Government Code requires that
8. Id. at 419, 795 P.2d at 1274, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 399-400, 795 P.2d at 1261, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
12. Id. at 406, 795 P.2d at 1265-66, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 81002(a)).
13. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87200 (West 1987) (specifying scope of Act's applicabil-
ity); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87203 (West 1987) (requiring persons specified in section 87200
to file annual statements regarding certain financial transactions); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 87206 & 87207 (West 1987) (describing the types of investment interests or income
that must be reported under the Act). See also Community Cause v. Boatwright, 124
Cal. App. 3d 888, 177 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1981) (interpreting fair value disclosure require-
ments of investment under Government Code section 87206 to require only statement
that investment exceeds the minimum amount required to be reported pursuant to the
statute); Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 153 Cal. Rptr.
311 (1979) (requiring campaign committees to report the benefit of campaign worker
who is loaned out to the campaign by an employer just as if the employer had made a
direct cash contribution).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84200 (West 1987) (which provides for periodic filing of
statements disclosing contributions and expenditures). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 84211 (setting forth the required contents of such statements). See generally 29
C.J.S. Elections § 329 (1965 & Supp. 1991) (discussing various corrupt practices acts and
expenditure statements); Annotation, Power of Corporation to Make Political Contri-
bution or Expenditure Under State Law, 79 A.L.R.3d 491 (1979) (power of corporations
to make political contributions); Note, Statutory Limitations on Corporate Spending
in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The Case for Constitutionality, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 433
(1985); Note, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982); Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Orders and Enactements Requiring Public Officers and
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such statements be verified under penalty of perjury.15
From 1980 to 1984, the defendant served as a member of the San
Diego County Board of Supervisors and successfully campaigned for
the San Diego Mayor's office.16 During these years, the defendant
filed various disclosure statements pursuant to the Political Reform
Act.17 As required by the Act, each statement was verified by the de-
fendant under the penalty of perjury.'8 On the basis of various state-
ments, or omissions, the defendant was charged with fourteen counts
of perjury pursuant to the Political Reform Act, one count of conflict
of interest,19 and one count of conspiracy to violate state and local fi-
nancial disclosure laws.2 0 The prosecution claimed that the defend-
ant received various contributions and support without reporting
them in derogation of local ordinances and the Political Reform
Act.21 During the trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements
of perjury, excluding materiality from the list of required ele-
ments.2 2 In fact, the court's instruction presupposed materiality
without allowing the question to be presented to the jury.23 The de-
fendant was convicted of twelve counts of perjury and one count of
conspiracy. 24
The trial court denied the defendant's request for a new trial and
the defendant appealed.25 After the court of appeal considered the
Employees, or Candidates for Office to Disclose Financial Condition, Interests, or Rela-
tionships, 22 A.L.R.4th 237 (1983).
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81004 (West 1987). Section 81004 provides in pertinent part
that "[a]ll reports and statements filed under this title shall be signed under penalty of
perjury and verified by the filer. The verification shall state that the filer has used all
reasonable diligence in its preparation, and that to the best of his knowledge it is true
and complete." Id.
16. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 400, 795 P.2d at 1261, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 403, 795 P.2d at 1263-64, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 807. See generally, 26 AM. JUR.
2D Elections § 287-290 (1966 & Supp. 1991) (discussing periodic statements).
20. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 403, 795 P.2d at 1263, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
21. Id. at 400, 795 P.2d at 1261, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The prosecution alleged that
two persons had made the following unreported contributions:
(1) financial support for Tom Shepard and Associates, which provided consul-
tation services for defendant's mayoral campaign; (2) a donation of $3,000 used
to create a computer list of names for fundraising purposes; (3) Hoover's
'purchase' of a promissory note owed to defendant, who continued to receive
interest payments on the note after the purchase; and (4) financial assistance
for the remodeling of defendant's home. In addition, the prosecution con-
tended that Harvey Schuster, one of defendant's supporters, had paid $500 for
legal services performed solely for defendant's benefit.
Id. See generally Mohr, Liability of Political Candidates and Their Staffs for Cam-
paign Committee Obligations, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 33 (1987).
22. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 404, 795 P.2d at 1264, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
23. Id. at 403, 795 P.2d at 1264, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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case,
2 6 the California Supreme Court granted review to consider two
questions: (1) whether materiality is an element of perjury under the
Political Reform Act that is to be determined by the jury; and (2)
whether allegations of jury misconduct27 empower the court with the
discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing and call jurors to testify
in order to determine the merit of such allegations. 28
At the supreme court level, the prosecution asserted several argu-
ments: (1) the element of materiality is "'fundamentally different'"
from other elements and is a question that should be decided by the
court;29 (2) even if the court holds that the question of materiality is
one for the jury, the decision should not be applied retroactively
since the defendant's trial occurred before the "new rule of law" was
created in People v. Figueroa;30 (3) that the alleged jury tampering or
jury misconduct did not affect the jury deliberation process;3 1 (4) that
an investigation of jury misconduct may be made by affidavit but not
by way of an evidentiary hearing;3 2 and (5) that even if the court has
the power to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding jury miscon-
duct, jurors cannot be called to testify. 33
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Materiality is an element of perjury under the Political Reform
Act that should have been entrusted to the jury for
consideration.
The California Supreme Court held in People v. Figueroa 4 that
each element of a crime must be presented to the jury for determina-
26. People v. Hedgecock, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 247 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1988), review
granted, 250 Cal. Rptr. 268, 758 P.2d 596 (1988), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 51 Cal. 3d
395, 795 P.2d 1260, 272 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1990).
27. See, e.g., People v. Veal, 58 Ill. App. 3d 938, 374 N.E. 2d 963 (1978), cert denied,
441 U.S. 908 (1979) (where a juror's consumption of a pint of liquor on the night before
trial was considered grave misconduct). See also People v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d 210, 801
P.2d 323, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1990) (trial court has the power to inquire into possible jury
misconduct by asking whether juror is following court's instructions during the pen-
alty phase of a murder trial). See generally 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 978-998 (1974 &
Supp. 1991); Note, Pre-Deliberations Juror MisconducA Evidential Incompetence, and
Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE L. J. 187 (1988).
28. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 399, 795 P.2d at 1261, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
29. Id. at 408, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
30. Id. at 409, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (citing People v. Figueroa, 41
Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986)).
31. Id. at 413, 795 P.2d at 1270, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
32. Id. at 415, 795 P.2d at 1272, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
33. Id. at 416, 795 P.2d at 1272, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
34. 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986).
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tion in order to produce a valid verdict.35 Although the prosecution
in Hedgecock conceded that materiality is an element of the crime of
perjury,3 6 the prosecution contended that the element of materiality
is "'fundamentally different' from other elements" and is a "legal
question best decided by the trial court." 37 In support of its position,
the prosecution asserted that numerous California and federal court
cases regarding perjury have held that materiality is a question that
is properly decided by the court.3 8
The court, however, was not persuaded by the prosecution's argu-
ment, and held that the element of materiality is a question properly
decided by the jury.39 The court reasoned that the cases cited by the
prosecution were not analogous because they did not involve perjury
prosecutions based on falsifications or omissions in connection with
the filing of financial disclosure statements.40 Instead, the court
analogized the instant scenario to cases in various other contexts
where materiality is an issue for the jury.41 The court concluded that
these analogies constituted strong support for finding materiality as
an element to be decided by the jury.4 2 The court stated that "the
determination of materiality is not simply a question of law .... [but
instead a question that] involves an evaluation of the significance of
the defendant's statements or omissions, in the circumstances in
which they were made."43 In a criminal prosecution for perjury pur-
suant to the Political Reform Act, the court defined a fact as
material:
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it
important in evaluating (1) whether a candidate should be elected to, or re-
35. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 407, 795 P.2d at 1266, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (citing Peo-
ple v. Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986)).
36. Id, at 407, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The Attorney General con-
ceded during oral argument that materiality is an element of a perjury conviction
under the Political Reform Act. However, the Attorney General argued that this ele-
ment was one properly decided by the court rather than the jury. Id.
37. Id. at 408-09, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
38. Id. at 408-09, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. The cases cited by the
prosecution include: People v. Pierce, 66 Cal. 2d 53, 423 P.2d 969, 56 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1967); People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224, 32 P. 11 (1893); Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 (1929); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at
408-09, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11.
39. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 409, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 408, 795 P.2d at 1267, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (citing Radiation Dynamics,
Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972) (prosecution based on federal securities
law where jury determined whether information was material); Warner Constr. Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 466 P.2d 996, 85 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1970) (involving a
civil fraud action where materiality was decided by the jury); People v. Allison, 48 Cal.
3d 879, 771 P.2d 1294, 258 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990) (in-
volving a criminal prosecution where jurors considered materiality as part of evaluat-
ing the witness' testimony).
42. Id.
43. Id.
1108
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tained in, public office, or (2) whether a public official can perform the duties
of office free from any bias caused by concern for the financial interests of the
official or the official's supporters.4 4
The prosecution also argued that in the event the court should de-
termine that materiality is a question for the jury, retroactivity con-
cerns preclude this result in Hedgecock.45  The prosecution's
retroactivity argument included three premises: (1) Figueroa estab-
lished a new rule of law by holding that materiality in a perjury ac-
tion is a question for the jury; (2) Figueroa was decided after the trial
in Hedgecock was complete; and (3) application of the factors set
forth in People v. Guerra 46 suggest that the Figueroa holding should
not be applied retroactively.47 The court did not, however, reach the
question of whether the decision in Figueroa should be applied retro-
actively because that decision did not constitute a new rule of law.4s
The court also refused to comment on whether Hedgecock may apply
retroactively to other cases involving the same issue.49
Because the court held that materiality is an issue to be submitted
to the jury, the court then considered whether the trial court's fail-
ure to do so was prejudicial.50 The court stated that application of
either of two possible tests51 would require reversal of the court of
appeal's decision.52 Since the fact issues were complex and the de-
fendant did not concede the issue, failure to present the issue of ma-
44. Id. at 406-07, 795 P.2d at 1266, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
45. 1& at 409, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811. See generally, Annotation,
Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 § 9-11
(1966) (discussing retroactivity in various contexts).
46. 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984).
47. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 409, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal.. Rptr. at 811. The
Guerra retroactivity test considers: "(1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent of
reliance on the old rule, and (3) the burden imposed- on the administration of justice
by retroactive application of the new rule." Id.
48. Id,
49. Id, at 409-10, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The court's refusal to find
that Figueroa created a new rule of law, which would warrant the application of the
Guerra retroactivity test, rested on the fact that in Figueroa, the issue of whether ma-
teriality is a jury question was not before the court. Id at 409, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 811. Based on the court's comment and the fact that the issue was before
the court in Hedgecock, it is probable that Hedgecock will be construed as creating a
new rule of law. Whether the holding in Hedgecock will be applied retroactively will
therefore depend on application of the Guerra test.
50. M at 410, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
51. The court discussed two standards by which prejudice could be measured: the
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard and the "fundamentally unfair" stan-
dard. Id. at 410, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12. The court stated that appli-
cation of either standard to the facts in Hedgecock would result in a finding of
prejudice and require reversal. Id.
52. Id.
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teriality to the jury was prejudicial and required reversal of the
perjury convictions.53 However, the conspiracy conviction, which did
not include a materiality element, was not reversed pursuant to the
court's materiality analysis.54 Therefore, the validity of the conspir-
acy conviction rested on the court's determination of whether it had
the discretion to order an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial, which alleged jury misconduct.55
B. The trial court improperly decided that it did not have the
discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
the merit of the jury misconduct allegations.
The defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of misconduct
included two allegations: (1) bailiff misconduct influenced the jury's
deliberations, and (2) juror alcohol consumption influenced jury de-
liberations.56 The prosecution argued that an evidentiary hearing on
the matter should not be granted because the allegations of juror
misconduct may be investigated only by affidavit5 7 The court, how-
ever, rejected the prosecution's contentionm and held that the court
does have the discretion to order an evidentiary hearing based on al-
legations of jury misconduct.5 9 In support of its position, the court
cited Penal Code section 118160 which states nothing requiring such
motions be supported by affidavit only.61
The prosecution then argued that regardless of the court's determi-
nation of whether the court could have conducted an evidentiary
hearing, jurors may not be called as witnesses to participate in such a
hearing.62 The prosecution contended that compelling jurors to tes-
53. Id. at 410, 795 P.2d at 1268-69, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
54. Id at 410, 795 P.2d at 1269, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
55. Id at 411, 795 P.2d at 1269, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
56. Id. at 411-13, 795 P.2d at 1269-71, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 812-14. Allegations of mis-
conduct included: Comments made by a bailiff to the jury while they were sequestered
regarding what constitutes "reasonable doubt;" comments by a bailiff to members of
the jury that he could predict how certain jurors would decide; and that one bailiff
provided alcohol to jury members the night before the trial, which caused one juror to
become so "hung over" on the final day of deliberations that the juror "had to go to
the bathroom every 15 minutes to vomit." Id.
57. Id. at 415, 795 P.2d at 1272, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1181 (West 1985)).
58. Id. The court rejected the Attorney General's contention because it felt that
the prosecution's reliance on section 1181 of the Penal Code was misplaced. Id
Although the statute provides for affidavit submission pursuant to motions for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, it has no bearing on such a motion based on
allegations of jury misconduct. Id.
59. Id. The court stressed that "discretion" does not require a court to order an
evidentiary hearing but instead allows a court to do so when it feels misconduct allega-
tions warrant such a hearing. Id.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 1985).
61. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 415, 795 P.2d at 1272, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
62. Id
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tify in such hearings would discourage jury service as well as juror
discourse and debate during the course of deliberations, because ju-
rors would fear having their mental processes scrutinized.63 The
court mentioned several reasons for rejecting this argument: (1) a
trial court may refuse to compel jurors to testify to such matters
when the testimony will relate to the "content" of jury decision-mak-
ing; (2) the court can virtually ensure that jurors are treated accepta-
bly by asking the questions of the jurors itself; and (3) section 1150 of
the Evidence Code64 protects jurors from having to reveal the mental
processes by which they reach a particular verdict.6 5
In response to the prosecution's assertion that the alleged miscon-
duct did not affect jury deliberations, the court stated that the allega-
tions made, if true, are "presumptively prejudicial. '" 6 After a brief
discussion of the evolution of the law from a traditional policy disal-
lowing jurors to present evidence, to a modern abandonment of such
a policy, the court articulated several advantages of a rule that allows
a court discretion to conduct a hearing in which jurors may be called
to testify: (1) cross-examination 67 of jurors at a hearing is more likely
to indicate whether misconduct actually occurred;68 (2) a hearing
would allow representative counsel, as well as the court, an opportu-
nity to facilitate the jurors' recollection of the deliberations in order
to determine truth;69 and (3) allowing such discretion is "consistent
with procedures at other stages of criminal proceedings."7 0 The court
concluded that the trial court's opinion that it was not empowered
with the discretion to order an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of
discretion.7 ' Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial72 and remanded the conspiracy con-
63. I& at 418, 795 P.2d at 1274, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
64. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991). See Trammel v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 157, 209 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1984) (certified for partial pub-
lication) (reasoning processes of jurors held inadmissable),
65. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 418, 795 P.2d at 1274, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
66. Id at 419, 795 P.2d at 1275, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (citing People v. Honeycutt, 20
Cal. 3d 150, 570 P.2d 1050, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1977)). The court stated that either the
bailiff's comments or the consumption of alcohol if true would be presumed to be prej-
udicial. Id.
67. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CAL. EVIDENCE 3d, Witnesses § 1873 (1986) (discuss-
ing nature and purpose of cross-examination of witnesses); 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses
§ 463 (1976 & Supp. 1991) (discussing cross-examination rules and procedures).
68. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 417, 795 P.2d at 1273, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 417, 795 P.2d at 1273, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
71. Id. at 420, 795 P.2d at 1275, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
72. Id.
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viction for consideration of whether misconduct actually occurred.73
In summary, the court determined that materiality is an element
of perjury under the Political Reform Act. The court further held
that this element like most other elements is properly decided by the
jury. The court rejected the argument that retroactivity precludes
reversal of the perjury convictions and declined to comment on
whether its decision should be applied retroactively. As a result, trial
courts now possess the discretionary power to order an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for a new trial premised on allegations of jury
misconduct. Furthermore, the court held that a trial court may order
jurors to testify at an evidentiary hearing in order to facilitate deter-
mination of the truthfulness of jury misconduct allegations.
C. Concurring Opinion of Justice Panelli
Although Justice Panelli concurred with most of the majority opin-
ion, he criticized and refused to adopt the definition of materiality
announced by the court.74 He argued that the definition adopted by
the majority was too subjective, as it would allow a jury to convict a
defendant of perjury based upon the individual subjective biases that
a voter may have towards a particular person or act.75 After criticiz-
ing the majority's substantial reliance on an analogy between proxy
statements76 and financial disclosure statements under the Political
Reform Act, Justice Panelli stated that unlike proxy statement sce-
narios, "there does not exist an objective standard by which we can
measure the reasonableness of a person's behavior as a voter."77 He
also attempted to distinguish the character and purpose of a proxy
statement from a financial disclosure statement.78
73. Id
74. Id. at 421, 795 P.2d at 1276, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Panelli, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Panelli suggested the following instruction for materiality: "[a] false statement in
a required report is material if it is of substantial importance in determining whether a
public official [or] candidate would be able to perform the duties of his or her office
free from bias caused by his or her own financial interests or the financial interests of
persons who have supported him or her." Id. at 423 n.2, 795 P.2d at 1277 n.2, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 820 n.2 (Panelli, J., concurring).
75. 1& at 421, 795 P.2d at 1276, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Panelli, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Panelli thought the definition esposed by the majority is too subjective because it
requires the jury to determine the materiality of a statement or omission by consider-
ing whether a reasonable person would consider it important in evaluating whether a
candidate should be elected to public office. Id. Justice Panelli stated that a reason-
able person may consider "anything" to be important in such an evaluation, since the
law allows voters to consider candidates' race and religion when voting for a candidate.
Id.
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (6th ed. 1990) defines proxy statement as
"[i]nformation required by SEC to be given stockholders as a prerequisite to solicita-
tion of proxies for a security subject to the requirements of Securities Exchange Act."
77. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 422, 795 P,2d at 1276, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Panelli, J.,
concurring).
78. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring).
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D. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Eagleson
Justice Eagleson concurred with the majority that a trial court has
discretionary authority to order an evidentiary hearing and dissented
with the majority's position that materiality is a question for the
jury.79 In his dissent, Justice Eagleson presented what he considered
to be substantial and persuasive federal case authority for the propo-
sition that materiality is not a question for the jury.8 0 After indicat-
ing that a great majority of jurisdictions treat materiality as an issue
for the court, he concluded that the general rule, which allows the
court to decide materiality, is proper.8 ' He also opined that under
the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,82 the jury would
have reached the same result as the court.8 3 Therefore, it was not
prejudicial to submit the question to the court rather than the jury.
E. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Lucas
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Lucas joined in Justice Eagle-
son's dissent stating that there is no reason for departing from the
traditional rule that materiality is a question for the court.8 4 How-
ever, he joined the majority opinion regarding all other
considerations.8 5
IV. IMPACT
In holding that materiality is a jury question in a perjury prosecu-
tion under the Political Reform Act, the court has prudently placed
79. Id. at 423, 795 P.2d at 1277-78, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21 (Eagleson, J., concurring
& dissenting).
80. Id. at 427, 795 P.2d at 1280, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (Eagleson, J., concurring &
dissenting) (citing United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)).
However, Justice Eagleson pointed out that two federal circuits have held that materi-
ality is a jury question. Id. at 423 n.4, 795 P.2d at 1280 n.4, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 823 n.4
(Eagleson, J., concurring & dissenting).
81. Id. at 431, 795 P.2d at 1283, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (Eagleson, J., concurring &
dissenting).
82. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Law Regarding Cure of Error, in
Instruction as One Offense, By Conviction of Higher or Lesser Offense, 15 A.L.R.4th
118 (1982) (discussing harmless error in juror instruction scenarios).
83. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 436, 795 P.2d at 1286, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (Eagleson,
J., concurring & dissenting). Justice Eagleson posited that since the conspiracy convic-
tion was upheld, the jury's conviction established that the jury rejected the defendant's
defense and thus, instructional error was not prejudicial. Id.. (Eagleson, J., concurring
& dissenting).
84. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
85. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
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the power to convict unethical politicians where it belongs, with the
laypersons of the jury. By vesting the jury with the power to decide
materiality pursuant to perjury prosecution, the court has ensured
the type of separation of powers that we have come to expect in the
federal system.8 6 Since the jury will decide materiality, the judiciary
will not be compelled to influence the outcome of the prosecution in
such a manner as it might otherwise.
The court's decision is also desirable because the defendant in a
perjury prosecution under the Political Reform Act is generally one
who was elected by the voting public to a position in the local govern-
ment. Who better to determine the materiality of the statement or
omission on an affidavit than a small portion of the voting public
itself?
Although Justice Panelli criticized the majority's definition of ma-
teriality because it involves a subjective voter standard,8 7 it is doubt-
ful that Justice Panelli's concerns will materialize. He stated that
the materiality definition is so subjective that it allows a juror to
"consult his subjective biases"88 and implies that race, sex and reli-
gion are factors that may be used by jurors to determine whether
something is material.89 Nothing in the majority's adopted definition
implies such a probability.90 In fact, when the definition is read in
the context of a perjury prosecution under the Political Reform Act,
it is clear that when a juror is to consider whether the fact is impor-
tant in determining whether a candidate should be elected to office,
he or she is to consider whether a conflict of interest exists that
would be important in evaluating whether a candidate should be
elected.91 It is doubtful that the materiality definition adopted will
86. Our federal system of government provides for a separation of powers between
the executive, judicial and legislative branches. Hedgecock leaves less opportunity for
state politicians to strike unsavory deals with the judiciary because allocating the ques-
tion of materiality to the jury further limits the judiciary's ability to control the result
of the prosecution. It is not being asserted that the judiciary would necessarily engage
in unethical behavior, however, allocating the question to the jury precludes any spec-
ulation of judicial impropriety. In a time when public perception of the legal system
has become less than laudatory, there is merit in avoiding the possibility or appearance
of impropriety.
87. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 423, 795 P.2d at 1277, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Panelli, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 421, 795 P.2d at 1276, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Panelli, J., concurring).
89. Id (Panelli, J., concurring).
90. The majority defined materiality under the Act as a "substantial likelihood
that a reasonable person would consider it important in evaluating (1) whether a can-
didate should be elected to, or retained in, public office, or (2) whether a public official
can perform the duties of office free from any bias caused by concern for the financial
interests of the official or the official's supporters." Id. at 406-07, 795 P.2d at 1266, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 809.
91. Id. at 406, 795 P.2d at 1266, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 81002(c) (West 1987), which indicates that the purpose of the Act is to prevent polit-
ical conflicts of interest).
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cause jurors to stray from the purpose of the prosecution, which is to
decide a defendant's guilt under the Act, and exercise such subjective
biases as race, religion and sex.
The court's holding that a trial court has the discretion to order an
evidentiary hearing is consistent with maintaining the integrity and
fairness of the judicial process. By giving trial courts discretion to or-
der such a hearing,92 the court has also given the trial courts the abil-
ity to discard meritless claims of misconduct. The discretion to order
such a hearing does not bind the trial court to do so blindly if it feels
that juror misconduct claims are not legitimate. Since the fairness
and integrity of the judicial system depend upon the participation of
the jury, it can hardly be said that the system will ensure a fair result
if jury misconduct exists. If a defendant's liberty is going to be sub-
ject to the determination of guilt by the jury, it is imperative the jury
performs its task diligently and without misconduct. Just as the con-
sumption of alcohol impairs the motor skills of a driver on the high-
way, consumption of alcohol, no doubt, impairs the deliberate
functions of persons participating on a jury panel. When egregious
juror behavior is presented to the court, as was the case in
Hedgecock, it is proper that the court should have the discretion to
order a hearing regarding the allegations. Furthermore, it is desira-
ble that it be the trial court that has such discretion. Since the mis-
conduct is that which occurred at the trial court level, and the trial
court is in the best position to determine what occurred during its
own proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Hedgecock creates a
new rule of law by holding that materiality is a jury question in a
prosecution for perjury under the Political Reform Act.93 The guilt
or innocence of a politician prosecuted for perjury under the Act will
92. Id. at 419, 795 P.2d at 1274, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 817. The court states that "[t]he
hearing should not be used as a 'fishing expedition' to search for possible misconduct,
but should be held only when the defense has come forward with evidence demon-
strating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred." Id.
93. Although the court does not state this explicitly, it can be inferred by the
court's statement that the only reason why Figueroa did not create a new rule of law
was because the case did not present the issue of whether materiality was a jury ques-
tion. Id. at 409, 795 P.2d at 1268, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 811. Since Hedgecock squarely
placed this issue before the court, the holding in Hedgecock will likely be construed in
the future as creating a new rule of law. The ramifications of whether a new rule of
law is created will affect the retroactivity of the holding to other cases.
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depend on the jury's resolution of whether the statements, or omis-
sions are material. In light of the general public's distrust of politi-
cians in general, the practical significance of the court's holding is
that public officials prosecuted under the Act will experience more
difficulty in absolving themselves.
In holding that the trial court has the discretion to order an evi-
dentiary hearing upon allegations of juror misconduct, the California
Supreme Court has demonstrated its distaste for juror misconduct.
The court's holding comports with upholding the fairness and integ-
rity of the judicial system because it gives a trial court that ability to
ferret out juror misconduct by conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, the court's holding enables the trial court to order ju-
rors to testify at such a hearing which gives the trial court the ability
to make the most effective inquiry of alleged misconduct. Therefore,
since the court stated that either juror alcohol consumption or bailiff
statements to jurors during sequestration would, if true, be presump-
tively prejudicial, the prosecution should take precautions to ensure
that everyone coming in contact with jurors conduct themselves
appropriately.
DARREN M. CAMPF
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Collateral estoppel does not attach to issues decided in
probation revocation hearing: Lucido v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue presented in Lucido v. Superior Court' was whether a
ruling favorable to a defendant in a probation revocation hearing
could act as collateral estoppel and consequently bar the state from
subsequent judicial prosecution. The majority opinion, written by
Chief Justice Lucas, 2 acknowledged that a finding in a probation rev-
ocation hearing could satisfy all the standard prerequisites for collat-
eral estoppel. 3 However, successful application of collateral estoppel
requires more than the satisfaction of certain conventional require-
ments. Any particular instance of preclusion by collateral estoppel
must also promote the underlying central precepts of the doctrine.4
1. 51 Cal. 3d 335, 795 P.2d 1223, 272 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1990) (en banc), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2021 (1991).
2. Justices Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard, and Arabian concurred in the majority
opinion of Chief Justice Lucas. Justice Eagleson wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Justices Mosk and Broussard issued separate dissenting opinions.
3. Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr.
767, 769 (1990).
4. Id. at 342-43, 795 P.2d at 1226, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
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Therefore, based upon policy considerations, the majority held that
collateral estoppel does not apply in this situation.5 Specifically, the
majority insisted that criminal trials, and not probation hearings,
were the proper forum for conclusive determinations of criminal
guilt or innocence.6
In direct opposition to the majority, the two dissenting Justices,
concerned primarily with the rights of the accused, asserted that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel should attach to specific findings deter-
mined at a probation revocation hearing.7
II. BACKGROUND
The doctrines of former adjudication, often collectively denoted by
the term res judicata,s prohibit the relitigation of identical claims or
issues.9 These procedural doctrines were developed to assure the fi-
nality of judicial determinations and thus conserve judicial resources
by preventing wasteful relitigation. In addition to considerations of
judicial economy, the preclusion doctrines serve to avoid inconsistent
rulings and prevent the harassment of vexatious litigation upon par-
ties involved in prior actions.' 0
5. See supra note 74 and part IV of this note (discussing the majority opinion
generally).
6. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 348, 795 P.2d at 1230, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
7. Id at 353, 795 P.2d at 1233, 727 Cal. Rptr. at 778 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Id. at
361, P.2d at 1239; 272 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
8. Former adjudication, also known as res judicata, and sometimes spelled "res
adjudicata," are general terms used to describe procedural preclusion doctrines. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS Chapter 3, introductory note (1982).
The terminology to describe the doctrines in this field of law varies widely. The Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments divides former adjudication into "claim preclusion"
(the doctrine coinciding with traditional res judicata) and "issue preclusion" (still com-
monly called collateral estoppel, as named in the first Restatement of Judgments). RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Chapter 1, introduction (1982). See 7 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment §§ 190(1), 193, 253 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990). The
modern terms advocated by the Second Restatement are thought to more clearly ex-
press the functions of the doctrines described. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Ex-
pansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 359 (1974) (suggesting the Second Restatement adopt
the more descriptive names); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 14.1 (1985).
9. For a discussion of the intended effects of the preclusion doctrines, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Chapter 1, introduction (1982). See also 7 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment § 188 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990).
10. See e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (listing judicial
economy, reliance on judicial action, and other factors, as policy reasons underlying
collateral estoppel); Chamblin v. Municipal Court, 130 Cal. App. 3d 115, 119, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 636, 638 (1982) (citing People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 695, 527 P.2d 622, 628-29,
117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76-77 (1974)).
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One branch of former adjudication, the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel, prohibits the relitigation of issues of fact previously adjudicated
on the merits."1 A party asserting collateral estoppel must prove 12
five basic prerequisites to prevent the relitigation of an issue:13 the
opposing party must be identical to or in privity with the opposing
party in the previous proceeding;14 the issue sought to be precluded
must be identical to that decided in the previous proceeding; the issue
must have actually been litigated;15 the issue must have been essen-
tial to, or necessarily decided16 in, the previous judgment; and the
previous decision must have been final17 and on the merits.' 8 The
satisfaction of these requirements enables, but does not assure,19 suc-
cessful issue preclusion. The judicial level at which the prior pro-
ceeding occurred is irrelevant because collateral estoppel attaches to
the final judgments of all courts.20 Thus, judgments from even the
lowest ranking tribunals effectively bind higher courts.21
Collateral estoppel is traditionally viewed as a doctrine of civil,
rather than criminal, procedure. However, modern statutory of-
fenses have become so specific that a single act may give rise to a va-
riety of crimes, each creating distinct prosecutions, but resolving
identical questions of fact. Hence, contemporary criminal law has
11. In contrast, the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents the reassertion of a claim
or cause of action in a subsequent suit. For a brief history of claim and issue preclu-
sion that traces the origins of these doctrines back to the Roman Empire and ancient
germanic tribes, see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.2
(1985).
12. See, e.g., Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 257, 572 P.2d 28, 31-32, 142 Cal. Rptr.
414, 417 (1977) (the burden of proof rests on the party advancing collateral estoppel).
13. This five element list is enumerated by Chief Justice Lucas in Lucido, 51 Cal,
3d 335, 341, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. 767, 769.
14. See 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses §§ 343-45
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (discussing the requirement that the parties be the same or
in privity).
15. See, e.g., Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695, 28 P.2d 916, 918 (1934).
16. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 177 Cal. App. 3d 466, 470, 225 Cal. Rptr. 673, 674,
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2893 (1985) (emphasizing that defense of collateral estoppel re-
quires that the issue be necessarily decided in the prior hearing, and not merely actu-
ally decided).
17. See 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment § 216 (3d ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1990).
18. See 7 B. WITKIN, & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Defenses § 342 (2d
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
19. Exceptions to the doctrine of collateral estoppel exist. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
20. This includes courts of special or limited jurisdiction, as well as courts in other
states. However, an exception exists for small claims courts due to the uniquely infor-
mal procedures of such hearings. 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment
§ 202 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990).
21. 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment § 201 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1990). Specifically, collateral estoppel applies to judgments from justice courts such as
the court which revoked Lucido's probation. Id.
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transformed collateral estoppel into a criminal defense. 22
Used as such a defense, collateral estoppel closely resembles the
doctrine of double jeopardy 23 encountered in criminal procedure.
Both serve to prevent wasteful and vexing relitigation.24 However,
the crux of this latter defense is the peculiar notion of "jeopardy"
found only in criminal proceedings. A judicial proceeding places a
criminal defendant in jeopardy when an imminent danger of convic-
tion exists.25 Double jeopardy was not a viable defense in Lucido be-
cause jeopardy does not attach to probation revocation hearings.26
22. 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 340 (2d ed.
1988 & Supp. 1990). Regarding the use of collateral estoppel in criminal law, see gen-
erally 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 321-335 (1981 & Supp. 1990); 22 CAL, JUR. 3D
(REV) Criminal Law § 3512 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
23. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend v. Double Jeopardy is an incorpo-
rated constitutional right, applicable to the states though the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Article I, sec-
tion 15 of the California Constitution also contains a double jeopardy clause. See gen-
erally 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses §§ 271-72 (2d
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
Indeed the fifth amendment bar against double jeopardy contains the collateral es-
toppel principle, as explained by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). In Ashe, a poker game was disrupted by several men
who robbed the card players. The defendant was charged with the armed robbery of
one of the players. The court acquitted the accused, holding that he was not one of the
robbers. Later, this same defendant was convicted for the robbery of one of the other
poker players. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the-collateral es-
toppel portion of double jeopardy barred relitigation of the question whether the de-
fendant was one of the robbers. Id, at 445-46. See also 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 341 (2d ed. 1988); 3 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE PRACTICE § 63.02[7] (1990 & Supp. 1990) (discussing Ashe, double jeopardy, and
collateral estoppel as a criminal defense).
For a comparison of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy, see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1 (1985); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 322 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
24. Despite their similarity, double jeopardy and collateral estoppel are distinct
criminal defenses. Under certain circumstances, including the situation in Lucido, an
accused could not claim double jeopardy, but could assert collateral estoppel. See
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1916), where Justice Holmes, in ar-
guing that an accused could use collateral estoppel as a criminal defense, writes "the
Fifth Amendment was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a funda-
mental principle of justice." See generally 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 273 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
25. Typically, jeopardy attaches to a proceeding when either the jury or the first
witness is sworn. See generally 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW, Defenses § 278 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
26. A probation revocation hearing "neither threatens the probationer with the
stigma of a new conviction nor with punishment other than that to which he was al-
ready exposed as a result of his earlier offense, [thus] it does not place the probationer
1119
Ultimately, the existence of collateral estoppel rests upon policy
considerations.27 Consequently, other potentially more important
policy considerations can outweigh those supporting collateral estop-
pel and nullify its application to a particular situation.28 In Lucido,
the California Supreme Court concluded that public policy interests
balanced in favor of disallowing collateral estoppel effect to findings
made at a probation revocation hearing.29
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Convicted in March of 1988 for indecently exposing himself,3 0
Arasimo Settemo Lucido was placed on probation for three years.31
The probation mandated that Lucido reform his conduct to remain
within the bounds of the law and stated expressly that he abstain
from ingesting or possessing illegal drugs.3 2 Approximately six
months into his probation, Lucido was again charged with indecent
exposure,33 this time in front of Mrs. Candice May Silva, her two-
in jeopardy." 51 Cal. 3d at 348, 795 P.2d at 1230, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 773. See also id. at
343 n.5, 795 P.2d at 1226 n.5, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 770 n.5; United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d
336, 341 (6th Cir. 1986).
27. See supra note 10.
28. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 117 Cal. App. 3d 596, 603, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 826, 827-28 (1981) (policy considerations may outweigh the use of collateral estop-
pel). See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.12
(1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3).
29. Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, asserted "application of collateral es-
toppel under the circumstances presented here would ill serve the integrity of the
criminal justice system as a whole." Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 347, 795 P.2d at 1229, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 773. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
30. Indecent exposure, a misdemeanor, violates CAL. PENAL CODE § 314(1) (West
1990). See generally 2 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Crimes
Against Decency & Morals § 802 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 841 (1984 & Supp. 1990); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, & Obscenity
§§ 17-18; California Penal Code Section 314(1); Nudeness or Lewdness,? 24 VI L. J. 1327
(1973) (authored by Walter Benjamin Fisherow).
Lucido was also convicted of another misdemeanor, the carrying a loaded firearm in
a public place in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031(a) (West 1990). See generally 2
B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Public Peach &
Welfare § 1011 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1624 (1984
& Supp. 1990).
31. 51 Cal. 3d 335, 339-40, 795 P.2d 1223, 1224, 272 Cal. Rptr. 767, 768.
32. Id at 340, 795 P.2d at 1224, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
33. This second indecent exposure was a felony because the new complaint filed
against Lucido noted his prior conviction for the same offense. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 314(2) (West 1990). See also People v. Curry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 181, 142 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1977) (making the second offense of indecent exposure a felony does not violate the
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); But cf In re Lynch, 8
Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (sentence of life imprisonment for a
second offense of indecent exposure violates the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment); Recent Decisions, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 416 (discussing
Lynch). See 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 841 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
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year old son Ryan, and several other young children.34
At Lucido's probation revocation hearing35 his probation officer ad-
vised that probation be revoked based not only upon Lucido's second
act of indecent exposure, but also because Lucido tested positive for
narcotics.3 6 Lucido then confessed to using illegal drugs while on
probation. Based solely upon this confession the justice court could
have revoked probation.37 However, Lucido's probation revocation
hearing continued, addressing the disputed charge of his second inde-
cent exposure incident which occurred on June 23, 1988.38
Both Lucido and the district attorney presented evidence and ques-
tioned witnesses regarding the indecent exposure.3 9 Of the five eye-
witnesses to the incident, the district attorney called only the adult,
Mrs. Silva, to testify.40 The hearing resulted in the revocation of
Lucido's probation 4 l founded upon his drug use, "and not based upon
the new indecent exposure charges," because the court found that
the district attorney failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing ev-
idence that a second indecent exposure occurred. 42 No record of the
proceedings was maintained.43
When the district attorney filed an information against Lucido
based on his second indecent exposure, Lucido argued that the prior
probation hearing collaterally estopped the new charges. The supe-
34. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 340 n.2, 795 P.2d at 1224 n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.2.
The dissenting opinion from the court of appeal relates the facts of the disputed inci-
dent. Apparently, while a group of children played on the sidewalk, Mrs. Silva sat fac-
ing her apartment. The children yelled for her attention, but Mrs. Silva ignored their
antics until her son Ryan shouted, "Mommy, he's got a big pee-pee!" This outburst
evoked her concern and when she finally turned around to note the cause of the com-
motion she was greeted by the grinning gaze of Arasimo Settemo Lucido, standing
stark naked on the sidewalk. This incident occurred only three months after Lucido
had been convicted and placed on probation for a previous indecent exposure. Lucido
v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (1989) (Anderson, P.J., dissenting).
35. The probation revocation hearing was held in the justice court in Little Lake
Judicial District, Mendocino County. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 340, 795 P.2d at 1224, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 768.
36. Id.
37. A valid revocation may occur on a showing of a violation of any provision of a
probation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 1990). See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 3475, 3478 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
38. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 340, 795 P.2d at 1224, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
39. Id. Lucido called two witnesses to supplement his own testimony. Lucido v.
Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 n.1 (Anderson, P.J., dissenting).
40. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 340 n.2, 795 P.2d at 1224 n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.2.
41. Lucido's probation was simultaneously revoked, reinstated, and lengthened by
an additional month. Id. at 341, 795 P.2d at 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
42. Id. at 340-41, 795 P.2d at 1224-25, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
43. Id
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rior court initially denied Lucido's motion to dismiss.44 However,
Lucido petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the court of appeal, be-
lieving collateral estoppel appropriate, ordered the information dis-
missed.45 The state subsequently filed a petition for review granted
by the supreme court.46 The supreme court reversed the court of ap-
peal, directing a denial of Lucido's writ.47
IV. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Lucas began the majority's discussion with an analysis of
the standard requirements for collateral estoppel as they apply to the
facts of Lucido. The privity requirement was satisfied because the
opposing parties at both the probation revocation hearing and the
criminal prosecution were the state and Lucido.48 Likewise, the dis-
puted issue in both proceedings was whether Lucido indecently ex-
posed himself before Mrs. Silva and the children.49 This issue was
actually litigated, because both sides had the opportunity to present a
complete case,50 and the decision of the justice court was final and on
the merits.51
Lastly, a defense of collateral estoppel requires that the determina-
tion of the issue be essential to the judgment.5 2 In this case a deci-
sion, whether or not Lucido exposed himself, was not necessary to
the revocation of his probation because his drug use provided in-
dependent grounds for revocation.53 However, the justice court
would probably have imposed a harsher penalty on Lucido had it de-
44. Id.
45. Lucido v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 343, 259 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1988) (ma-
jority opinion by Justice Poche, joined by Justice Perley; dissenting opinion filed by
Presiding Justice Anderson).
46. Lucido v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 475, 777 P.2d 1120, 261 Cal. Rptr. 686
(1989).
47. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 352, 759 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
48. I at 342, 795 P.2d at 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
49. Id The fact that the justice court could only revoke probation, while the supe-
rior court could impose criminal penalties, was immaterial in concluding that the iden-
tical issue requirement had been satisfied. The question is not whether the potential
punishments are identical, but rather whether the same factual allegation is disputed.
'CL
50. l1& at 341, 795 P.2d at 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 769. The key question here is
whether each side has a chance to present all available evidence, and not whether all
such evidence is actually presented. Thus, even though the State did not advance the
strongest possible case against Lucido by calling every eye-witness, the State had the
opportunity to do so. Hence, for purposes of collateral estoppel the issue was "actually
litigated" at the probation revocation hearing. Id, at 340 n.2, 795 P.2d at 1224 n.2, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.2.
51. I& at 341-42, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. 767, 769.
52. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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termined that Lucido had indeed exposed himself as alleged. Thus,
the issue was not wholly irrelevant to the judgement,54 and so this
final requirement was satisfied as well.
Having established that Lucido's case fulfilled every traditional
prerequisite for collateral estoppel, the majority proceeded to evalu-
ate the appropriateness of utilizing the doctrine in this case with re-
gard to social policy.55 The majority was especially concerned with
reconciling Lucido with earlier decisions. Whether factual findings
made at a probation revocation hearing could properly preclude sub-
sequent prosecution was previously addressed by the court of appeal
in the factually similar case of Chamblin v. Municipal Court.56
In Chamblin police officers witnessed a traffic violation, pursued
the defendant, and eventually captured him.57 At his probation revo-
cation hearing the state failed to prove that the defendant was the
driver of the vehicle, but convinced the court that he had resisted
arrest.5 8 Thus, probation was revoked not based on the traffic of-
fense, but upon other violations of probation. Later, when the state
charged the defendant for the traffic violation he defended on the
grounds that the probation court's finding that he was not the driver
collaterally estopped the prosecution.5 9 The court of appeal ruled
that collateral estoppel did not apply because of the significant differ-
ences between a probation revocation hearing and a criminal prosecu-
tion.6 0 The court feared that allowing collateral estoppel "would
have the effect of barring full and fair litigation of ... criminal guilt
due to a less formal proceeding which involved entirely different pur-
poses, policies, procedures and issues."61 Therefore, the Chamblin
54. Justice Lucas explained that the proper analysis questions whether the issue
was "entirely unnecessary" rather than whether the issue was necessary. Lucido, 51
Cal. 3d at 342, 795 P.2d at 1226, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (citing 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Judgment § 268 (3d ed. i985)).
55. Justice Lucas writes, "assuming all the threshold requirements are satisfied
... our analysis is not at an end. We have repeatedly looked to the public policies un-
derlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a
particular setting." Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 342-33, 795 P.2d at 1226, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
56. 130 Cal. App. 3d 115, 181 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1982). See 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 348 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
(REV) Criminal Law § 3512 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
57. Chamblin, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 118, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
58. Id. Resisting an arrest violates CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West 1990). The court
also convicted the probationer of vandalism in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 594
(West 1990). Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 120, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
61. Id. at 121, 181 Cal. Rptr. 639.
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court directly confronted the issue presented by Lucido and explic-
itly denied preclusive effect to findings from probation revocation
hearings.
Had the Chamblin decision existed alone in the sea of case law it
could have provided sufficient precedent to support the denial of
Lucido's writ, and the supreme court might not have granted
Lucido's petition for review. However, another case, People v.
Sims,62 decided by the supreme court, had eroded the effectiveness of
Chamblin.6 3 The Sims case did not involve a probation revocation
hearing, but an administrative hearing, and the court held that ad-
ministrative decisions could collaterally estop criminal prosecution. 64
Because administrative hearings procedurally resemble probation
revocation hearings,65 and both differ substantially from criminal tri-
als, it appeared that the supreme court had implicitly overruled the
lower court's analysis in C'hOamblin.66 The court of appeal used this
assumption to justify Lucido's writ of mandate.67
However, the majority opinion in Lucido made clear that this as-
sumption is erroneous. Chief Justice Lucas resolved that Sims and
Chamblin "do not necessarily conflict."68 Each remains valid prece-
dent with regard to administrative hearings and probation hearings
respectively. The majority distinguishes Sims from C(hamblin by not-
ing that the legislature required the administrative hearing in Sims
prior to any criminal action, the major purpose of such hearing being
to ascertain issues of guilt or innocence.69 Thus, the court perceived
an intent to give preclusive effect to those findings7 0 which do not ex-
ist with respect to probation revocation hearings. 71
The policy analysis of the majority opinion evaluated three specific
social policies which underlie collateral estoppel. First, the court
pondered what effect a ruling either way would have upon the integ-
rity of judicial determinations. 72 Beginning with the assumption that
inconsistent findings endanger public faith in the judiciary, the ma-
jority noted that allowing collateral estoppel prevents any possibility
62. 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982). See California Supreme
Court Survey, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 875 (1983).
63. "Chamblin has been nullified sub silentio by the principles enunciated in Peo-
ple v. Sims." Lucido v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340 (1989).
64. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 489, 651 P.2d at 343, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
65. Both types of proceedings are relatively informal; neither utilizes a jury, or the
rules of evidence. See, e.g., Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 364, 795 P.2d at 1241, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
785 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
66. See supra note 63.
67. Lucido v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
68. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 345, 795 P.2d at 1227, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
69. Id at 349, 795 P.2d at 1231, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
70. Id at 345, 349, 795 P.2d at 1227, 1231, .272 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72, 775.
71. Id at 350, 795 P.2d at 1231, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
72. Id. at 347-50, 795 P.2d at 1229-32, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 773-76.
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of contradictory judgments.73 However, the benefits of consistency
between probation hearings and criminal trials must then justify
eliminating altogether the latter, more formal and thorough proceed-
ing.74 The majority concluded that the minor value stemming from
the eradication of hypothetically inharmonious judgments fails to jus-
tify this result.75
Judicial economy was the second policy consideration the court
considered. 76 Allowing findings from probation hearings to collater-
ally estop future criminal trials would undeniably diminish the
number of trials and issues litigated, clearly conserving judicial re-
sources. 77 In addition, if the state knew that a finding from a proba-
tion hearing could prevent a criminal prosecution, the state may opt
to bypass the less formal hearing and directly initiate a criminal
case.78 If the criminal court acquits the defendant, the state may still
invoke a probation revocation hearing because in California preclu-
sion does not apply in this situation.79 This too promotes judicial
economy to some degree. However, the majority contended that
these positive results do not warrant a rearrangement of the current
organization of criminal courts. In the words of Chief Justice Lucas,
"[w]hatever the efficiencies of applying collateral estoppel in this
case, they pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial
73. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 347, 795 P.2d at 1229, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
74. Justice Lucas aptly remarked that "[c]onsistency ... is not the sole measure of
the integrity of judicial decisions." Id.
75. "The differences between revocation hearings and criminal trials outweigh
whatever adverse effect inconsistent factual determinations would have on the integ-
rity of the judicial system." Id. at 350, 795 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
76. Id. at 350-51, 795 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. In re Coughlin, 16 Cal. 3d 52, 57-59, 545 P.2d 249, 252, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340
(1976). The fact that the state has the lower burden of proof of "clear and convincing
evidence" at a probation revocation hearing than the "Beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard required at criminal trials seems to justify the lack of preclusion in this in-
stance. Accord Dunn v. State, 65 Md. App. 637, 501 A.2d 881 (1985), cert. granted, 308
Md. 146, 517 A.2d 771 (1986); Jackson v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 1981); John-
son v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 242 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978); State v. Jame-
son, 112 Ariz. 315, 541 P.2d 912 (1975); Russ v. State, 313 So.2d 758 (Fla.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 924 (1975).
Nevertheless, some states apply collateral estoppel in this situation, disregarding the
reduced level of proof. See, e.g., People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975) (criminal acquittal prevents states from revoking pro-
bation in Illinois). See, Note, Probation and Parole: Effect of Felony Acquittal on Pro-
bation Revocation, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 474, 485 (1978) (indicating that Illinois is alone in
this view). But see Commissioner v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983) (indicat-
ing that Pennsylvania also shares this view).
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process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence."8 0
Lastly the court addressed the policy against vexatious litigation.8 1
While it is true that denying Lucido's collateral estoppel argument
forces him to endure two separate hearings, this is to be expected be-
cause the state accused Lucido of committing two separate crimes: vi-
olating probation and indecent exposure. "The essence of
vexatiousness . . . is not mere repetition. Rather, it is harassment
through baseless or unjustified litigation."8 2 Hence, the majority
maintained that the subsequent criminal trial after Lucido's proba-
tion revocation hearing was perfectly fair and not vexing in any way
that justified barring the appropriate criminal prosecution.83
B. Concurring Opinion
The short concurring opinion by Justice Eagleson serves to reiter-
ate the majority's conclusion that allowing collateral estoppel to at-
tach to findings in probation revocation hearings would not suit the
underlying social policies.8 4 Furthermore, the concurring opinion ad-
dressed an argument raised by the dissenting justices not mentioned
in the majority opinion. The dissenters worry that the holding of
Lucido allows an oppressive government to prosecute the same
charges against the same individual at two different hearings.8 5 Jus-
tice Eagleson exposed this anxiety as illusory. He explained that in
actuality a probation revocation hearing and a criminal trial exists as
Distinct proceedings, administered by different state representatives
with dissimilar objectives, in separate courts, possibly in different
counties.8 6
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Mosk and Broussard filed separate dissenting opinions.8 7
Both begin by emphasizing that the traditional requirements for col-
lateral estoppel are met by showing that the facts of the case satisfy
80. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 351, 795 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
81. Id. at 351, 795 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 350, 795 P.2d at 1232, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
84. 51 Cal. 3d at 352-53, 795 P.2d at 1233, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Eagleson, J.,
concurring).
85. "[T]he assumption underlying the dissenting opinions, that a monolithic 'state'
prosecutes both the probation revocation proceeding and the new criminal charge...
ignores . . . reality." Id. at 352, 795 P.2d at 1233, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Eagleson, J.,
concurring). See also infra notes 94 & 96 and accompanying text.
86. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 352, 795 P.2d at 1233, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Eagleson, J.,
concurring).
87. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 353-61, 795 P.2d at 1233-39, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777-83 (Mosk,
J., dissenting); Id. at 361-67, 795 P.2d at 1239-44, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 783-87 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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each element.88 Then, as in the majority opinion, both then address
the policy considerations of collateral estoppel.8 9
Justice Mosk viewed the fact that the state, as prosecutor in both
the probation revocation and criminal hearings, dominates the pro-
gression of events as a critical consideration. 90 He views the majority
decision as unjustly granting the state the choice to pursue either
proceeding in any order and the power to attack the same defendant
twice.91 Justice Broussard characterized this situation as "[h]eads I
win, tails I flip again" for state prosecutors.9 2
Justice Mosk also analyzed the same social policies as the majority
arguing that the application of collateral estoppel furthers all three.93
Especially concerned with the rights of the criminally accused, he
contended that protection of due process better serves to promote
public confidence in judicial integrity than the majority's concern for
preserving determinations of guilt in criminal trials.94 Likewise, in
asserting that collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy, he as-
sailed the result of the majority opinion that allows a failed prosecu-
tion to attempt to prove the same issue which it could not meet even
at the lower burden of proof required at a probation revocation hear-
ing.95 Justice Mosk also advanced that the litigation, though not in-
tentional harassment, still qualifies as vexatious.96 Justice Broussard
also briefly declared that the use of preclusion in this case furthers
the three policy factors.97
Granting that the revocation hearing did not place Lucido in jeop-
88. I. at 353-55, 795 P.2d at 1233-35, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting);
Id at 361-63, 795 P.2d at 1239-41, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 783-85 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
89. IM at 355, 795 P.2d at 1235, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Id. at
366, 795 P.2d at 1242-43, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 786 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 353, 795 P.2d at 1233, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "ITihe
People control the sequence of the proceedings.... They should be bound by the pro-
cedural choice they make." Id. at 360-61, 795 P.2d at 1239, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
91. "Collateral estoppel demands that the People not be given two such opportuni-
ties at the expense of the rights of a criminal defendant." Id. at 355, 795 P.2d at 1235,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 367, 795 P.2d at 1243, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 72-83.
94. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 356, 795 P.2d at 1236, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). Justice Mosk insists that "the majority needlessly threaten the due process
rights of criminal defendants." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 357, 795 P.2d at 1236, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 366-67, 795 P.2d at 1243, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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ardy, Justice Mosk nevertheless seemed to feel that denying collat-
eral estoppel preclusion verges on breaching the prohibition against
double jeopardy.9 8 Both he and Justice Broussard urged that recent
expansions of the double jeopardy doctrine by the United States
Supreme Court provide evidence that preclusion should apply.9 9
However, the majority plainly disagreed.100
Justice Broussard reasoned that if Sims allowed collateral estoppel
for an administrative hearing, then Lucido should certainly allow it
for a judicial decision.lOl He alleged that the majority cannot mean-
ingfully distinguish between the administrative hearing in Sims and
the probation revocation hearing in Lucido.102 Thus, his dissent
flatly charges that "[t]he majority presents no logical basis why the
same conclusion [as reached in Sims] should not extend to... revoca-
tion hearing[s]."103 Furthermore, even ignoring any differences be-
tween the hearings in Sims and Lucido, Justice Broussard's
permissive philosophy regarding preclusion stressed that "collateral
estoppel depends on what issues are adjudicated, not the nature of
the proceeding."104
V. IMPACT
As support for its decision, the majority opinion notes that more
jurisdictions oppose the application of collateral estoppel to probation
revocation hearings than allow it.105 The ruling in Lucido thus con-
98. Id, at 357-59, 795 P.2d at 1237-38, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 780-82 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
99. Both Justices Mosk and Broussard cite to Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084
(1990) as support. Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 358-59, 795 P.2d at 1237-38, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 781
(Mosk, J., dissenting); Id. at 366 n.7, 795 P.2d at 1243 n.7, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 786 n.7
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Lucas declared that "[n]othing in Grady affects our analysis here [in
Lucido]." Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 343 n.5, 795 P.2d at 1227 n.5, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 771 n.5.
101. Id at 364-65, 795 P.2d at 1241-42, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 785-86 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 364, 795 P.2d at 1241, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 365, 795 P.2d at 1242, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 786 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
105. The majority cited to five cases holding that collateral estoppel does not apply
to probation or parole hearings: United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336 (1986); Green v.
State, 463 So.2d 1139 (Fla 1985); People v. Fagan, 104 A.D.2d 252, 483 N.Y.S.2d 489
(1984), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 815, 489 N.E.2d 222, 498 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1985); State v. Williams,
131 Ariz. 211, 639 P.2d 1036 (1982); State v. Dupard, 93 Wash.2d 268, 609 P.2d 961
(1980). Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 345-46, 795 P.2d at 1228, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 772. Other cases
denying collateral estoppel include: State v. Jones, 196 Ga. App. 896, 397 S.E.2d 209
(1990) (decided only twelve days after Lucido); Maisonet v. Merola, 69 N.Y.2d 965, 509
N.E.2d 341, 516 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1987); State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 721 P.2d 1248
(1986) (no application of collateral estoppel because no final judgment); Chamblin, 130
Cal. App. 3d 115, 181 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1982).
The court also cited to three cases which specifically allow collateral estoppel in this
situation: Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tx. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Bradley, 51
Or. App. 569, 626 P.2d 403 (1981); People v. Kondo, 51 Ill. App. 3d 874, 366 N.E.2d 990
(1977). No other states appear to hold this view. See generally Appellate Decisions,
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firms California's place in this more popular position.
Prior to Lucido it appeared that the Sims decision cast doubt over
the precedential value of Chamblin. Now, the majority opinion rein-
vigorates Chamblin and makes clear that the court will interpret
Sims narrowly. Given the conservative composition of the court, 0 6
this comes as no surprise.
A markedly liberal court decided the Sims case, heavily relied
upon by the dissenting justices, but distinguished from Lucido by the
majority. Former Chief Justice Bird authored the Sims opinion,
joined by Justices Mosk, Richardson, Newman, Broussard, Rey-
noso.10 7 Elections in 1986 unseated two of these judges,OS and others
have since retired. 0 9 Thus, the only justices still on the court at the
time of Lucido were the two dissenters, Justices Mosk and Brous-
sard. no When commentators compared the California Supreme
Court to the United States Supreme Court, these two justices were
analogized to former Justices Brennan and Marshall, because each
pair champions liberal views in an environment surrounded by a con-
servative majority."' Therefore, Lucido provides evidence of the
court's trend towards more conservative holdings, especially in the
Extending the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to Include Determinations Made at Pro-
bation Revocation Proceedings, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 1417 (1981) (authored by Stephen M.
Bressler).
106. The influence of former republican Governor George Deukmejian shows
clearly in Lucido. Deukmejian appointed Chief Justice Lucas, Justices Panelli and
Arabian, and selected Justice Kennard for elevation from the court of appeal. This
composes every member of the majority except Justice Eagleson who has since retired.
Justice Baxter, another Deukmejian appointee has filled this vacant seat. See Blum,
Toward a Radical Middle, 77 ABA Journal, Jan. 1991 at 48-52 (briefly outlining the
historical and present composition of the California Supreme Court); See also Snider,
The Cinderella Justice, 9 California Lawyer, No. 9, Sept. 1989, at 61 (profiles Justice
Kennard).
Moreover, with the imminent retirement of Justice Broussard, Governor Pete Wil-
son has the opportunity to place yet another conservative on the court. See Hagar, Lib-
eral Justice Broussard to Retire in 1991, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at Al & A41.
107. Justice Otto Kaus dissented.
108. Former Chief Justice Rose Bird, and Justice Cruz Reynoso. Justice Joseph R.
Grodin also lost his seat on the bench. See Hagar, supra note 106, at A41.
109. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 97.
110. Democratic governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, Sr. appointed Justice Mosk in
1964. Similarly, democratic governor Edmund G. !'Jerry" Brown, Jr. appointed Justice
Broussard in 1981. These two liberal judges have dissented together often, especially
in cases like Lucido involving the rights of criminal defendants. See Uelmen, Main-
stream Justice, 9 Cal. Lawyer, No. 7, July 1989, at 37-41.
111. Id. This situation results in statistics which indicate that Justices Mosk and
Broussard have the highest dissent rate percentages, nearly double that of any other
justice on the court. Id. See also Hagar, supra note 97 at A41.
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field of criminal procedure.112
VI. CONCLUSION
Lucido v. Superior Court stands for the proposition that even if a
finding determined at a probation revocation hearing favors the ac-
cused, collateral estoppel will not attach to the finding to preclude
the state from criminally prosecuting the defendant for the same vio-
lation at a later trial. This is true regardless of whether the finding
satisfies all the traditional requirements for the application of collat-
eral estoppel, because the court has ruled that the policies underlying
the preclusion doctrine do not suit the different purposes of proba-
tion hearings and criminal trials. The majority opinion emphasizes
that public policy mandates questions of criminal guilt be determined
only at criminal trials and not probation hearings.
Therefore, the state may proceed to prosecute Lucido for indecent
exposure even though the justice court conducting his probation rev-
ocation hearing held that the state did not produce clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the crime.
BENJAMIN GROSS SHATZ
B. An indigent criminal defendant may not be required to
demonstrate inadequate representation by his retained
counsel before the defendant's timely motion to discharge
his retained attorney will be granted by the trial court:
People v. Ortiz.
In People v. Ortiz,' the California Supreme Court resolved conflict-
112. "In the criminal arena... the court has clearly reflected what may be a na-
tional conservative mood, of downplaying the procedural rights of criminal defendants
and emphasizing the interests of society." Blum, supra note 97, and 50 (quoting former
Justice Joseph Grodin).
1. 51 Cal. 3d 975, 800 P.2d 547, 275 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1990). Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard,
Panelli, Kennard and Arabian. Justice Eagleson concurred only in the judgment. The
defendant, charged with murder, was declared indigent soon after the proceedings
commenced. He was appointed a public defender, but retained Daniel and Arturo Her-
nandez to represent him instead. Soon after the first trial ended in a mistrial, the Her-
nandezes moved to withdraw because of the defendant's inability to pay their legal
fees. Upon denial of this motion, the defendant requested their discharge. The court,
in camera, denied the motion on the ground that the attorneys' incompetence had not
been demonstrated.
After a series of motions and continuances, both the Hernandezes and the defendant
requested a discharge. These motions were denied despite the listing of several factors
by the defendant that indicated discharge of counsel would be appropriate. For exam-
ple, counsel repeatedly failed to appear due to their concurrent representation of Rich-
ard Ramirez in the highly publicized "Night Stalker" case. Later, the defendant
submitted the matter as a "Bunnell plea." See Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d
592, 531 P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975) (a "Bunnell plea" is a second trial plea
made by the defendant based on the condition that the charged offense shall not be
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ing court of appeal decisions 2 by affording an indigent criminal de-
fendant the opportunity to discharge retained3 counsel by a timely
motion, without a showing of inadequate representation or identify-
ing an irreconcilable conflict. In addition, the court determined that
when a previously discharged attorney is appointed by the court to
continue representation of an indigent defendant, the defendant must
be granted a Marsden hearing,4 in which he may demonstrate why
such appointment could abridge his sixth amendment rights.5 The
need to preserve the right to counsel and the due process rights of
the indigent defendant, coupled with a desire to establish consistency
in the law, compelled the court to review Ortiz.6
The supreme court found that the trial court erred by not granting
the indigent defendant's motion to discharge.7 The court recognized
that the right to choose counsel also involves the right to discharge
retained counsel.8 The court then concluded that the defendant's
right to determine how to conduct his defense should be respected
unless it results in "'significant prejudice'" or a "'disruption of the
greater than second degree murder). The defendant was found guilty of second degree
murder. The court of appeal reversed this conviction because defendant's timely mo-
tion to discharge retained counsel had been denied. The California Supreme Court
here affirms that holding. 51 Cal. 3d at 982, 800 P.2d at 552, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
2. The Ortiz opinion is consistent with People v. Stevens, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1119,
203 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1984), which held that an indigent criminal defendant was denied
his right to effective assistance of counsel when the trial court "unjustifiably" denied
his request to discharge his volunteer attorney. Id, at 1121, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Ortiz
effectively overrules contrary court of appeal decisions. See South v. Superior Court,
188 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 233 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1986); People v. Barnes, 146 Cal. App. 3d 663,
194 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1983).
3. To "retain" counsel is "[t]o engage the services of an attorney or counsellor to
manage a specific matter or action or all legal matters in general." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1183 (5d ed. 1989). "Appointed counsel" refers to legal aid assigned by the
court to represent an indigent defendant. Generally, an individual who is appointed
counsel will not be required to pay legal fees. However, reimbursement may be sought
if the defendant later becomes able to pay. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
4. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970) (defend-
ant must make sufficient showing that denial of substitution would substantially im-
pair his constitutional rights).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to effective
assistance of counsel and compulsory process to a defendant. See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 15. Article 1, section 15 was "adopted to secure the accused person all the benefits
which may flow from the employment of counsel to conduct his defense .... People
v. Avilez, 86 Cal. App. 2d 289, 294, 194 P.2d 829, 833 (1948) (discussing former CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 13 which is currently art. I, § 15).
6. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 981, 988, 800 P.2d at 551, 555-56, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 195, 199-
200.
7. Id. at 975, 800 P.2d at 549, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
8. Id. at 983, 800 P.2d at 552, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 196. See generally Magee v. Supe-
rior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 954, 506 P.2d 1023, 1025, 106 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1973).
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orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of
the particular case.' "9 Furthermore, the court stressed that upon
timely filing of a motion to discharge, adverse consequences. are pre-
sumed unlikely and state interference should be kept to a
minimum.1 0
The state has long recognized the nonindigent's right to discharge
retained counsel with or without cause.'1 The court observed that
this right is not absolute, but rather, within the trial court's reason-
able discretion.12 Nonindigent criminal defendants have never been
required to demonstrate inadequate representation by counsel before
a discharge is deemed appropriate.13 In contrast, indigent defendants
seeking to substitute one appointed counsel for another are required
to make a showing of incompetency or irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the defendant and his attorney.14 The rationale for demanding
this presentation is that the defendant is "requesting duplicative rep-
resentation and repetitive investigation at taxpayer expense."'15 Ac-
knowledging the different concerns associated with appointed and
retained counsel, the supreme court in Ortiz decided that the require-
ments for discharge should depend upon the type of counsel dis-
charged, not the indigency of the defendant.' 6
9. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 982, 800 P.2d at 552, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (citing People v.
Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 208, 417 P.2d 868, 875, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966)).
10. Id. In Ortiz, the defendant's timely filing "reflects [his] genuine concern about
the adequacy of his defense rather than any intent to delay the retrial." Id. at 987, 800
P.2d at 555, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 199. Similarly, the right to obtain counsel should be ob-
served when defendant files a timely continuance. People v. Courts, 37 Cal. 3d 784, 693
P.2d 778, 210 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1985).
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 284 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). This section addresses
change or substitution of counsel either by consent or order of the court. See 1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 82 (3d ed. 1985); Mandell v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 4, 136 Cal. Rptr. 354, 355 (1977); People v. Bouchard, 49 Cal. 2d 438, 440-42,
317 P.2d 971, 973-74 (1957).
12. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 983, 800 P.2d at 552-53, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97 (citing Peo-
ple v. Lau, 177 Cal. App. 3d 473, 478, 223 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1986); People v. Gzikowski,
32 Cal. 3d 580, 586-87, 651 P.2d 1145, 1149, 186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (1982)). See 19 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2155 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1991); 5 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2746 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991); People v. Maese, 105
Cal. App. 3d 710, 164 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1980) (court denied substitution of counsel when
request was made only hours before jury deliberation); see also People v. Jeffers, 188
Cal. App. 3d 840, 233 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1987) ("denial of defendant's request for continu-
ance to obtain alternate counsel was not an abuse of discretion").
13. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 984, 800 P.2d at 553, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
14. Id. (citing People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 854, 760 P.2d 423, 439, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 227, 242 (1988), cert. denied sub nom, Crandall v. California, 490 U.S. 1037 (1989);
People v. Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d 80, 93-94, 648 P.2d 578, 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 618-19
(1982), cert. denied sub nom., Stankewitz v. California, 111 S. Ct. 1432 (1991) (defend-
ant must identify an irreconcilable conflict to be granted a discharge); In re Banks, 4
Cal. 3d 337, 342, 482 P.2d 215, 218, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591, 594-95 (1971) (defendant must
show indaequate representation to discharge appointed counsel)).
15. 51 Cal. 3d at 986, 800 P.2d at 554, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
16. Id. See People v. Stevens, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 1128, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 512. For
an instance where retained and appointed counsel have been treated equally, see gen-
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The court's opinion focused on the synonymous interests of the in-
digent and nonindigent defendant desiring to discharge retained
counsel. A reason traditionally given by nonindigents seeking to dis-
charge their retained attorneys has been that the attorney-client rela-
tionship has deteriorated to such a degree that the client no longer
has confidence in his counsel's ability.17 The necessity for trust and
open communication between attorney and client is equally funda-
mental to the indigent defendant, especially where life or liberty is at
stake.18 The court further justified allowing discharge of counsel by
an indigent defendant by acknowledging that denial of such motions
forces the defendant to proceed without legal assistance or be repre-
sented by a reluctant, uncompensated attorney.19 Clearly, either of
these scenarios would be detrimental to the defendant. 'Accordingly,
the court realized that discharge motions must be granted regardless
of the economic stature of the defendant.20
The California Supreme Court went one step further to delineate
the proper procedure for appointing counsel after an indigent has dis-
charged his retained council.21 Penal Code section 987.5 offers no
barrier to appointment of previously discharged counsel, leaving such
decisions within the court's discretion.22 When a court decides to
reappoint an attorney, the indigent defendant must be afforded a
Marsden hearing to explain how his sixth amendment rights will be
erally People v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 3d 495, 114 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1974) (rules applying to
appointed counsel on indigent appeals also apply to retained counsel).
17. Todd v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. 406, 413, 184 P. 684, 687 (1919).
18. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561, 440 P.2d 65, 72, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1,
8 (1968); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956).
19. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 984-85, 800 P.2d at 553, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (citing Scott v.
Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) ("quality of the uncompensated service can be
expected to decrease in almost direct proportion to the loss of choice of the profes-
sional rendering the service")); see Uelmen, Simmering on the "Backburner": The
Challenge of Yarbrough, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 285, 308-10 (1985); Gilbert & Gorenfeld,
The Constitution Should Protect Everyone - Even Lawyers, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 75,
88 (1984); Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 354-55, 222 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1986) (public defender was created due to lack of quality assistance being provided
to indigent criminal defendants).
20. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 984, 800 P.2d at 553, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
21. Id. at 989, 800 P.2d at 556-57, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1991). This section outlines the proce-
dure for assigning counsel. The public defender replaces discharged retained counsel
unless there is conflict of interest. Id. In addition, if the discharged counsel must be
reappointed, he will be provided compensation pursuant to subdivisions (a) & (b) of
this section. Id. See generally People v. Owen, 210 Cal. App. 3d 561, 258 Cal. Rptr. 535
(1989) (the trial court did not have to warn defendants of multiple representation dan-
gers after appointing defendants' previously retained counsel).
1133
impaired by the attorney's representation. 23 Ultimately, the supreme
court concluded that failure to grant a Marsden hearing or to dis-
charge retained counsel upon timely request will result in an auto-
matic reversal because the defendant will, in effect, be denied his
right to counsel.24
The Ortiz decision expands indigent defendants' due process rights
by placing them on equal footing with nonindigents in the area of dis-
charging retained counsel. It also ensures against erosion of sixth
amendment rights by making choice of counsel a reality to the indi-
gent.25 Lastly, Ortiz provides explicit direction to lower courts con-
fronted with discharge situations.
It is unlikely this decision will spark an increase in discharges
among indigent defendants as many prefer retained counsel, viewing
appointed counsel as part of the "system," and therefore, biased
against them.26 Nevertheless, the ability to discharge a retained at-
torney will carry great significance to an individual who has been de-
clared indigent after the proceedings have commenced and can no
longer compensate retained counsel.27
The Ortiz decision established that indigents must be afforded
their constitutional rights, even at the expense of judicial and fiscal
economy. In sum, the court determined that the right to discharge
retained counsel is a fundamental component of the sixth amend-
ment, and no individual should be required to make a showing of in-
23. See supra note 3. A Marsden hearing appears to be guaranteed to indigent de-
fendants. Before Ortiz, this hearing had been entirely within the court's discretion.
24. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 988, 800 P.2d at 555-56, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200 (citing Peo-
ple v. Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d 580, 589, 651 P.2d 1145, 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345 (1982));
see People v. Hidalgo, 22 Cal. 3d 826, 587 P.2d 230, 150 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1978) (reversible
error when court denied defendant's timely motion to substitute appointed counsel
without giving defendant an opportunity to state his grounds for the substitution). See
also U.S. CONST. amends. VI & XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d
412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 865, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 738 (1979) ("a conviction may not be up-
held if the state has furnished an indigent with representation of lower quality than
that of a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate.").
25. Prior to the Ortiz decision, whether indigent defendants were being afforded
their right to effective assistance of counsel had been questioned. See, e.g., Klein, The
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).
26. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d at 988 n.4, 800 P.2d at 554-55 n.4, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99 n.4
(citing In re JGL, 43 Cal. App. 3d 447, 451-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. 799, 801-02 (1974)).
27. The defendant in Ortiz was declared indigent shortly after a preliminary hear-
ing. 51 Cal. 3d at 979, 800 P.2d at 550, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 194. " 'The test of inigency for
the purpose of funding investigators and experts is financial means to secure these
services'... we concur ... if defendant is able to pay counsel, by whatever means, his
indigency has not been established." People v. Worthy, 109 Cal. App. 3d 514, 520, 167
Cal. Rptr. 402, 404 (1980) (citing Anderson v. Justice Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 398, 403,
160 Cal. Rptr. 274, 277 (1979)).
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adequate representation or irreconcilable conflict before exercising
this right.
JODY L. GRAY
C. The proper standard of proof in a probation revocation
hearing is a preponderance of the evidence standard:
People v. Rodriguez.
In People v. Rodriguez,1 the California Supreme Court examined
the standard of proof applicable to a probation revocation hearing.2
After reviewing the mandates of constitutional due process and Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 1203.2,3 the supreme court concluded that
facts in a hearing to revoke probation must be proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, rather than by satisfaction of the clear and
convincing standard.4 In this decision, the court sought to preserve
judicial flexibility and discretion in the revocation process and to set-
tle an issue of law which had received disparate treatment in the
lower courts.5 Because Rodriguez's probation violation had been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the supreme court af-
1. 51 Cal. 3d 437, 795 P.2d 783, 272 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1990). After a conviction for
second degree burglary, Petitioner Rodriguez was placed on probation. In order to re-
tain his freedom, he was required to refrain from any further violation of law. Subse-
quently, his probation officer sought to revoke his probation on the grounds that
Rodriguez had allegedly committed another theft. At his revocation hearing, the court
found that the state had proven this additional violation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and consequently revoked probation. The court of appeal reversed this decision
on the grounds that the clear and convincing evidence standard was the proper mea-
sure of proof in a probation revocation hearing, and the supreme court subsequently
granted review.
2. Id. at 440, 795 P.2d at 785, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 1203.2 provides, in
pertinent part, that a "court may revoke and terminate such probation if the interests
of justice so require and the court ... has reason to believe ... that the person has
violated any of the conditions of his or her probation." Id. (emphasis added).
4. Rodriquez, 51 Cal. 3d at 447, 795 P.2d at 789, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
5. Prior to Rodriguez, the supreme court had not made any firm declarations on
the standard of proof applicable to probation revocation hearings. In People v. Cole-
man, the court acknowledged that the standard of proof in hearings to revoke proba-
tion was lower than that required in criminal proceedings and stated in dicta that
proof by a clear and convincing standard was sufficient to revoke probation. Coleman,
13 Cal. 3d 867, 876-77 n.8, 533 P.2d 1024, 1033 n.8, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 n.8 (1975).
However, as the Rodriguez court emphasized, this was mere dicta which simply de-
clared the heightened standard of proof to be sufficient, not mandatory. See infra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text. See 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Introduc-
tion § 26(1) (3d ed. 1986) (noting the various standards that courts have found applica-
ble to probation revocation hearings).
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firmed the superior court's decision to revoke his probation.6
The supreme court determined that the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard satisfies constitutional due process and thus may
properly be applied to probation revocation hearings. 7 Noting that a
hearing to revoke probation is not part of a criminal prosecution, the
court utilized the United States Supreme Court's decision in Morris-
sey v. Brewers to declare that due process requirements in probation
revocation hearings are less stringent than those imposed upon the
state in criminal trials.9 Thus, a lower standard of proof is permissi-
ble.10 The court noted that one explanation for lowered due process
requirements is that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing is
not being deprived of "'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special 0 restrictions.' ""'
The Rodriguez court declared that the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard was consistent with both the California Penal Code
and California case law.12 Writing for the court, Justice Panellil3 de-
clared that California Penal Code section 1203.2, which authorizes a
tribunal to revoke probation if it has "reason to believe" that a proba-
tioner has broken the terms of his probation, should be read to allow
facts in a probation revocation hearing to be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.14 In addition, the court stated that no case law
6. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 447, 795 P.2d at 789, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
7. Id. at 441, 795 P.2d at 785, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a...
crime... without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amend-
ment imposes a similar duty upon the states, declaring that no state may "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
8. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Morrissey Court stated that "the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in [a criminal] proceeding does not apply to parole revocations."
Id. at 480. Because due process requirements for parole revocation hearings and proba-
tion revocation hearings are generally parallel, the Rodriguez court concluded that
Mor issey authorized the adoption of a lower standard of proof for hearings to revoke
probation.
For a general discussion of probation proceedings and the due process rights of a de-
fendant in this process, see Comment, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Proce-
dure: Uniwd States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1982-1983, 72 GEo. L. J. 249,
642-49 (1983).
9. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 441, 795 P.2d at 785, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
10. Id. at 441, 795 P.2d at 785, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
11. Id. at 442, 795 P.2d at 786, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (citing Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d at
877 n.8, 533 P.2d 1033 n.8, 120 Cal. Rptr. 393 n.8 (quoting Morrissey, 480 U.S. 480)).
12. Id. at 442-44, 195 P.2d at 786-87, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
13. Justice Panelli delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which Justices
Mosk, Eagleson, Kennard and Arabian concurred. Chief Justice Lucas and Justice
Broussard wrote separate concurring opinions.
14. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West Supp. 1991)). See 3 B. WITKIN &
N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1695 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1991) (discussing a court's statutory authority to revoke probation). As the Rod-
riguez court noted, no California statute specifically addresses the issue of the proper
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dictated a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. 15 While the court's dicta in People v. Coleman16
stated that facts in a probation hearing might be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, the Rodriguez court emphasized that it had
never declared that such a standard was mandatory.17
Finally, the court underscored the importance of preserving and
respecting judicial discretion in the probation revocation process.18
Flexibility and discretion are fundamental to a trial court because of
the potential danger to society that may be present when a convicted
criminal is allowed to remain free, and because of the judicial sys-
tem's limited resources. 19 The Rodriguez court believed that impos-
ing a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence
would have the detrimental effect of lengthening revocation proceed-
ings and creating additional work for already overburdened judges.2 0
In Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court has finally given a
firm declaration of the standard of proof applicable in probation rev-
standard of proof in a hearing to revoke probation. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 442, 795
P.2d at 786, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 616. While Justice Broussard thought that a clear and
convincing standard would better serve the interests of public policy, he believed the
court to be bound in its decision by section 1203.2 of the California Penal Code, which
suggests a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 449, 795 P.2d at 791, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 621 (Broussard, J., concurring).
15. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 443, 795 P.2d at 787, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 617. For a discus-
sion of cases dealing with revocation of probation, see 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law
§ 3478 (1985 & Supp. 1991); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 578 (1981 & Supp. 1990); 24
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1560 (1989).
16. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 876-77 n.8, 533 P.2d 1024, 1033 n.8, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 n.8
(1975).
17. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 444, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 617, 795 P.2d at 787; see infra
note 4. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lucas focused on the question of why a clear
and convincing standard was not necessary in a probation revocation hearing. Id at
447, 795 P.2d at 789, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Justice Lucas con-
cluded that
the fact that revocation of probation affects an interest tied to narrowly tai-
lored restrictions distinguishes the revocation hearing from proceedings at
which an intermediate standard applies. In short, the hearing threatens the
probationer with a sanction less significant than those at stake in proceedings
in which the high court has required proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 449, 795 P.2d at 791, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 621 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
18. Id at 445, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 618, 795 P.2d at 788. See 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment forCrime §§ 1695, 1696 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1991) (discussing a court's broad discretion to revoke probation).
19. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d at 445, 795 P.2d at 788, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
20. Id. at 445-46, 795 P.2d at 788, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court stated that re-
quiring a higher standard of proof "could result in poor-risk convicted criminals re-
maining at large and would further tax limited judicial resources by complicating and
lengthening revocation proceedings." Id. at 446, 795 P.2d at 788, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 618
(citations omitted).
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ocation hearings. This decision enables the lower courts to act with
greater certainty when facing probation revocation issues. Because
the court adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard, de-
fendants in probation revocation hearings will face a greater danger
of imprisonment than their counterparts in criminal prosecutions.
Ultimately, the court's ruling in Rodriguez means that judges will
maintain the flexibility in the probation process which is necessary to
protect society.
MARY KAY ROGERS
vi. DEATH PENALTY LAW - SURVEY VI
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court rendered opinions on thirteen death
penalty cases and one appeal concerning a writ of mandate involving
a special circumstance decision' between July and December 1990.2
The court affirmed all thirteen death sentences, relying heavily on
1. The court's review of only fourteen cases demonstrates its continuing difficul-
ties in reducing its backlog due to the growing number of death penalty cases. See Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 18 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 716
(1991) [hereinafter Death Penalty V] (citing The Exodus of California's High Court,
Nat'l L. J., May 14, 1990, at 29; California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty
Law, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1095 (1990) [hereinafter Death Penalty IV]).
2. This survey addresses the following cases, listed alphabetically by defendants:
People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990); In re
Fields, 51 Cal. 3d 1063, 800 P.2d 862, 275 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1990); People v. Frank, 51 Cal.
3d 718, 798 P.2d 1215, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2816 (1991); Peo-
ple v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990), petition for
cert. filed, (May 28, 1991) (No. 90-8163); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 802 P.2d 376,
276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990), petition for cert. filed, (July 11, 1991) (No. 91-5082); People v.
Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 802 P.2d 278, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990), petition for cert. filed,
(May 28, 1991) (No. 90-8201); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 799 P.2d 1282, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1990); People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1342 (1991); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719,
801 P.2d 1142, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1990), petition for cert. filed, (June 12, 1991) (No. 90-
8308); People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 798 P.2d 849, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 2816 (1991); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1990), modified, 52 Cal. 3d 1282c, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1991), petition
for cert. filed, (May 20, 1991) (No. 90-8130). The case examined on interlocutory appeal
involving a writ of mandate was Curl v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 1292, 801 P.2d 292,
276 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1990). Hereinafter, subsequent histories will be omitted.
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the "harmless error" doctrine.3 The court established new policies
concerning timeliness for filing a writ of habeas corpus.4 First, the
court increased the time allotted for the filing of the writ.5 Second,
the court set forth new methods concerning what may establish ab-
sence of substantial delay or whaf demonstrates good cause for such
delay in filing.6
This survey highlights selected defense arguments including inef-
fective assistance of counsel, instructional errors, prosecutorial mis-
conduct, jury selection issues, proportionality of the death sentence,
and constitutionality of the death penalty. For clarification of the is-
sues addressed on automatic appeal this survey is divided into phases,
as at trial. Although defendant claims differ according to the particu-
lar facts of each case, this survey addresses them in broad categories
according to the general issue raised.7
II. NEW CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DEATH PENALTY POLICIES
The California Supreme Court amended the timeliness require-
ments for filing petitions for writs of habeas corpus.8 Under the
amendment, the court expanded the rule that a petition must be filed
"without substantial delay."9 Under standard 1-1.1, the court
changed the definition of substantial delay from sixty to ninety days
after the filing of appellant's reply brief on direct appeal becomes
due.l0
The court also amended its rules by allowing a petitioner to file an
appeal after the allotted ninety days, but only upon defense counsel's
3. The court adhered to its previous approach that "error is not reversible unless
it is prejudicial." See Death Penalty IV, supra note 1, at 1096 (citing 9 B. WITKIN, CAL-
IFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 324 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
4. See infra notes 7-9 & 12 and accompanying text.
5. See inkfra notes 7, 8, & 10-12 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
7. Five previous surveys regarding the California death penalty are: California
Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 451 (1989); Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1165
(1989); California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 17 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 537 (1990) [hereinafter Death Penalty III]; Death Penalty IV, supra note 1; Death
Penalty V, supra note 1.
. 8. CAL. R. CT., Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judg-
ments of Death, Policy 3, at 815 [hereinafter Supreme Court Policies].
9. Id.
10. Standard 1-1.1 reads: "[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be presumed
to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed within 90 days after the final due date
for the filing of appellant's reply brief on the direct appeal. [As amended effective
Sept. 19, 1990]." Id.
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showing that the petitioner filed "within a reasonable time" after dis-
covery of both a "factual" and "legal basis for the claim".1l The
court may dismiss the petition if it does not meet these two timeli-
ness requirements or if the petitioner cannot demonstrate "good
cause" for noncompliance.12
The timeliness standard allows the court to liberally use its discre-
tion. Standard 1.3 states that even if a motion is untimely, the court
"may," rather than "must," dismiss the motion.13 Thus, even though
facially stringent, the rule allows the court to exercise its equitable
judgment, especially in cases of extenuating circumstances.
III. CURL V. SUPERIOR COURT' CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
ESTABLISHES THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF REVIEW FOR
COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
VALIDITY OF PRIOR-MURDER
CONVICTIONS UNDERLYING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE ALLEGATIONS
In Curl v. Superior Court,14 the court granted review to "settle the
question of whether the constitutional validity of a prior murder
conviction underlying a prior-murder special-circumstance may be
collaterally attacked via a pretrial motion to strike the special-cir-
cumstance." 15 The court also determined the appropriate standard of
proof a defendant must demonstrate before the prior-murder will be
excluded from special circumstance.16
The court held that the defense in a penalty case may challenge
the constitutional validity of a conviction by pretrial motion.17 Fur-
ther, the defendant must be given an evidentiary hearing if a motion
to strike is made.18 The court established that the defendant's bur-
11. Standard 1-1.2 allows counsel to prove an "absence of substantial delay" after
ninety days if the petition "alleges with specificity facts showing [it] was filed within a
reasonable time after petitioner or counsel became aware of information indicating a
factual basis for the claim and became aware, or should have become aware, of the
legal basis for the claim. [As amended effective Sept. 19, 1990]." Id. (emphasis in
original).
12. Standard 1-2 allows for any delay not meeting the requirements of standards
1-1.1 and 1-1.2 if the petitioner "demonstrate[s] good cause for delay." Standard 1-3
calls for the discretionary denial of any petition that does not meet the above require-
ments as untimely. Id at 816.
13. Supreme Court Policies, supra note 8, at 816. See, e.g., Death Penalty III, supra
note 6, at 538-39. Death Penalty III also provides an analysis on other timeliness issues
addressed by the California Supreme Court in Supreme Court Policies including delays
due to withdrawal of counsel and a review of habeas corpus procedures by a federal
panel. Id. (citing Supreme Court Policies, supra note 8, Policies 2 and 3).
14. Curl v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 1292, 801 P.2d 292, 276 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1990).
15. Id. at 1295-96, 801 P.2d at 293, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 1296, 801 P.2d at 293, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
17. Id.
18. The court stated the procedure would be governed by People v. Coffey and
People v. Sumstine. People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 217, 430 P.2d 15, 24, 60 Cal. Rptr.
457, 466 (1967) (establishing the five-step approach defendant and trial court must fol-
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den of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.19
In Curl, the defendant's pretrial motion sought to strike a prior-
murder conviction introduced as special circumstance, alleging he
was on drugs when he pled guilty to the 1977 murder.20 The trial
court examined the merit of the motion in an evidentiary hearing
and concluded the defendant had made a satisfactory showing shift-
ing the burden to the prosecutor, who then established the conviction
was valid by "clear and convincing evidence." 21 The defendant un-
successfully petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandate on
the motion.22 The defendant then petitioned the California Supreme
Court which granted review.23
The supreme court stated that the first issue was whether the right
to a jury trial on "the truth" of a prior conviction underlying special
circumstance also includes the right to a jury trial when the defend-
ant is trying to collaterally attack the prior conviction's "constitu-
tional validity."24 The court concluded that under Penal Code
section 190.1(a), the trier of fact must concurrently decide the truth
of the prior conviction as well as the defendant's guilt in the present
case.25 However, when the issue concerns a prior-murder underlying
a special circumstance allegation, a separate hearing is required.26
Second, the court held that when carrying out the additional pro-
ceeding under Penal Code section 190.4(a), it is the trier of fact who
determines the truth of the alleged special circumstance.27 The court
concluded that when sections 190.1 and 190.4 are read together, they
low for a pretrial hearing on constitutional issue); People v. Sumstine, 36 Cal. 3d 909,
923, 687 P.2d 904, 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (1984) (same).
19. Curl, 51 Cal. 3d at 1296, 801 P.2d at 293, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1296-98, 801 P.2d at 293-95, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 50-52.
22. Id. at 1298-99, 801 P.2d at 295, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 52. The California Supreme
Court noted that the court of appeal erroneously stated that the defendant's pretrial
motion was governed by Penal Code section 995. d, (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 995
(West 1938)). The high court stated the appellate court erred when it held the applica-
ble standard to be "whether 'reasonable cause' has been shown to bind the defendant
over for trial on the special circumstance allegation" and that a new evidentiary hear-
ing was not needed because the trial court applied the elevated clear and convincing
evidence standard. Id
23. 1d at 1299, 801 P.2d at 295, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
24. Curl, 51 Cal. 3d at 1299, 801 P.2d at 295, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
25. Id (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1(a) (West 1988)).
26. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1(b) (West 1988)). The court noted that,
under section 190.1(b), special circumstance allegations must be accompanied by "sepa-
rate 'further proceedings'" to determine the truth. Id.
27. Id. at 1299-1300, 801 P.2d at 295, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(a) (West 1988)). The court interpreted this section to require the jury to decide
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do not provide a right to a jury trial to decide the constitutional valid-
ity of a prior conviction.28
The court noted that there are positive policy considerations in de-
ciding the collateral attack before the present murder trial, stating
that the current jury would be mentally unable to disregard a previ-
ous murder conviction, even if constitutionally invalid.29 The trial
court, however, should render a decision on the constitutional valid-
ity of the prior conviction only after the jury has returned a guilty
verdict on the current murder charge.30
The court then addressed the burden of proof required when such
a challenge is made. The court reestablished the rule that the de-
fendant bears the burden of proof for such a challenge 31 and held
that the appropriate level of proof is by a "preponderance of the
evidence." 32
The court concluded by identifying the proper procedure for a de-
fendant to collaterally attack a prior-murder special circumstance.
The defendant must first submit facts sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify a pretrial hearing on the motion.33 An evidentiary hearing must
then be administered by the trial court.34 Only after the prosecution
has made a prima facie showing of the prior conviction's existence
does the burden shift to the defendant to establish the conviction's
constitutional invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.3 s
whether the defendant was actually convicted of the prior-murder. I& at 1301, 801
P.2d at 296, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
28. ML at 1300 n.5, 801 P.2d at 296 n.5, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 53 n.5.
29. Curl, 51 Cal. 3d at 1302, 801 P.2d at 297, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (citing People v.
Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 360, 450 P.2d 33, 41, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 721 (1969) ("California
policy clearly requires the question of the constitutionality of a prior conviction to be
determined by the court and not the jury .... ")).
30. Id. at 1302, 801 P.2d at 297, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
31. Id. at 1303, 801 P.2d at 298, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 55. The court stated that in this
case the defendant bore the burden of proving that he was under the influence of
drugs when he waived his constitutional rights. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's determination that, based on the evidence presented at the pretrial evidentiary
hearing, the defendant had made a knowing waiver. Id. at 1304-05, 801 P.2d at 299, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 55-56. The supreme court further held that the court of appeal errone-
ously held that the prosecution bore the burden under section 190.4(a) which states
that the People only bear the burden of proving "the truth" of the alleged prior con-
viction. Id at 1305, 801 P.2d at 299, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
32. Id. at 1305, 801 P.2d at 299, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The court stated that because
section 190.4 of the Penal Code is silent as to the burden of proving constitutional inva-
lidity, section 115 of the Evidence Code governs, with its requirement of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1988)). The
court also cited case authority holding that the appropriate standard when determining
similar constitutional questions is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id at
1305-06, 801 P.2d at 300, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
33. Id. at 1306, 801 P.2d at 300, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1306-07, 801 P.2d at 300, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
1142
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IV. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A. Jury Issues
Seven of the cases surveyed involved alleged errors concerning
jury selection during the guilt phase of the trial, raising issues of
Wheeler and Witherspoon-Witt errors.3 6 These errors concern the
dismissal of jurors on voir dire.
1. Wheeler Error
Four cases specifically addressed Wheeler error on appeal.3 7
Wheeler error occurs when a peremptory challenge is used to ex-
clude from the jury any member of an identifiable class due to a pre-
sumed "group bias" based on "racial, religious, ethnic, or similar
grounds." 38 If defense counsel wants to raise the issue of Wheeler er-
ror, a timely challenge must be made and a prima facie case of dis-
crimination must be shown.3 9
In People v. Hayes, the defendant claimed a violation of his cross-
section right by the use of peremptory challenges to exclude black
persons from the jury.4 0 Because the defendant did not make a
timely challenge, the court also refused to review the charge that
persons with Spanish surnames had been improperly excluded.41
Moreover, even though the defense made a prima facie showing for
review, the court held the prosecutor's exclusion explanations were
36. See infra notes 37 and 52 and accompanying text.
37. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990); People
v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990); People v. Stankewitz,
51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 279 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367,
802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
38. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902
(1978). See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (jury discrimination based
upon race not allowed). Wheeler error is based upon the constitutional right to a "trial
by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community." Wheeler, 22 Cal.
3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
39. heeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The Wheeler
court stated that a defendant wishing to raise the issue must keep an extensive record
of the circumstances during voir dire, must establish that the excluded persons were
"members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section
rule," and must prove a "strong likelihood" that the exclusion was the result of group
and not specific bias. Id. Once the trial court decides a prima facie case has been
made, the burden shifts to the opponent to explain why the peremptory challenges
were valid. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
40. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 603, 802 P.2d 376, 390-91, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 888
(1990). See supra note 38 (jury must be drawn from cross-section of the community).
41. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 605, 802 P.2d at 392, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
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facially proper and gave considerable deference to the trial court's
conclusion that the challenges were not based on group bias.42
The court in People v. Sanders stated that despite a timely chal-
lenge, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that there
was a strong likelihood of group bias against persons with Spanish
surnames.43 Again, the court showed its strong deference to the trial
court's conclusion in such factual determinations. 44
The third case alleging Wheeler error was People v. Stankewit. 45
In that case the court refused to even address the record because the
defendant raised no objection at trial, the challenge was not timely,
and no evidence establishing a prima facie case of group bias was
presented.46 Therefore, the burden never shifted to the prosecutor to
justify his challenge.47
People v. Wright did not raise a true Wheeler issue; however, the
defense did allege the prosecutor discriminated against a black juror
based upon race.48 The court dismissed the claim for failure to estab-
lish a prima facie case because there could be no "purposeful discrim-
ination or systematic exclusion" when only one black juror was
peremptorily challenged. 49
42. Id at 606, 802 P.2d at 393, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The prosecutor excused one
black juror based on an outstanding warrant for her arrest and because of her current
divorce proceeding from a law enforcement employee. A second black juror was ex-
cused for death penalty scruples, while a third black juror was excused for reasons re-
lating to police department employment and for suspiciously claiming to have a
"photostatic" mind. The final black juror was excused because her daughter employed
a man whose stolen wallet was found at the crime scene. Id, at 605-06, 802 P.2d at 392-
93, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
43. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 497, 797 P.2d 561, 574, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 550
(1990). The court upheld the challenges excluding four hispanics for individual and
not ethnic violations on various grounds including reservations against the death pen-
alty, language problems, financial difficulty, and prior arrest convictions. Id. at 498-500,
797 P.2d at 574-76, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 550-52.
44. Id at 501, 797 P.2d at 576, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (citing People v. Johnson, 47
Cal. 3d 1194, 1221, 767 P.2d 1047, 1057, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 579 (1989) (trial court aware
of its duty to be sensitive when governing the use of peremptory challenges).
45. People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990).
46. Id at 105, 793 P.2d at 45, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
47. Id.
48. The defendant did not directly raise the Wheeler error issue alleging jurors
were eliminated based on a cognizable group bias, but relied instead on Batson v. Ken-
tucky, stating removal was for racial reasons violating the equal protection clause.
People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 399, 802 P.2d 221, 241, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 751 (1990)
(citing Batson v. Kentucky, 467 U.S. 79 (1986)). The court cited the test from Batson
stating that to establish "discriminatory motive, 'the defendant must first show that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group [citation], and that the prosecutor has exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of defendant's
race.'" Id (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96).
49. Id. at 400, 802 P.2d at 242, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
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2. Witherspoon- Witt Error
A second type of jury selection issue is Witherspoon-Witt error.5 0
This occurs when a juror is dismissed because of objections to the
death penalty without a finding by the trial court that the juror
would not be able to perform impartially the duties of a juror in ap-
plying the law.51
The court heard five appeals based on Witherspoon-Witt error.52
In People v. Kaurish, the supreme court reaffirmed the application of
the Witt standard used in conjunction with Witherspoon,53 stating
that the veniremen in question were properly excused due to their
continual contentions that they would be unable to apply the death
penalty.54 The court also rejected the defendant's contention that
the veniremen's answers were ambiguous and, therefore, did not sat-
isfy the exclusion standard.55 The court further stated that even if
the juror qualification is ambiguous, "the trial court's determination
on substantial evidence of the juror's fitness is binding upon appel-
late courts."5 6 The court warned, however, that a juror will not be
automatically excused for merely expressing personal opposition if
the belief would not substantially impair the administration of the ju-
ror's duty and oath.57
50. The original error was labeled Witherspoon after Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon error exists when jurors are excused "simply because
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or reli-
gious scruples against its infliction." Id. at 522. However, the strict standard was later
modified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In Witt, the United States
Supreme Court adopted a lesser standard, allowing removal when the prospective ju-
ror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at 424. The California
Supreme Court adopted this standard in conjunction with Witherspoon in People v.
Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 767, 739 P.2d 1250, 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 100 (1987).
51. Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26.
52. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 802 P.2d 278, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990); Peo-
ple v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990); People v. Sanders,
51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d
72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221,
276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990), petition for cert. filed, (May 20, 1991) (No. 90-8130).
53. See supra note 50 (California Supreme Court adoption of the Witt standard).
54. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 697-98, 802 P.2d 278, 304, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788,
814 (1990).
55. Id. at 698, 802 P.2d at 304, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
56. Id. (citing People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 356, 673 P.2d 680, 696, 197 Cal. Rptr.
803, 820 (1983)). See also People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 103, 793 P.2d 23, 44, 270
Cal. Rptr. 817, 838 (1990) (judge's discretion on conflicting testimony of juror's ability
to be impartial is generally binding).
57. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 699, 802 P.2d at 304-05, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15 (citing
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).
1145
In People v. Sanders, the defendant was denied his appeal that the
removal of the juror in question violated the Witt standard because
the court reasoned the juror's "antipathy" towards the death penalty
would substantially impair his duty as a juror.58
In People v. Stankewitz, the court rejected the defendant's claim
that the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant's challenges
for cause made against a few prospective jurors for bias adverse to
the defendant.59 The court stated that because the defendant failed
to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges, no error could be
claimed.60 The court rendered the same conclusion on similar facts
in People v. Kelly.61
Finally, in People v. Wright, the defendant contended that two ju-
rors were wrongly excluded under Witherspoon.62 After the court
quickly ruled that the jurors had been properly excused due to their
inability to vote for the death penalty, it also rejected defendant's as-
sertion that the trial court's limit of only three questions for Wither-
spoon voir dire was prejudicial. 63
The court also curtly dismissed all contentions that the death pen-
alty question qualification of jurors was unconstitutional.64 Among
the contentions raised and rejected was that the qualification violated
a defendant's right to a fair, impartial, and representative jury.65
3. Miscellaneous Jury Contentions
The court in People v. Medina briefly addressed whether an entire
58. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 503, 797 P.2d 561, 578, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 554
(1990). The supreme court also rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court
had an obligation to instruct the juror that he had a "civic duty" to apply the law and
disregard personal belief. Id. (citing People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 96, 744 P.2d 1127,
1151, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 618 (1987) (trial court not obligated under Witherspoon to give
civic duty instructions to jurors)).
59. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d at 103-04, 793 P.2d at 43-44, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. The
defendant claimed juror bias, alleging that some of the challenged jurors said they
would "automatically vote" for the death sentence. Id.
60. Id. at 103, 793 P.2d at 44, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
61. People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 960, 800 P.2d 516, 533-34, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 177-
78 (1990).
62. People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 417, 802 P.2d 221, 254, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 764
(1990).
63. Id. at 419, 802 P.2d at 255, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65. The court noted that the
right to voir dire stems from the idea of promoting impartial juries, not the United
States Constitution. Though a trial judge may not completely eliminate counsel ques-
tions, the supreme court maintained that in this case a three-question maximum was
permissible because the trial court had already conducted its own extensive question-
ing. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 419, 802 P.2d at 255, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The court repeatedly referred
to People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 732, 750 P.2d 741, 750, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 876 (1988)
and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-76 (1986), to support the constitutionality of
the death penalty question qualification.
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venire must be discharged when there is the possibility of prospective
juror bias against the defendant. 66 The court stated that since the
trial court held a bias hearing on the matter and that none of the ju-
rors implicated actually served on the jury, the appropriate relief was
further voir dire and not the more extreme solution of discharging
the entire venire.6 7
In People v. Anderson, the defendant alleged jury misconduct in its
submission of questions before all the evidence had been presented.68
The court stated that merely questioning prior to deliberations does
not prove the jury began improperly developing premature conclu-
sions.69 The court also held that a juror substitution based on cause
does not necessitate a mistrial.70 In People v. Gonzalez, the court also
rejected the defendant's contention that the substitution of the trial
judge, absent defendant's consent, was error and in violation of the
due process rights.71
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
An important source of appeals in the guilt phase concerns accusa-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct. Nine of the thirteen cases re-
viewed addressed this allegation.72 The charges included failure to
disclose material evidence,73 improper direct examination,74 and mis-
66. People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 888, 799 P.2d 1282, 1293, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849,
860 (1990).
67. Id. at 889, 799 P.2d at 1294, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
68. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 471, 801 P.2d 1107, 1122, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356,
371 (1990). Under Penal Code section 1122, a jury must not form opinions concerning
the case until all evidence has been offered. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1122 (West 1988).
69. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d at 471, 801 P.2d at 1122, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72.
70. Id. at 472, 801 P.2d at 1123, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 372. The court noted that if an
alternate juror is accessible, the jury must only set aside its past deliberations and start
again, including the new juror. Id. See also People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 420, 802
P.2d 221, 255-56, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 765-66 (1990) (no error for failure to give instruc-
tion because deliberations had not started).
71. People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1211-12, 800 P.2d 1159, 1172-73, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 742-43 (1990) (holding that trial judge's absence for one day during jury de-
liberations was not an error, nor was the defendant's consent to substitution required).
72. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990);
People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 798 P.2d 1215, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990); People v. Gon-
zalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal.
3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 802
P.2d 278, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 799 P.2d 1282, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1990); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 801 P.2d 1142, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1990); People
v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
73. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 802 P.2d at 396, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (holding fail-
ure to disclose amended complaint for impeachment of prosecutorial witness not preju-
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conduct during closing statement.75 The supreme court quickly dis-
missed a majority of these contentions where defense counsel had
failed to make objections or admonitions at trial when the purported
misconduct occurred.76 The court relied heavily on its policy that if
defendant raised no objection at that time or if an admonition might
have cured the misconduct, the objection on appeal is waived.77 Fur-
ther, in cases examined for merit, the court concluded the error was
not prejudicial, giving great deference to the "harmless error" doc-
trine.78 The court was very thorough in its examination of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct in all trial phases.79
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Another broad area frequently raised on appeal is ineffective
assistance of counsel. Although raised throughout all three phases of
seven cases, the issue never resulted in reversal.8 0 In order to obtain
dicial since there was no reasonable probability that proceeding would have resulted
differently).
74. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 676-77, 802 P.2d at 289-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800 (find-
ing the prosecutor's comments regarding defendant's dealing in drugs fell within the
prosecutor's privilege to make inferences from trial evidence). The court also held
that discrediting the defendant's expert witness did not deny defendant a fair trial
where an admonition would cure any impropriety. Id at 678-79, 802 P.2d at 291, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 801.
75. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 436, 802 P.2d at 267, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (holding the
prosecution's comments on defendant's lack of remorse was proper and not
misconduct).
76. The court repeatedly referred to People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 27-29, 609 P.2d
468, 484, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 16-17 (1980), for the proposition that such objections must be
raised at the time of the actual misconduct or the defendant cannot raise the issue on
appeal. See also People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 535, 778 P.2d 129, 147, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1,
19 (1989). The Bell court, in citing Green, stated the applicable standard of review for
defense objections not raised at trial:
[Tihe initial question to be decided ... is whether a timely objection and ad-
monition would have cured the harm. If it would then [the] contention must
be rejected...; if it would not, the court must then and only then reach the
issue whether [based] on the whole record the harm resulted in a miscarriage
of justice within the meaning of the Constitution.
Id. (citing Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 34, 609 P.2d at 487-88, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21). See, e.g.,
Death Penalty IV, supra note 1, at 1102.
77. For a discussion of the consequences of a failure to object, see supra note 76
and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of the harmless error doctrine, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
79. Allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct were raised at every trial
phase. The court rejected all contentions based on timeliness, harmless error, or
proper prosecutorial conduct.
80. The following cases presented the ineffective assistance of counsel issue for re-
view: In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d 1063, 800 P.2d 862, 275 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1990); People v.
Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 798 P.2d 1215, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990); People v. Gonzalez, 51
Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577,
802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 802 P.2d 278,
276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
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reversal on this issue, a defendant must show: (1) the defense coun-
sel was deficient,8 1 and (2) the deficiency must have actually
prejudiced the defendant.8 2
In six cases the court found that counsel's assistance did not fall
below the minimum standards of assistance.8 3 Five cases also found
that the attorney error at issue was not prejudicial enough to fail the
"reasonable probability" standard.8 4 This standard was defined in In
re Fields, where the court addressed defense counsel's failure to offer
mitigating facts concerning defendant's background and character.8 5
81. The court stated that a defendant must prove that the counsel's assistance was
so defective as to fall "below an objective standard of reasonableness... under prevail-
ing professional norms." In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d at 1069, 800 P.2d at 865, 275 Cal. Rptr.
at 387 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
82. The court applied a very strict standard as to what can establish a prejudicial
error. The court stated:
[I]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceiv-
able effect on the outcome of the proceeding... [Paragraph] The defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence
in the outcome.
In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d at 1070, 800 P.2d at 865, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (quoting Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 693-94).
83. Some pertinent contentions include: In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d at 1075, 800 P.2d
at 869, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (defense counsel's failure to investigate for further expert
witnesses to prove mental incompetence not deficient); Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 731-32, 798
P.2d at 1223, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (defense counsel's failure to raise confrontation ob-
jection in penalty phase testimony not deficient due to strategic attack on witness in
guilt phase); Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 623-24, 802 P.2d at 404-05, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03
(defense counsel's adoption of defective defense strategy against adverse witness
within "reasonable range of attorney competence"); Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 677-78, 802
P.2d at 290, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (defense counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial
misconduct was tactical defense and not ineffective assistance where objection would
have "accentuate[d] defendant's negative qualities"); Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d at 113-16,
793 P.2d at 50-53, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 844-47 (failure to impeach witness, request instruc-
tion, and to call medical witness was neither ineffective assistance nor prejudicial);
Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 411-15, 802 P.2d at 250-52, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 760-62 (nsrepresenta-
tion of defense counsel's skill and experience, lack of request for second counsel, use of
challenges in jury selection, failure to move to disqualify trial judge, and over-all inef-
fective trial strategy fails both prongs).
84. The noteworthy arguments include: In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d at 1079, 800 P.2d at
872, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (the court refused to examine the first prong because the
appeal failed the second prong); Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1179, 800 P.2d at 1202, 275 Cal.
Rptr. at 772 ("though counsel might have done more in several areas," representation
was not so severely deteriorated as to require reversal); Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 612,
802 P.2d at 392-94, 397, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 891, 894-95 (failure to object to non-crucial tes-
timony and introduction of amended prosecutorial complaint was not prejudicial). For
a listing of other cases failing the first and second prongs, see supra note 83 and ac-
companying text.
85. In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d at 1076-81, 800 P.2d at 869-73, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 391-95.
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The court stated that where the challenge is to a death sentence, the
test for prejudice is whether, "'absent the errors, the sentencer ...
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.' "86 In general, the court is
very conservative in examining ineffective assistance appeals, giving
considerable deference to counsel strategy.8 7
D. Miranda
In People v. Sanders, the defendant asserted a violation of his Mi-
randa rights,88 claiming he was not informed of the charges against
him, thereby precluding a knowing waiver of his rights.8 9 The
supreme court stated that although such an argument could be made,
the contention is without merit following the United States Supreme
Court decision in Colorado v. Spring, where the Court held the Con-
stitution does not mandate a suspect be told of every possible conse-
quence of any voluntary admissions.90
In People v. Anderson, the defendant alleged a Miranda violation
in the special circumstance phase of the trial regarding his recorded
confession and filmed reenactment of the crime.9 1 He contended
these were induced involuntarily due to his intense sleep deprivation
and inadequate Miranda warning.92 The court rejected the defend-
ant's contentions, stating first that the evidence did not support a
finding of sleep deprivation and, second, that the defendant had been
repeatedly warned that his psychiatrists were working for the prose-
cution and that any admissions would be used against him.93
The court also rejected an appeal in People v. Kelly, where the de-
fendant claimed the Miranda instruction he received was misleading
86. Id. at 1078, 800 P.2d at 871, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695).
87. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (United States Supreme Court held
that under the Fifth Amendment, a person in custody must be informed that the indi-
vidual has the right to remain silent; that anything the individual says may be used
adversely in a court of law; that the individual has the right to an attorney; and that if
the individual is indigent, an attorney will be appointed). See generally 5 B. WITKIN &
N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2679 (2d ed. 1989).
89. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 512, 797 P.2d 561, 583, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 559
(1990). The court noted that under Miranda, ".'the defendant may waive effectuation'
of the rights conveyed in the warnings 'provided the waiver is made voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently.' " Id. Therefore, the court stated for an effective waiver, the
defendant must have full knowledge of "the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of [his] decision to abandon it." Id. at 512 n.17, 797 P.2d at 584 n.17,
273 Cal. Rptr. at 560 n.17.
90. Id. at 513, 797 P.2d at 584, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479
U.S. 564 (1987).
91. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990).
92. Id. at 459-60, 801 P.2d at 1115, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
93. Id. at 460-61, 801 P.2d at 1115-16, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
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and inaccurate because it, inter alia, failed to inform him of his right
to have an attorney present during questioning.94 The court held the
warnings given were unequivocal and that a reasonable defendant
could not have misunderstood them.95
E. Shackling of Defendant
The supreme court heard two appeals alleging jury prejudice re-
sulting from in-court shackling of the defendant.96 The court stated
that a defendant may be shackled only "as a 'last resort'. . . where a
manifest need therefore arises and no lesser measure would suf-
fice." 97 In both cases, the court noted that the shackles were mani-
festly necessary due to the defendants' prior violent behavior.98
Further, the court stated that the shackles in both cases were not ap-
parently visible to the jury, and even if noticeable, were not
prejudicial. 99
V. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE ISSUES
In California, a defendant may be given the death penalty only if
he is charged and convicted of first-degree murder in the guilt phase
of trial, and in conjunction, one or more of the special circumstances
enumerated by statute are presentloo Although the court addressed
several special circumstance contentions, this survey addresses only
the most prominent.
In People v. Anderson, the court addressed whether jury notifica-
tion of the defendant's prior conviction and subsequent reversal of
94. People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 948-49, 800 P.2d 516, 526, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 170
(1990).
95. Id. at 949, 800 P.2d at 526, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
96. People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 799 P.2d 1282, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1990); Peo-
ple v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990).
97. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 897, 799 P.2d at 1299, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
98. Id. (defendant turned over counsel table during competency hearing);
Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d at 95-96, 793 P.2d at 38, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (defendant had
tried to escape from court house holding cell).
99. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 897-98, 799 P.2d at 1300, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 867; Stankewitz,
51 Cal. 3d at 95-96, 793 P.2d at 38-39, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). See also 2 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 1026C (Supp. 1985). The most common type of special circum-
stance is a finding that the defendant has committed a multiple murder. Under sec-
tion 190.2(a)(3), the defendant need only be convicted of one or more murders in the
first or second degree to satisfy the statutory requirement. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Other special circumstances satisfying the re-
quirement include: murder-robbery, murder-arson, murder-burglary, and murder-rape.
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a).
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the same offense was prejudicial. 101 The court held that any preju-
dice would have affected the guilt rather than the special circum-
stance phase, which was already supported by overwhelming
aggravating evidence1 02 The court also stated that the defense coun-
sel knew of, but did not object to, the admission of the evidence for
tactical reasons, thereby waiving any appeal on this issue.10 3 This is-
sue was also addressed and rejected in People v. Whitt on identical
facts.104
The court in People v. Gonzalez, examined a special circumstance
contention based on whether the defendant had shot and killed a po-
lice officer "engaged in the performance of [his] duties."105 The de-
fendant contended the police officer in question was acting pursuant
to an invalid warrant when shot and, therefore, was not engaged in
his "duties."'1 6 The court decided this issue of first instance by hold-
ing "that if a warrant is valid on its face, an officer carrying out its
command to search or arrest is lawfully engaged in duty, and his at-
tacker may be convicted and punished on that basis ... ,"107
Another special circumstance- issue raised concerned the jury in-
struction of intent to kill under a finding of felony-murder special
circumstance. The court in People v. Hayes8OS noted that its decision
in Carlos v. Superior Court,0 9 requiring proof of intent to kill before
a felony-murder special circumstance could be found, was overruled
by People v. Anderson,110 which established that the death penalty
could be given to a first degree felony-murderer, regardless of in-
tent."1 This issue was also addressed in People v. Whitt, where the
101. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 466, 801 P.2d 1107, 1112, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356,
361-62 (1990).
102. Id. at 466-67, 801 P.2d at 1113, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
103. Md at 467-68, 801 P.2d at 1113-14, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
104. People v. Witt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 639-41, 798 P.2d 849, 860, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 263
(1990) (defendant invited error by submitting a proposal statement on the matter and
by a tactical failure to object).
105. People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1217, 800 P.2d 1159, 1176, 275 Cal. Rptr.
729, 746 (1990). Section 190.2(a)(7) provides that special circumstances exist when the
murder victim was a ."peace officer . .. who, while engaged in the course of the per-
formance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and defendant knew or reason-
ably should have known that such victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties .... CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991).
106. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1217, 800 P.2d at 1176, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 746. The de-
fendant contended that the trial court erred in not considering the search warrant's
validity when giving the jury instruction that an officer acting pursuant to a search
warrant is performing his duties. Id. at 1218, 800 P.2d at 1177, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
107. d. The court concluded that this would encompass the execution of a war-
rant, even where no probable cause existed, as long as the warrant was facially valid.
Id,
108. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 52 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990).
109. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
110. People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 11.04, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
111. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 632, 802 P.2d at 410, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 908. The court also
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court held that retroactive application of Anderson was constitu-
tional.112 The issue of Anderson's retroactivity was also challenged
and rejected in People v. Kaurish.113
In People v. Sanders, the supreme court stated that the instruction
allowing a jury to find a felony-murder special circumstance against
the actual killer without a finding of intent to kill does not extend to
a defendant who is only an aider and abetter."4 The high court held
that the jury instructions provided by the trial court distinguishing
the actual killing from the intent to aid and abet were not erroneous
because the instruction required the jury to find that the defendant
either was the actual killer, or if only an aider and abetter, possessed
the intent to kill.115
VI. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A. Instructional Error
1. Brown Error
The supreme court in People v. Brown 116 held that jury instruc-
tions concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances may mis-
lead a jury when given in isolation."l 7 In Brown error allegations
stated that Anderson's retroactive application does not violate the due process clause.
1d.
112. People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 637-38, 798 P.2d 849, 858, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 261
(1990). The court also rejected the law-of-the-case doctrine which provides that
"where an appellate court states a rule of law necessary to its decision," the rule shall
be applied in a subsequent hearing of the same case even where the rule of law is in-
correct. Id. at 638, 798 P.2d at 858, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 261. The court noted that an "ex-
ception [to this rule] exists where there has been a 'controlling' change in the law
between the time of the first and second appellate decisions." Id. at 638-39, 798 P.2d at
858, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 261. The court concluded that since Anderson clarifies the death
penalty statute, it represents a controlling change in the law, making retroactivity con-
stitutional. Id. at 639, 798 P.2d at 859, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
113. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 696-97, 802 P.2d 278, 303, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788,
813 (1990).
114. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 515-16, 797 P.2d 561, 586, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537,
562 (1990).
115. Id. at 516-17, 797 P.2d at 586-87, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63. The court also ad-
dressed and rejected the defendant's contention on a different special circumstance,
concluding that a witness-killing special circumstance instruction should not be limited
to a finding that a witness was killed for the sole purpose of preventing that person's
testimony in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 519, 797 P.2d at 589, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
116. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
117. CALJIC 8.84.2 (West 4th ed. 1979) states: "If you conclude that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of
death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the ag-
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surveyed,118 the court reiterated that an instruction stating that the
jury "shall" impose death is not improper or misleading if another
applicable instruction adequately informs the jury of its sentencing
and discretionary responsibilities.119 In the cases raising this issue,
the court repeatedly held that the instruction was not misleading and
that the jury was fully aware of its duties.120
gravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole." Id. In People v. Brown, the court
stated that error exists when the jury believes it should arithmetically add mitigating
and aggravating circumstances to determine which total is greater and impose its sen-
tence from those findings alone. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 541, 726 P.2d at 531-32, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 849-50.
118. See People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1228, 800 P.2d 1159, 1183-84, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 753-54 (1990) (the prosecution telling jury not to decide the appropriate pen-
alty but to make a mechanical assessment of the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances questioned as error); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 641-42, 802 P.2d 376, 416-
17, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 914 (1990) (jury instruction implying a mechanical balancing test
of aggravating and mitigating evidence was prejudicial); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d
648, 711, 802 P.2d 278, 313, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 822-23 (1990) (defendant alleged error by
prosecutor's statement that the jury had no discretion and must impose death if the
aggravating factors prevail); People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 521, 797 P.2d 561, 590-91,
273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 566-67 (1990) (defendant argued the words "shall impose a sentence
of death" in jury instruction were misleading); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 745-46,
801 P.2d 1142, 1156, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 405-06 (1990) (modified jury instruction did not
inform jurors that they could not return lesser verdict if appropriate); People v. Whitt,
51 Cal. 3d 620, 650, 798 P.2d 849, 867, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 270 (1990) (defendant alleges
jury misled to believe death was "mandatory" in special situations); People v. Wright,
52 Cal. 3d 367, 438-39, 802 P.2d 221, 268-69, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 779 (1990) (defendant
contended prosecutor misled jury by stating that jury "shall," and not "may," impose
death).
119. See, e.g., People v. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d 879, 905-06, 771 P.2d 1294, 1313, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 208, 225-26 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990) (word "shall" does not
make instruction per se invalid); People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 858, 755 P.2d 894, 910-
11, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 460-61 (1988) (reasonable jury understands the instruction does
not compel it to give defendant death). The court also stated that no error exists for
death cases properly tried under the 1977 and not the 1978 death statute because the
1978 statute is only "prospective in effect" and is actually less favorable to a defendant.
People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 108-09, 793 P.2d 23, 47, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 841
(1990).
120. See Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1229-30, 800 P.2d at 1184-85, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55
(prosecutor cured prior misleading statements by informing the jury it must weigh,
rather than count, the factors and evidence presented); Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 642, 802
P.2d at 417, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 915 (additional jury instruction stating jury must use its
discretion and not mechanically weigh the factors eliminated possible error); Kaurish,
52 Cal. 3d at 714, 802 P.2d at 314-15, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25 (jury was not misled due to
the prosecution's repeated statements stressing jury discretion); Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d at
521-24, 797 P.2d at 590-92, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 566-68 (in light of the whole record, jury
understood and followed its discretionary duties); Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 745-46, 801 P.2d
at 1156, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (jury not misled by statement that it must choose death if
mitigating factors do not outweigh aggravating factors); Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d at 650-51, 798
P.2d at 867, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (trial court anticipated Brown issue and gave jury
special instructions on jury's discretion in the weighing process); Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at
439-40, 802 P.2d at 269, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (jury was not misled in light of prosecu-
tor's and trial court's repeated instruction on the appropriate weighing process).
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2. Factor (k) Error
Four of the cases surveyed' 2 ' alleged factor (k) error, addressing
whether a jury may consider other extenuating circumstances as a
mitigating factor, even if it does not legally excuse the crime.122 The
original factor (k) was expanded to include as a mitigating factor
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."123 Alleged error in cases tried under the
original factor (k) must be examined in light of the instructions
given, prosecutorial statements, and the record as a whole, to deter-
mine whether the jury knew it should consider all mitigating circum-
stances presented in the case.124
The court in People v. Gonzalez rejected the defendant's contention
that the jury was not able to consider his background and charac-
ter.125 The court held that the "catch all" factor in the mitigation in-
struction, telling the jury to consider "all of the evidence," eliminated
any defect in the overall instruction. 2 6
In People v. Hayes, which was tried prior to the current instruc-
tion, the supreme court held that the jury was not prevented from
considering other mitigating circumstances despite the lack of the ex-
panded instruction.127 The court based its holding on the fact that
both the defense counsel and the prosecutor informed the jury that it
should consider the defendant's character and background when
making its judgment.128
The court in People v. Taylor examined the trial court's definition
of a "factor in mitigation" to see whether the instruction precluded
the jury from taking the defendant's character and background into
121. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729; Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d
577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874; Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 801 P.2d 1142, 276 Cal. Rptr.
391; Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731.
122. Factor (k) error concerns jury instruction under California Penal Code section
190.3(k). Under factor (k), a jury may contemplate as a mitigating factor "[any other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). See also
B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1608 (2d ed. 1989).
123. The new expanded version of factor (k) is contained in CALJIC No. 8.85(k)
(5th ed. 1988).
124. People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 777, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 107
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).
125. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1225, 800 P.2d at 1181-82, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
126. Id.
127. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 640-41, 802 P.2d at 416, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
128. Id.
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consideration.129 The court held that in light of the jury's instruction
to consider sympathy and any other mitigating factor raised by the
defendant, the definition was not prejudicial error. 130
Finally, in People v. Wright, the jury was not read the factor (k)
instruction verbatim.131 Despite the defendant's contention to the
contrary, the supreme court found that the jury understood it was to
weigh all the evidence presented.132 Both the prosecution and the
defendant advised the jury to consider sympathy evidence and "any
other factors in mitigation." 133
3. General Issues Regarding Aggravating and Mitigating
Evidence
The defendant in People v. Anderson contended that the trial court
erred by admitting a prior statement of his as a statutory aggravating
factor. 34 The defendant alleged that the trial court should have spe-
cifically weighed the evidence's relevance against its possible prejudi-
cial effect as required by section 352 of the Evidence Code.135 The
court stated that an express ruling under section 352 is not required
unless the defendant specifically requests such a weighing or invokes
this section as a ground for objection.136
Five other cases addressed whether the court should have required
additional instruction regarding a defendant's nonextreme mental
disturbance as a nonstatutory mitigating factor.137 The court rejected
the contentions, stating that such evidence fell under the expanded
"catchall" factor (k) instruction.1 38
The defendant in People v. Sanders alleged that the court improp-
erly instructed the jury on whether to consider "sympathy" as miti-
129. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 746, 801 P.2d at 1156, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
130. Id. at 746, 801 P.2d at 1157, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
131. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 441, 802 P.2d at 270, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 476, 801 P.2d 1107, 1119, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356,
368-69 (1990).
135. Id. at 477, 801 P.2d at 1120, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 369. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1988).
136. Id.
137. People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 740, 798 P.2d 1215, 1228, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 385
(1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2816 (1991); People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1226-27,
800 P.2d 1159, 1183, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 753 (1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 968-
69, 800 P.2d 516, 539-40, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 183-84 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d
870, 907-08, 799 P.2d 1282, 1306-07, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849,. 873-74 (1990); People v. Wright,
52 Cal. 3d 367, 443-44, 802 P.2d 221, 271-72, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 781-82 (1990).
138. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 740, 798 P.2d at 1228, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Gonzalez, 51
Cal. 3d at 1227, 800 P.2d at 1183, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 753; Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d at 969, 800 P.2d
at 540, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 184; Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 799 P.2d at 1306-07, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 873-74; Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 444, 802 P.2d at 272, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
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gating evidence in its penalty phase deliberations.139 The defendant
contended that earlier instructions ordering the jury not to consider
sympathy in its guilt phase determination influenced consideration of
sympathy at the penalty phase,14 0 The court rejected the defendant's
contention, citing three cases in which it had previously rejected the
same argument.141
Sanders also addressed whether the defendant's refusal to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase constituted reversible er-
ror.142 The court held that the defendant's failure to present mitigat-
ing evidence does not render the verdict constitutionally unreliable,
nor does it convincingly show ineffective assistance of counsel.143
The court in People v. Taylor and People v. Wright stated that Cal-
ifornia Penal Code section 190.3 requires the prosecution to present
the defendant with written notice of the aggravating factors to be
presented prior to trial.144 The court held that although the prosecu-
139. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 528, 797 P.2d 561, 595, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 571
(1990).
140. Id. In Sanders, the jury was instructed prior to its guilt phase decision that it
could not be "swayed by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling." Id. Before deliberation on the penalty phase issue, the jury
was instructed that it should be guided by the instructions given in the guilt phase. Id.
141. Id. (citing People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1225, 800 P.2d 1159, 1182, 275
Cal. Rptr. 729, 752 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 705, 802 P.2d 278, 308-09,
276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 818-19 (1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 107-08, 793 P.2d
23, 46-47, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 841 (1990)).
142. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 797 P.2d at 592, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 568. The court
addressed two problems that might occur in such a situation: (1) that the death deter-
uination may be unreliable absent such mitigating factors; and (2) defense counsel
performance might be considered ineffective for succumbing to his client's wishes
rather than making an independent decision to present mitigating evidence. Id. at 525-
26, 797 P.2d at 593, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
143. Id. at 526, 797 P.2d at 593-94, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 569-70. The court noted that if
the correct instructions and procedures under the 1978 death penalty statute are fol-
lowed, the verdict is considered reliable. Id. Further, absent a showing of counsel's
failure to search for available mitigating evidence, there is no error. Id. at 526, 797
P.2d at 594, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 570. The defendant made a constitutionally acceptable
waiver of his rights during the penalty phase, and could not later claim error based on
this waiver. Id. at 527, 797 P.2d at 594, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 570. The court also stated that
nonparticipation in the penalty phase is not equivalent to a guilty plea, and does not
require the defense counsel's consent. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE 1018 (WEST
1988)).
144. People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 736, 801 P.2d 1142, 1150, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 399
(1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 422-23, 802 P.2d 221, 257-58, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731,
767-68 (1990) (prosecution substantially complied with section 190.3 by giving oral no-
tice). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). The court noted the policy considera-
tions behind this canon that provide defense counsel with sufficient warning to
prepare an adequate defense. Taylor, 52 Cal, 3d at 736, 801 P.2d at 1150, 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 399; Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 422-23, 802 P.2d 257-58, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
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tion had not complied with the notice requirement, the effect was not
prejudicial because the defendants received actual notice. 145
In People v. Whitt, the court rejected the defendant's contention
that excluding a description of an execution denied his right to pres-
ent relevant mitigating evidence.146 The court stated that while the
defense may introduce evidence of the defendant's background and
character to elicit sympathy, it considered evidence concerning ex-
ecutions irrelevant to the jury's decision of whether a particular de-
fendant deserves the death penalty.147
The court also addressed the defendant's contention that he was
denied his right to present mitigating evidence when the trial court
excluded the defense counsel's questions concerning the defendant's
desire to live.14s The court held that such questions were admissible
as evidence of defendant's character and humanity, but concluded the
error was not prejudicial.149
4. Boyd Error
As stated in the factor (k) discussion, the jury may consider all
mitigating evidence that defense counsel presents.150 However, the
jury may consider only aggravating evidence that is specifically enu-
merated by statute.151 Boyd error occurs where the jury weighs ag-
gravating evidence not enumerated in California Penal Code section
190.3.152 The supreme court addressed two cases asserting Boyd
error.15 3
In People v. Anderson, the prosecutor introduced evidence of both
nonviolent criminal activity as well as noncriminal activity.1 5 4 An-
145. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 737, 801 P.2d at 1150, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 399; Wright, 52 Cal.
3d at 423, 802 P.2d at 258, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
146. People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 664-65, 798 P.2d 849, 862-63, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252,
265-266 (1990).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 647, 798 P.2d at 864, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
149. Id. at 648 n.17, 798 P.2d at 865 n.17, 374 Cal. Rptr. at 268 n.17. See generally
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (prejudicial effect regarding right to offer
mitigating evidence is governed by the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
150. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
151. People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 775, 700 P.2d 782, 791, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1985).
152. Id. at 775, 700 P.2d at 791-92, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Under Boyd, "[e]vidence of defendant's background,
character, or conduct which is not probative of any specific listed factor would have no
tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the determination of the action,
... [and] is therefore irrelevant to aggravation." Id. at 774, 700 P.2d at 790-91, 215 Cal.
Rptr. at 9.
153. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990);
People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
154. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d at 475, 801 P.2d at 1118, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 367. Specifically,
the prosecution presented evidence of the defendant's burglaries, lack of meaningful
employment, and his use of an alias. Id. at 475, 801 P.2d at 1118-19, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
367-68.
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swering the defendant's assertion that this was Boyd error, the court
held that the evidence was admissible because the defendant himself
had introduced one of the disputed facts, waived his objection to an-
other, while the third fact was properly admitted under an enumer-
ated factor.155
The court also examined improperly admitted evidence in People v.
Wright.156 The court, however, noted that mere Boyd error alone
was not grounds for reversal.157 The court also found that even
though improper, the admission was harmless when examined in
conjunction with the extensive, properly admitted aggravating
evidence.158
5. Davenport Error
Davenport error exists where the absence of mitigating evidence is
presented as an aggravating factor. 5 9 In People v. Whitt, the court
rejected the defendant's allegation of Davenport error, stating that
although the prosecutor could not argue that the absence of certain
mitigating factors was aggravating, he could point out which factors
were statutorily deficient.160 The same argument was addressed in
People v. TaylorX61 and People v. Kaurish.162 In People v. Gonzalez,
the court stated that even though lack of remorse cannot be consid-
155. Id at 475-76, 801 P.2d at 1119, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The court also concluded
that the evidence admitted was inconsequential and did not affect the verdict. Id, at
476, 801 P.2d at 1119, 276 Cal. Rptr. 368.
156. People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990). The
court found the testimony of nine witnesses recounting the defendant's various violent
acts and threats inadmissible because they were not enumerated nor did they consti-
tute "'criminal activity' in violation of a penal statute." Id. at 425-26, 802 P.2d at 259-
60, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
157. Id at 426, 802 P.2d at 260, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 770. The court noted that in cases
where reversal was granted it was based on a combination of prejudicial effects. Id.
The court stated that a verdict will stand unless the defendant can reasonably prove
that absent the error, the jury would not have rendered the death penalty. Id. at 428,
802 P.2d at 261, 276 Cal. Rtpr. at 771.
158. Id. at 427, 802 P.2d at 260, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 770. The court held that in light of
the defendant's violent criminal past, including the rape and murder of a 76-year-old
woman, the erroneously admitted evidence was merely "cumulative" and did not alter
the jury's already "damaging inferences." Id. at 429, 802 P.2d at 262, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
772.
159. See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 288-89, 710 P.2d 861, 888, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794, 821 (1985). For example, Davenport error would occur if the prosecution argued
that the lack of the defendant's ability to prove that he was under extreme emotional
distress was an aggravating factor.
160. People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 653-54, 798 P.2d 849, 869, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 272
(1990).
161. People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 744, 801 P.2d 1142, 1155, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 404
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ered an aggravating factor, the prosection's comments regarding de-
fendant's overt remorse at the exact time of the crime is admissible
under section 190.3 factor (a), which allows the jury to consider "all
aggravating and mitigating aspects of the capital crime itsef."163
6. Ramos Error
In People v. Ramos, the Briggs instruction, which allows the trier
of fact to consider the Governor's power to parole or commute a capi-
tal punishment sentence, was held to be both misleading and uncon-
stitutional based on the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United -States Constitution.8 4 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the constitutionality holding, however, and remanded
for further consideration.16 5 The California Supreme Court, on re-
mand, again declared the Briggs instruction unconstitutional, this
time basing the finding on a violation of the due process clause to the
state constitution.166
The court addressed this issue in only one other case, People v.
Whitt.167 In Whitt, the court held that under Ramos a trial court has
the discretion to supply a modified Briggs instruction if there is a rea-
sonable belief that the jury is speculating on the possibility of a fu-
ture sentence reduction. 6 8 The court reasoned that because the trial
court instructed the jury that considering the possibility of a reduced
sentence would be a violation of its duty, no error existed, or in the
alternative, was harmless.169
In People v. Kaurish, the defendant claimed that a juror's remark
on parole possibilities was as prejudicial as a Briggs instruction, and
that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury not to con-
sider such possibilities in its deliberations.170 The supreme court
(1990) (holding prosecutor entitled to mention that particular mitigating factors are ab-
sent, as long as such absence is not presented as an aggravating factor).
162. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 706, 802 P.2d 278, 309, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 819
(prosecution's statement that certain mitigating factors were not applicable was not
error).
163. People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1231-32, 800 P.2d 1159, 1186, 275 Cal. Rptr.
729, 756 (1990) (emphasis in original). The court noted, however, that post-crime re-
morse should not be presented as a factor in aggravation. Id. at 1232, 800 P.2d at 1187,
275 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The court also held that the prosecution's assertions of the de-
fendant's lack of mitigating evidence regarding remorse was not error. Id.
164. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 600-01, 639 P.2d 908, 936, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266,
294 (1982), rev'd sub nom. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
165. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1014.
166. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 159, 689 P.2d 430, 442, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 814
(1984).
167. People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 798 P.2d 849, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1990).
168. Id. at 657, 798 P.2d at 871, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
169. Id.
170. People v. Kavrish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 708-09, 802 P.2d 278, 311, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788,
821 (1990).
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stated, however, that the remark was not as prejudicial as either the
Briggs instruction or an admonishment would have been.17 1 The
court also reviewed a similar allegation in People v. Stankewitz,
where the defendant claimed the trial court responded inadequately
to jury questions regarding the possibility of parole.172 The supreme
court held that because the trial court told the jury not to consider
issues not before it when rendering sentence, no Ramos error
occurred.173
B. Factor (b) and (c) Error
When considering whether the death penalty should be imposed, a
jury may consider evidence offered under factors (b) and (c) of Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 190.3. Factor (b) allows the jury to con-
sider evidence of the defendant's prior criminal conduct which
"involved the use or attempted use of force or violence" as well as
any "express or implied threat to use force or violence."' 74 Under
factor (c) a jury may consider "[t]he presence or absence of any prior
felony conviction." 75
1. Factor (b) Error
The issue of whether prior criminal offenses, dismissed pursuant to
a plea bargain, are admissible under factor (b) was addressed in Peo-
ple v. Frank.7 6 The court stated that section 190.3, though not al-
lowing evidence of violent criminal activity where the defendant was
acquitted, does not preclude "bargained conviction[s] or dismis-
sal[s]."' 77 The court concluded similarly in People v. Taylor and Peo-
ple v. Kaurish, allowing evidence of the defendants' plea bargains to
be admitted.178
In People v. Hayes, the court addressed whether evidence of a prior
171. Id. at 709, 802 P.2d at 311, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
172. People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 110, 793 P.2d 23, 48, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 842
(1990).
173. Id. at 110-11, 793 P.2d at 48-49, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West 1988).
175. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c) (West 1988).
176. People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 728, 798 P.2d 1215, 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377-
78 (1990).
177. Id. at 728-29, 798 P.2d at 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The court cited People v.
Melton, stating that a capital sentencing jury may consider "prior dismissed or bar-
gained charges" when deliberating in the penalty phase. Id at 728, 798 P.2d at 1221,
274 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (citing People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 755, 750 P.2d 741, 765, 244
Cal. Rptr. 867, 892 (1988)).
178. People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 742-43, 801 P.2d 1142, 1154, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391,
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juvenile court proceeding could be considered under factor (b).179
The court held evidence of violent criminal conduct could be consid-
ered whether done as a juvenile or adult.180 The court in People v.
Sanders rejected the defendant's contention that the jury instruction
should have been modified, finding instead that the jury was ade-
quately informed that factor (b) criminal activity does not include the
activity for which the defendant is being tried.18 '
2. Factor (c) Error
The defendant in People v. Taylor alleged prejudice caused by the
erroneous admission of aggravating evidence under factor (c) regard-
ing two burglaries he committed which were not adjudicated until af-
ter the capital offense trial had begun. 82 The defendant argued that
under People v. Balderas prior felony convictions admitted under fac-
tor (c) must have been decided before the "commission of the capital
crime."183 While the court agreed with the defendant's contention, it
concluded that because the jury was later told to disregard the evi-
dence, and because the evidence was slight compared to other aggra-
vating factors properly admitted, the error was harmless. 8 4 In
People v. Kaurish, the court held that the prosecution could not ad-
mit evidence of either the defendant's prior prison escape or his post-
capital offense; however, the court declined to reverse, stating the de-
fendant had failed to object to admission of the evidence, thereby
waiving the issue on appeal. 8 5 The court also rejected the defend-
ant's contention that admission of prior felonies under factor (c) was
unconstitutional.186
403 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 703, 802 P.2d 278, 307, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788,
817 (1990).
179. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 633, 802 P.2d 376, 411, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 908
(1990). The defendant originally argued that juvenile court proceedings are not consid-
ered criminal convictions and, therefore, are not admissible under section 190.3(c) as
prior felony convictions. The court, however, noted that the evidence was properly ad-
mitted under factor (b). Id at 633, 802 P.2d at 411, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
180. Id. at 633, 802 P.2d at 411, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
181. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 528, 797 P.2d 561, 595, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 571
(1990). The court noted that it had previously rejected such allegations, and that the
prosecution's closing argument identified which previous crimes could be considered
under factor (b).
182. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 740, 801 P.2d at 1152, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
183. Id. (citing People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 201, 711 P.2d 480, 513, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 217 (1985)) (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 702, 802 P.2d 278, 306, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 816
(1990). The court held that the defendant, by failing to object, also waived the errone-
ous admission of his breach of probation, which is not admissible under either factor
(b) or (c). Id.
186. Id. at 700-01, 802 P.2d at 305-06, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16 (holding factor (c) does
not violate Eighth Amendment by making the sentencing process "capricious and
arbitrary").
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C. Victim and Family Impact Evidence
The supreme court rejected ten challenges to the admissibility of
evidence, in all trial phases, concerning the crime's impact on the vic-
tim and the victim's family.'8 7 Such evidence is precluded from ad-
mission at trial, 8 8 and statements made to elicit sympathy or pity on
such grounds also are barred.'8 9 However, "brief references to the
victims or their families" are not prevented.190
Most appeals regarding victim and family impact evidence involve
photographs of the victim's corpse, the crime scene, and the victim
while alive, as well as evidence and statements regarding the victim's
character and the crime's impact on the family.191 The main argu-
ments presented by the defendants were that the challenged evi-
dence was irrelevant to any disputed issue and that its probative
value did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.'192
The supreme court gave great deference to the trial courts' find-
ings that the evidence was relevant to show: (1) facts incriminating
the defendant;19 3 (2) the defendant's intent or frame of mind; 94 (3)
187. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990);
People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 798 P.2d 1215, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990); People v. Gon-
zalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52
Cal. 3d 648, 802 P.2d 278, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800
P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 799 P.2d 1282, 274
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1990); People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990); Peo-
ple v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 801 P.2d 1142, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1990); People v. Wright,
52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
188. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987).
189. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). But see Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at
734, 798 P.2d at 1224, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543, 576,
749 P.2d 776, 795, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 140 (1988). In Frank, the California Supreme
Court stated that pictures appealing to jury sympathy may be properly admitted at the
penalty phase where the jury must "'weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant's
background against those that may offend the conscience'" so long as no "wholly irrel-
evant information or inflammatory rhetoric is employed." Id. The supreme court
warned, however, that the use of a victim's photograph should be discouraged. Id.
190. See Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d at 470, 801 P.2d at 1121-22, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71
(brief reference to victim's wish not to die was harmless); Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 905-06,
799 P.2d at 1305, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (quoting People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 536,,
268 P.2d 640, 680, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 166 (1990)); Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d at 112, 793 P.2d
at 49-50, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44 (brief reference to loss suffered by victim's family not
prejudicial error).
191. See, e.g., Gonzales, 51 Cal. 3d at 1236-37, 800 P.2d at 1189-90, 275 Cal. Rptr. at
759-60 (photographs of victim's corpse); Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d at 962-63, 800 P.2d at 535, 275
Cal. Rptr. at 179 (photographs of victim and crime scene).
192. See, e.g., Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d at 962-63, 800 P.2d at 535-36, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80;
People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 434, 802 P.2d 221, 265, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 775.
193. People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 683-84, 802 P.2d at 294-95, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 804-
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"circumstances of the crime;" and (4) prior violent criminal con-
duct.'9 5 In addition, the court agreed with the trial courts that the
evidence was neither gruesome nor inflammatory.196
The court further noted that such evidence was not barred during
a sentence modification hearing, though it could not be considered by
a judge when rendering his or her modification decision.' 97 The
court repeatedly held that if any error existed, it was harmless. 98
The high court also stated that a trial court's admission of such pho-
tographs and testimony will not be overruled unless the prejudicial
effect is clear.199
D. Automatic Motion for Modfication of Verdict
In every case where a death sentence is imposed, the trial court
must consider whether the verdict should be modified.200 The court
05 (holding photographs of corpse showing markings and bodily fluids were relevant to
establish that the defendant was the murderer).
194. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d at 963-64, 800 P.2d at 536, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (holding that
even if evidence was only marginally relevant to establish the defendant's frame of
mind, the error was harmless).
195. People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 734, 798 P.2d 1215, 1224, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 381
(1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 905, 799 P.2d 1282, 1305, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 872
(1990) (allowing evidence of victim's passive nature to show whether victim would
have resisted a robbery); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 111, 793 P.2d 23, 49, 270
Cal. Rptr. 817, 843 (1990) (victims' assault testimony admissible under both factor (a)
and (b)); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 741, 801 P.2d 1142, 1153, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391,
402 (evidence of victim's terror relevant to show nature and circumstance of crime).
196. See People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 474-75, 801 P.2d 1107, 1118, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 356, 367; People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1237, 800 P.2d 1159, 1190, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 760; Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 683-84, 802 P.2d at 294-95, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05;
Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d at 963, 800 P.2d at 536, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 180; People v. Sanders, 51 Cal.
3d 471, 515, 797 P.2d 561, 586, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 562; Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 434, 802 P.2d
at 265, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 775. But see Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 735, 798 P.2d at 1225, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 382 (though pictures of the victim were gruesome, their relevance outweighed
their prejudice).
197. See, e.g., Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 741-42, 798 P.2d at 1229-30, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 386-
87. In Frank, the court addressed the allegation that admitting evidence from the
murder victim's grandmother prior to the modification hearing was prejudicial. Id at
741, 798 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court held that Eighth Amendment
restraints do not apply to family impact evidence presented during a modification
hearing, though the trial judge may not consider this evidence when rendering his de-
cision. Id. at 742, 798 P.2d at 1229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 386. See also infra note 208 and
accompanying text (judge may not consider family impact evidence that is not admissi-
ble to the jury); Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 911-12, 799 P.2d at 1309-10, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 876-
77 (same conclusion concerning family impact and victim character evidence presented
after the modification hearing but before formal sentencing).
198. See Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 747, 801 P.2d at 1157, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 406; Kelly, 51
Cal. 3d at 963, 800 P.2d at 536, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 180; Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 734, 798 P.2d at
1224, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
199. See Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d at 514, 797 P.2d at 585, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 561; Wright, 52
Cal. 3d at 434, 802 P.2d at 265, 276 Cal. Rtpr. at 775; see also Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 734,
798 P.2d at 1225, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (failure to object to photograph admission consti-
tutes a waiver on appeal).
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1991). Section 190.4(e) requires, inter
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has authority to render a modification ,under California Penal Code
section 1385(a). 2O1 In rendering such a decision, the court must weigh
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances to determine whether
the jury's finding was "contrary to law or the evidence presented."202
After a review of the application for modification, the judge must
state the reasons for his or her conclusions on the record.2 03 The
supreme court heard a total of eight appeals claiming improper con-
sideration of the motion for modification.204 Although the supreme
court did not reverse any decisions due to the trial courts' refusal to
modify, it did address various errors that were non-prejudicial.
In People v. Gonzalez, the court noted that the trial judge had
erred by considering a probation report that had not been submitted
to the jury.20 5 The court stated that only evidence which was admit-
ted in the penalty phase could be considered on a modification mo-
tion.2 °6 In People v. Whitt, the court reached the same conclusion
regarding the trial court's consideration of a probation report.20 7 The
court in People v. Frank also stated that family impact evidence,
alia, that "[i]n every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding
imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an applica-
tion for modifwation of such verdict .... " Id. (emphasis added). See generally 3 B.
WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1618 (2d
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991); 22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3347 (1985); Death Penalty III,
supra note 6, at 547-48; Death Penalty V, supra note 1, at -
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 1385(a) states, in perti-
nent part, "[t]he judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion... and in
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." Id. The trial court may dis-
miss on a finding of special circumstances without reversing the entire conviction.
People v. Williams, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 441-42, 556 P.2d 1101, 1114, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 663
(1981). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181(7) (West 1988) (allowing judge to modify a
verdict "by imposing [a] lesser punishment without granting or ordering a new trial
. .
. .
) .
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988).
203. /L
204. See People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1990);
People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 798 P.2d 1215, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990); People v. Gon-
zalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal.
3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 800 P.2d
516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1990); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 801 P.2d 1142, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 391 (1990); People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 798 P.2d 849, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1990);
People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990).
205. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1237, 800 P.2d at 1190, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
206. Id. at 1238, 800 P.2d at 1190, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 760. The court refused to address
whether the defendant waived the error by submitting to the report's review, stating
judgment on this issue was not necessary because the report was overwhelmingly out
weighed by aggravating factors. Id. at 1238-39, 800 P.2d at 1190-91, 275 Cal. Rptr. at
760-61.
207. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d at 660-61, 798 P.2d at 874, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
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though admissible at the modification hearing, was correctly disre-
garded by the trial judge because the evidence had not been
presented to the jury.208
In People v. Hayes, the court declared that the defendant was not
denied "meaningful oral argument" merely because the trial court
had tentatively ruled on a motion before the defendant could present
oral evidence.209 The court in People v. Kelly, held that due to the
egregious nature of the defendant's crimes, the trial judge's failure to
consider a mitigating factor was not prejudicial. 210
As with other issues appealed, the supreme court repeatedly gave
great deference to the trial judge's ability to balance the mitigating
and aggravating factors, finding no reversible error in any of the
cases reviewed.
E. Proportionality Review
A final issue addressed on appeal concerned the proportionality of
the death sentence under the federal Constitution's Eighth Amend-
ment.211 There are two types of proportionality review: intercase and
intracase. In intercase proportionality review, the trial court com-
pares the penalties given the defendant with those given other de-
fendants found guilty of the same or similar crimes.212 Such review
is discretionary, however, since it is not guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.213 The California Supreme Court does, however, address intra-
case proportionality when the issue is raised on automatic appeal.2 14
208. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d at 742, 798 P.2d at 1229-30, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. See also
supra note 197 and accompanying text (admissability of family impact evidence at
modification hearing).
209. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 644-45, 802 P.2d 376, 419, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874,
916-17. The supreme court stated that it is "common practice" for a trial judge to for-
mulate a tentative conclusion. The trial court is not bound by such a decision and may
amend if so persuaded at the modification hearing. Id. at 645, 802 P.2d at 419, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 916-17.
210. People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 970, 800 P.2d 516, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 185 (1990).
211. Such appeals generally asserted that the death penalty was disproportionate to
penalties levied on other defendants who had committed similar crimes. Under the
Eighth Amendment, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, no excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis ad-
ded). See also Death Penalty IV, supra note 1, at 1116.
212. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
213. Id. at 50-51. The United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not require a "comparative proportionality review" in every death penalty
case. In two cases that raised the intercase proportionality issue, People v. Stankewitz
and People v. Medina, the California Supreme Court stated review is not mandatory.
People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 112, 793 P.2d 23, 50, 270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 844 (1990);
People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 912-13, 799 P.2d 1282, 1310, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 877
(1990).
214. In People v. Turner, the court stated that under the California Constitution,
punishment not proportionally based on "the defendant's individual culpability" was
"preclude[d]." People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 718, 789 P.2d 887, 915, 268 Cal. Rptr.
706, 735 (1990).
1166
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The standard applied is not a strict comparison of similar punish-
ments, rather, it is whether the sentence given was proportionate to
the defendant's particular culpability.215
Six of the fourteen cases surveyed raised the issue of either inter-
case or intracase proportionality. 216 The court rejected all six appeals
that the death penalty was disproportionate, by finding either the
sentence was justified on the particular facts of the case or by defer-
ring to the trial court's refusal to review proportionality.217
F. Cumulative Prejudice
The court addressed the issue of whether the cumulative effect of
trial errors, though individually harmless, should result in a total re-
versal. The court stated that most of the errors were minimal and,
even considered together, were not unduly prejudicial.218
G. Constitutionality of Death Sentence
Seven of the thirteen defendants alleged the constitutional invalid-
215, People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 1043, 782 P.2d 627, 662, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 421
(1989).
216. People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990); People
v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 802 P.2d 278, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990); People v. Medina, 51
Cal. 3d 870, 799 P.2d 1282, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1990); People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471,
797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72, 793 P.2d 23,
270 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr.
731 (1990).
217. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d at 645, 802 P.2d at 419, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (death not dispro-
portionate in light of brutal killing over money and cigarettes as well as a continual
pattern of violence); Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d at 716, 802 P.3d at 316, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 826
(death adequate sentence for molestation and murder of adolescent female); Medina,
51 Cal. 3d at 912-13, 799 P.2d at 1310, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (court refused to address
intercase. proportionality); Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d at 529-30, 797 P.2d at 596, .273 Cal. Rptr.
at 572 (death not disproportionate despite accomplice's lesser prison sentence because
of defendant's motive and prior criminal activity); Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d at 112-13, 793
P.2d at 50, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (facts of case do not produce intracase disproportional-
ity); Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 449, 802 P.2d at 275, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (death appropriate
because of defendant's violent criminal history combined with brutal murder and rape
of an elderly woman).
218. See People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718, 736, 798 P.2d 1215, 1225, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372,
382 (1990) (majority of errors barred by failure to object while others lacked cumula-
tive merit); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 644, 802 P.2d 376, 418, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874,
916 (1990) (record indicated few errors, and when considered together, did not require
reversal); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 970, 800 P.2d 516, 540, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 184
(1990) (majority of errors rejected as meritless, leaving no basis for cumulative preju-
dice); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 750, 801 P.2d 1142, 1159, 276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 408
(1990) (cumulative error not reversible because, even absent errors, the jury could
have reached no other verdict).
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ity of the 1978 death penalty law and sentencing procedures.2 19 The
court dismissed the arguments in one paragraph opinions stating that
such challenges have been continually rejected.220 The court stated
that none of the defendants' contentions justified reconsideration of
past decisions.221
VII. CONCLUSION
The affirmation of all thirteen death penalty sentences underscores
the Lucas court's reluctance to reverse death sentences on appeal.
While noting that many harmless errors occur, the court rarely finds
reversible error.
Perhaps the most predominate aspect of the death penalty affirma-
tions was the dismissal without review of many possible noninstruc-
tional errors because defense counsel waived the issue on appeal by
failing to object at trial. The court was also able to dismiss many is-
sues under the harmless error doctrine, stating that the aggravating
evidence was so compelling that the errors were not prejudicial. The
court continued its policy of allowing defense counsel great leeway in
using questionable tactics as part of the defense strategy. The court
allowed the same latitude in the areas of prosecutorial misconduct
and judicial discretion. For example, the court tolerated considerable
219. People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 475, 801 P.2d 1107, 1125, 276 Cal. Rptr. 356,
374 (1990); People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1228, 800 P.2d 1159, 1184, 275 Cal. Rptr.
729, 754 (1990); People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648, 715, 802 P.2d 278, 315, 276 Cal. Rptr.
788, 825 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 879, 915, 799 P.2d 1282, 1309, 274 Cal. Rptr.
849, 876 (1990); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719, 748, 801 P.2d 1142, 1158, 276 Cal. Rptr.
391, 407 (1990); People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 661, 798 P.2d 849, 874, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252,
277 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 448, 802 P.2d 221, 275, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731,
784 (1990).
220. The court cited: People v. Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d 963, 760 P.2d 475, 251 Cal. Rptr.
278 (1988); People v. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d 659, 758 P.2d 1217, 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1988); Peo-
ple v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987); People v. Rodri-
guez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.
3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599
P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
221. Some of the grounds for reversal that the court rejected included: (1) that ag-
gravating factors must be individually proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that a
finding of aggravating factors requires a unanimous jury; and (3) that aggravating fac-
tors outweighed mitigating ones must also be found beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1236, 800 P.2d at 1189, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 759; Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d
at 715-16, 802 P.2d at 315-16, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26; Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d at 748-49, 801
P.2d at 1158, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 407; Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d at 661, 798 P.2d at 874-75, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 277-78. The court also rejected the contention that the death penalty law vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment "because it fails to replace arbitrary jury discretion with
'objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process
for imposing a sentence of death.'" Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 448, 802 P.2d at 275, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 785 (citing-Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)). Finally, the
court rejected allegations that the death penalty violates the equal protection clause
because it requires no specific, written findings of aggravating factors relied on by the
jury when making penalty determination. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d at 909-10, 799 P.2d at
1308, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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Brown and factor (k) error by the People and trial court so long as
some attempt to cure or clarify the instruction was made.
Overall, no one issue on appeal was predominant or particularly ef-
fective. The least effective challenge was to the constitutionality of
the death penalty statute. The court rarely gave the issue even a one
line renunciation. Most potentially reversible issues hinged on spe-
cific facts and did not fall within the specific appeal categories.
DENISE RENEE HARRINGTON
VII. ELECTION LAW
An initiative is invalid if, at the time it is adopted, it is
inconsistent with a city's general plan: Lesher
Communications v. City of Walnut Creek.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of initiatives and referenda by voters to change the land
use decisions enacted by their local governments has become one of
the newest trends facing courts throughout the country.1 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide the validity of
such a practice in Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek.2 The Court interpreted the California Planning and Zoning
Law3 and found that a controlled growth initiative4 was invalid and
unenforceable because it conflicted with the pro-growth general plan
of the city.5
1. Voters Rights Challenged in Land Use: Cases Pit People Against Developers,
Wash. Post, May 7, 1990, at F28 [hereinafter Voters Rights] (noting that land use initia-
tives will be considered in at least six states).
2. 52 Cal. 3d 531, 802 P.2d 317, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990). Justice Eagleson wrote the
opinion of the court and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and by Justices Broussard,
Panelli, Kennard, and Arabian. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
3. The Planning and Zoning Law can be found in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65000-
66403 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
4. The initiative, known as "Measure H" and entitled the "Traffic Control Initia-
tive," sought a building moratorium on new construction if the current or proposed
peak hour traffic in the core business district exceeded 85%. Lesher Communications,
Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 536-37, 802 P.2d 317, 319, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1,
2-3 (1990) (hereinafter "Lesher"). The initiative was adopted by the voters on Novem-
ber 5, 1985, winning by a narrow margin of 9,562 to 9,162. Lesher Communications,
Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 225 Cal. App. 3d 645, 649, 262 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1989)
(hereinafter "Lesher Communications") (describing the election process).
5. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546, 802 P.2d at 326, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (1990). The gen-
eral plan, as adopted in 1971, stated that its objectives were: "1) To enhance Walnut
Creek's subregional position as the administrative and professional office center of
Central Contra Costa County; 2) To strengthen and enhance Walnut Creek's position
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While the case was pending before the court of appeal, the city's
general plan was amended to incorporate the initiative's slow-growth
provisions.6 The California Supreme Court nevertheless granted re-
view to determine not only the effect of the initiative on the general
plan, but the effect of the subsequent amendment of the general plan
on the validity of the initiative.7 The court concluded, with one jus-
tice dissenting,S that in order to be a valid exercise of the voting
power, a zoning initiative must be consistent with the general plan in
effect at the time the initiative is passed.9 If an adopted initiative is
inconsistent with the general plan, it cannot become part of the plan,
even if the plan is subsequently amended to conform with the
ordinance.i 0
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
The court considered the implications of characterizing Walnut
Creek's Measure H Traffic Control initiative as an amendment to the
general plan"i because the initiative would have been invalid if con-
strued as a zoning ordinance.' 2 The court noted that the Planning
and Zoning Law allows the amendment of a general plan by a legisla-
as a subregional retail shopping center." See Lesher Communications, 225 Cal. App. 3d
at 657, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 344. In 1977, the general plan noted that "[c]ommute-hour con-
gestion... will continue to increase as new development occurs. Although some mi-
nor improvements can be made... drivers will have to adjust to an increased level of
congestion." Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 536, 802 P.2d at 319, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 3 (emphasis in
original).
6. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 538, 802 P.2d at 321, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The case
originated in 1986 when Lesher Communications, the largest employer in the city,
.sought to expand its building, but was hindered by the 1985 initiative. It brought suit
to invalidate the initiative on the basis that it conflicted with the general plan. For a
history of the litigation, see Lesher Communications, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 657, 262 Cal.
Rptr. at 339-40. The superior court found the initiative to be invalid. Id. (describing
the proceedings). The court of appeal heard the case and found the initiative to be
valid, even though the city amended its general plan during the pendency of the ac-
tion. Id. at 657, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
7. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 535, 802 P.2d at 318, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 2. See generally CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65860(c) (West 1977) (explaining an inconsistent zoning ordinance may
be amended or conformed to a general plan, but not addressing the situation where a
general plan is subsequently amended to conform to an inconsistent zoning ordinance).
8. Justice Mosk dissented on the grounds that the subsequent amendment to the
general plan rendered the litigation moot. See Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 547, 802 P.2d at
327-28, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
9. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 545-46, 802 P.2d at 327-28, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
10. Id. at 545, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
11. Id. at 539, 802 P.2d at 321, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
12. Id. at 541, 802 P.2d at 322, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 6. See generally, deBottari v. Norco
City Council, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1210, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793 (1985) (noting that if
an initiative is a zoning ordinance it must be consistent with the general plan); Sierra
Club v. Kern County Board of Supervisors, 26 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261,
264 (1981) (emphasizing the importance of an internally consistent general plan).
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tive act. 1 3 Thus, the court reasoned that because a voter initiative is a
legislative act, voters can amend a general plan.J4 The initiative was
not, however, presented to the voters as an amendment pursuant to
the notice provisions of the Elections Code.' 5 The ballot summary
simply explained that adoption of the initiative would change "ex-
isting law" and make the initiative's slow-growth plan consistent
with the general plan.16 It did not indicate that the initiative was ac-
tually a proposed amendment to the general plan.' 7 Because it was
not identified as an amendment, the supreme court opined that the
voters saw the proposed initiative not as an amendment, but as a zon-
ing ordinance.' 8 Hence, the court concluded that it could not arbi-
trarily convert the initiative into an amendment if the voters
13. The amendment process is as follows: First, the city requesting the amend-
ment to the plan must hold a noticed public hearing before recommending the amend-
ment. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65353(a) (West Supp. 1991). Then, the city files a request
for hearing by the legislative body. Id. at § 65354.5. Next, the legislative body partici-
pates in the public hearing. Id. at § 65355. And finally, the legisltaive body may adopt,
modify, or disapprove of the proposed amendment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65356 (West
Supp. 1991). See also, 66 CAL. JUR. 3D, Zoning and Other Land Controls § 30 (1981 &
Supp. 1991).
14. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 539, 802 P.2d at 321, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 1. Initiative and
referendum powers have been previously applied to zoning ordinances. The seminal
case giving voters the right to effect the zoning plan of a region was Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 479-80, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 48-49 (1976) (removing the notice and hearing requirements required when a
legislative body adopts an ordinance). See also Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 570-71,
685 P.2d 1152, 1158, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 807 (1985) (explaining that the adoption of a
specific city plan is a legislative act subject to initiative or referendum); Arnel Devel-
opment v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 516-17, 620 P.2d 565, 572-73, 169 Cal. Rptr.
904, 907 (1980) (finding that California precedent mandates that all zoning measures
are legislative acts, permiting the use of initiatives); 66 CAL. JUR. 3D, Zoning and Other
Land Controls § 83 (1981 & Supp. 1991); 8 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Con-
stitutional Law § 829 (9th ed. 1988).
15. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 542, 802 P.2d at 323, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7. The California
Elections Code requires that a ballot title and summary provided by the city attorney
describe the proposed initiative. See generally, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4002 (West Supp.
1991) (setting forth the notice requirements which mandate the initial filing of a "No-
tice of Intent to Circulate Petition"); CAL. ELEc. CODE § 4002.5 (West Supp. 1991)
(pointing out that upon receipt of proposed measure, the city attorney must prepare a
ballot title and summary); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4003 (West Supp. 1991) (explaining that
initiative's title and summary must be circulated to public); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D, Initiative
and Referendum §§ 44-54 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
16. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 543, 802 P.2d at 324, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 543-44, 802 P.2d at 324, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. See generally, Annotation,
Adoption of Zoning Ordinance or Amendment Thereto Through Initiative Process, 72
A.L.R. 3D 991, 1008-15 (1976 & Supp. 1990) (explaining history and interpretation of
the zoning through initiative process in California).
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themselves did not recognize it as an amendment.19
Once the court identified the initiative as a zoning ordinance rather
than an amendment, it examined the inconsistencies between the
pro-growth general plan and the limited-growth ordinance. In doing
so, it addressed the subsequent amendment to the plan as a possible
remedy to those inconsistencies. Acknowledging the well-settled
view that "[a] zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan is
invalid at the time it is passed,"2o the court concluded that even the
1989 amendment to the general plan could not cure the initiative
since the consistency and validity of an ordinance must be based on
the general plan in force at the time of the adoption of the ordi-
nance.21 The court further posited that the city could not rely on
provisions in the amendment to California Government Code section
6586022 to rescue an ordinance which was never valid. The court ex-
plained that the purpose of the statute was to bring existing zoning
ordinances into compliance with the general plan rather than to vali-
date ordinances which were inconsistent with the general plan at
their adoption.23 Finally, the court noted that the legislative intent
of the Planning and Zoning Law would be frustrated if a general
plan could be amended to conform to an inconsistent and invalid zon-
ing order.24 Based on these arguments, the court held the Measure H
Traffic Control Initiative to be invalid, and gave no remedial effect to
19. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 542, 802 P.2d at 323, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7 (emphasizing the
need to maintain a comprehensive plan).
20. Id at 544, 802 P.2d at 324, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8. See generally, deBottari v. Norco
City Council, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (1985) (an enacted
voter referendum would result in an invalid zoning ordinance); Sierra Club v. Board of
Supervisors, 26 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261, 264 (1981) (legislative intent
would be frustrated if ordinance could thwart general plan requirements); 8 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 844 (9th ed. 1988).
21. Lesher, 51 Cal. 3d at 545, 802 P.2d at 325-26, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8. But see, Build-
ing Industry Ass'n v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 277, 297, 259 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338-
39 (1989) (compliance decree is a preferrable remedy to complete invalidation of
ordinance).
22. "In the event a zoning ordinance becomes inconsistent with a general plan by
reason of amendment to such plan.., such zoning ordinance shall be amended... so
that it is consistent with the general plan as amended." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(c)
(West 1977) (emphasis added).
23. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546, 802 P.2d at 325-26, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9 (noting that
"[tihe obvious purpose of [the statute] is to ensure an orderly process of bringing [the
zoning ordinance] into conformity with a new or amended general plan, not to permit
development that is inconsistent with that plan"). See Concerned Citizens of
Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal. App. 3d 90, 97, 103, 212 Cal. Rptr.
273, 278, 282 (1985) (a document that is full of contradictions and inconsistencies can-
not be given effect, as it is impossible to ascertain what the plan actually means, but
the invalid portion should be the only portion invalidated); 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 831 (9th ed. 1988) (general plan acts as a con-
stitution and must be integrated).
24. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9. See generally
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 1991) (describing general plan as "comprehen-
sive, long-term plan"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65358 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasizing the
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the subsequent amendment to the general plan.25
B. Dissenting Opinion
Unlike the majority, which focused on the initiative and its valid-
ity, Justice Mosk believed that the case should have been dismissed
on abstention grounds in light of the subsequent amendment to the
general plan.26 Since a challenge to the 1989 amended plan was still
pending, Justice Mosk initially claimed that the majority's invalida-
tion of the 1985 initiative was moot and a waste of judicial re-
sources.27 Deferring to the court of appeal decision,28 he noted that
because continuing litigation in the instant case was apparent,29 the
majority decision was unnecessary and was destined to be "relegated
to a footnote in future decisions involving the validity of the 1989
plan."30 Justice Mosk further posited that the only way to cure the
mootness issue would be to construe and determine the validity of
the general plan as amended.31 However, Mosk pointed out that such
an approach was inappropriate due to the ripeness considerations in-
volved in hearing a case based on an amendment not in effect at the
time it was heard before the court of appeal.3 2
need for long-term general plan by limiting the number of times a plan may be
amended).
25. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546-47, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
26. Id. at 547, 802 P.2d at 326-27, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 10 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 549, 802 P.2d at 328, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating
the majority's reliance on section 4013 of California Elections Code was not justified
since the purpose of section 4013 was to satisfy the will of the voters). Section 4013 of
the California Elections Code states, inter alia, that an ordinance passed by initiative
and adopted by voters cannot be repealed unless the voters themselves repeal it or if
the ordinance itself provides for the repeal. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4013 (West 1977).
28. See Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 225 Cal. App. 3d 645, 654,
262 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1989) (appeal appeared moot, but case should be decided on its
merits).
29. A second lawsuit, seeking to invalidate the 1989 amendment, is currently
pending before the courts. See, Court Curbs Anti-Growth Bid in Hotel Ruling, L.A.
Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
30. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 549, 802 P.2d at 328, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors, 26 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 179
Cal. Rptr. 261, 265 (1981) (finding the appeal moot since the zoning ordinance was
made consistent by adoption of general plan); Lesher Communications, 225 Cal. App.
3d at 658, 262 Cal. Rptr. 342 (setting forth the rule relied upon by Justice Mosk in his
dissent). The rule in the appellate court decision that Justice Mosk relied on stated
that "[a]n inconsistent land use regulation is invalid at the time it is passed, but if the
general plan is amended or a new general plan adopted to eliminate the inconsistency
while an appeal is pending on that issue, the appeal will be dismissed as moot." Id.
31. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 550, 802 P.2d at 328, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (explaining the review was constitutionally unsound
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Finally, Justice Mosk criticized the majority opinion not only for
invalidating the will of the voters by nullifying the initiative,33 but
also for stating that any inconsistencies should be found in favor of
the lawmaking body, which, in this case, was the voters.3 4 The over-
riding view of Justice Mosk, therefore, was that the case should have
been dismissed on abstention grounds, given the fact that the 1989
amendment was more appropriate for review than the initiative.35
III. CONCLUSION
While developers may see the plan as a victory, the ramifications of
Lesher are short term at best. This is especially true in light of the
pending action based on the amendment to the general plan. Thus,
little effect can be given to the decision as to the parties in the case.36
A more troublesome issue, however, is the unwillingness of the
court to respect the will of the voters.3 7 Rather than broadly reading
the Zoning and Planning Law and the initiative process in order to
accomodate the wishes of the voters,38 the court strictly interpreted
the general plan.39 The Supreme Court saw the plan as a strict man-
date, rather than as a flexible document designed to meet the chang-
ing needs of a community.40
because the appeal of litigation involving 1989 amendment was undecided). See gener-
ally, Building Industry Assoc. v. City of Oxnard, 40 Cal. 3d 1, 3, 706 P.2d 285, 287, 218
Cal. Rptr. 672, 673 (1985) (finding that only those legislative provisions in effect at the
time of appeal are capable of appellate review in injunctive proceedings); Selby Realty
v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 125-26, 514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799, 809 (1973) (evaluating a denial of building permit only as to those provisions in
effect as of date of law in effect at time of denial).
33. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 55, 802 P.2d at 329, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). See generally, Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Prac-
tices Comm., 51 Cal. 3d 744, 771, 799 P.2d 1220, 1245, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787, 812 (1990)
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining that duty of court in construing initi-
ative is to further preserve intent of voters when construing an initiative).
34. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 551, 802 P.2d at 329, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id at 552, 802 P.2d at 329, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating
that majority opinion "stymies" the court's later ability to evaluate the 1989 plan).
36. I (Mosk, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 551, 802 P.2d at 329, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the majority for frustrating the desires of the voters of Walnut Creek).
38. See Building Industry Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 824, 718 P.2d
68, 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 89 (1986) (explaining that the requirement to make detailed
findings by voters prior to initiative proposal would frustrate initiative process); Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 194 (1987).
39. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 551, 802 P.2d at 322, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 5. See generally Leg-
islature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 675, 802 P.2d 17, 27, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 791
(1983) (explaining that initiatives must be judicially construed with the same scrutiny
as statutes); Note, Instant Planning: Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California,
61 S.C.L. REV. 497, 533 (1988) (pointing out that courts are given power to determine
whether initiative addresses interests of voters).
40. See Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546-47, 802 P.2d at 326, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See gener-
ally Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal. App. 3d
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While the application of the initiative and referendum process to
zoning has been criticized,41 the court seemed to adopt the view that
a legislative body, rather than the voting public, is in a much better
position to plan for changes in the community.42 In light of this rul-
ing, the court set the stage for its eventual review of the 1989 amend-
ment. If the court follows the rationale of Lesher, it is likely to
invalidate the amendment,43 thus paving the way for continued
growth, and ultimately more traffic congestion in the City of Walnut
Creek and other cities whose voters may attempt to use initiative
power to slow continuing development.
SUSAN D. RESLEY
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Under the California Environmental Quality Act, a
reviewing court shall deem an environmental impact
report to be sufficient when it analyzes all feasible
alternatives; in certain circumstances, the administrative
record or the local coastal plan may be the basis for a
feasibility determination: Citizens of Goleta Valley v.
Board of Supervisors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modeled after the National Environmental Policy Act,1 the Cali-
90, 97, 212 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1985) (holding that an inconsistent general plan cannot
be given effect due to difficulty in determining intent of drafter).
41. Note, supra note 39, at 518-20 (stating that zoning changes by initiative 1) do
not serve public welfare since general plans are created after numerous studies which
may not be embarked upon by voters; and 2) are not democratic due to low voter turn-
out on such issues); Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 74, 103-05 (1976) (arguing that procedural leniency must be afforded in
order to prevent the barring of zoning initiatives).
42. Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 544, 802 P.2d at 324, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8 ("assuming," but
not deciding, that electorate could amend general plan). See generally Voter Rights
Challenged, supra note 1 (questioning whether some government issues may be "too
important to be left up to the people"). But see Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore, 38 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (noting
that initiative powers are given to people in order to allow them to exercise their
rights).
43. The court emphasizes the long-term and fairly inflexible nature of a general
plan throughout its opinion. See Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 546, 802 P.2d at 325-26, 277 Cal.
Rptr. at 9-10.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190,
201, 553 P.2d 537, 543, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1976) (considering NEPA as persuasive
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fornia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)2 attempts "to afford the
fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable
scope of the statutory language." 3 The environmental impact report
(EIR) is the mechanism which serves to achieve this goal by inform-
ing the public and its responsible officials of the potential environ-
mental consequences of a certain project.4 The standard for
determining reasonable alternatives is feasibility, which has been de-
fined by the legislature as, "capable of being accomplished in a suc-
cessful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into
account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors."5
Furthermore, the statutory requirements mandate that such alterna-
tives be judged "against a rule of reason." 6
The recent decision of Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Super-
visors 7 reaffirms these already established principles by holding that
only reasonable alternatives need be examined in an EIR.8 After a
careful examination of the record, the supreme court determined
that none of the alternative building sites, suggested by the public
groups after the close of an official comment period, were feasible al-
ternatives and, therefore, need not be included in the EIR.9
The Citizens of Goleta initially instituted a proceeding for a writ of
mandate,10 alleging that the EIR had not adequately considered all
feasible alternatives to the construction of a resort hotel on seventy-
authority for CEQA); see also 39A C.J.S. Health & Env. § 67 (1976) (discussion of envi-
ronmental impact statements).
2. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21080 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). See generally
Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental Quality Act, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197 (1984); J. LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE REGULATION (2d ed.
1987) (providing a discussion of CEQA requirements).
3. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049,
1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (.1972). This case represents a landmark decision because
it broadly interpreted the CEQA to apply to private projects. Prior to this decision, the
CEQA was construed applicable only to state-initiated developments.
4. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (West 1986). See also Hildreth, Environmental
Impact Reports Under the California Environmental Quality Act: The New Legal
Framework, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (1977).
5. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (West 1986).
6. See Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. San Francisco,
106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401, 410 (1980); see also Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978);
Coalition for Caryon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1980); San
Francisco Ecology Center v. San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 3d 584, 594, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100,
108 (1975).
In addition to these decisions, the instant case resolves that "there is no ironclad
rule.governing the nature or scope of the alternatives to be discussed in an EIR other
than the rule of reason." Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (Goleta II),
52 Cal. 3d 553, 576, 801 P.2d 1161, 1175, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410, 424 (1990).
7. 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990).
8. Id. at 565, 801 P.2d at 1168, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
9. Id. at 566-67, 801 P.2d at 1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
10. Id. at 553, 801 P.2d at 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
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three acres of undeveloped oceanfront land."t The EIR evaluating
this land was certified in September, 1984.12 It examined four possi-
ble alternatives along with its initial proposal of a 574 unit resort.13
Local coastal planning amendments were made to designate the land
for visitor-serving commercial development, despite a previous
"white hole" created by a disagreement between Santa Barbara
County and the Coastal Commission.14 The trial court upheld the
sufficiency of the EIR,15 but was swiftly overruled by the court of ap-
peal on the ground that "'omission from the EIR of consideration of
whether there was a feasible alternate site or sites was unreasonable
and rendered the EIR inadequate, so as to make the [County's] ac-
tions with regard to it a prejudicial abuse of discretion.' "16
11. Id at 559, 801 P.2d at 1163, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 412. The land, known as Haskell's
Beach, was vacant at the time of this dispute, but it had been previously utilized as an
oil processing plant. This property presently contains various "environmentally sensi-
tive species and habitats" and was once the site of a Chumash Indian settlement. Id. at
559, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
Goleta II only briefly mentions the presence of Indian cemeteries at Haskell's Beach
because the CEQA only protects archaeological resources which are shown to be scien-
tifically or historically unique. See CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE § 5097.98(c) (West 1986) (pro-
viding protection for Native American sacred sites). Therefore, if reburial of these
remains occurs, there is a possibility that no EIR will be required. Id at § 21083.2(a),
(g) (discussing project's effect on archaeological resources). For further discussion on
this topic, see Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains: Ap-
proaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 197-99 (1989).
12. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 560, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413. Both supple-
mental and minor addendum were certified the same month. Id.
13. Id. "The four development alternatives were: no project; clustered high-den-
sity residential development; a smaller, 340-unit resort hotel and conference center
south of the highway; and the alternative ultimately approved, a 400-unit hotel, with
the potential for second-phase development of an additional 100 hotel rooms and 24
villas." Id
14. Id. "White hole" was defined by the court as, "an area without any particular
land-use designation or development policy." Id. In 1980, the state Coastal Commis-
sion rejected the County's "urban" designation. In turn, the County refused to accept
the Commission's recommendation of "visitor-serving commercial development," thus
creating a "white hole" in the local plan. Id. at 559-60, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 413.
The California Coastal Act requires mandatory local planning by cities and counties.
Approval of these plans is within the Coastal Commission's discretion. The Commis-
sion considers the cumulative impact a particular project could have on the environ-
ment. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986). For a thorough
examination of the California Coastal Act, see Rieser, Managing the Cumulative Ef-
fects of Coastal Land Development: Can Main Law Meet the Challenge?, 39 ME. L. REV.
321, 372-85 (1987).
15. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 553, 801 P.2d at 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
16. Id. at 560, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (quoting Citizens of Goleta
Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1167, 1180, 243 Cal. Rptr. 339, 346
(1988)).
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Realizing the concerns of the public, the County began preparing a
supplemental EIR which included a detailed analysis of an alterna-
tive site for development: Santa Barbara Shores.17 The County re-
jected this suggestion because the land was not owned by the Hyatt
Corporation, the company seeking to build the resort.1 8 Additionally,
Santa Barbara Shores had more traffic congestion, less water re-
sources, and deficient air quality.19 No other properties were ex-
amined because the project required beach-front land that could
accommodate a large hotel.20 In February 1988, the Planning Com-
mission certified the final EIR.21 However, this decision was ap-
pealed by the Citizens of Goleta.2 2 This group submitted a letter the
night before the board hearing requesting the County to consider sev-
eral additional sites. 23 The Board specifically addressed each of the
alternatives and found none to be a feasible site because none was
"designated for large scale visitor-serving commercial develop-
ment."2 4 After approving the 400-unit resort hotel, the County filed
its reply to the peremptory writ issued by the trial court.2 5 The Citi-
zens of Goleta asserted that the Board had not complied with the
court of appeal's request for a factual discussion of alternative sites in
the EIR. The California Supreme Court found the court of appeal to
be in error.26
II. TREATMENT
The California Supreme Court began its opinion by stating that the
EIR is the "'heart of CEQA' "27 because it "protects not only the en-
17. Id. at 560-61, 801 P.2d at 1164-65, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
18. Id at 561, 801 P.2d at 1165, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
19. Id
20. I& (citing the final EIR).
21. Id.
22. Id, at 561-62, 801 P.2d at 1165, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
23. Id. at 562, 801 P.2d at 1165, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The Citizens' request was
made well after the close of the official comment period. Hyatt, the developer, con-
tended that withholding these comments was a dilatory tactic. Id. at 567, 801 P.2d at
1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
The court concluded that these alternatives did not have to be included within the
EIR. However, such alternatives did warrant discussion within the administrative rec-
ord. Id, at 568, 801 P.2d at 1170, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
24. Id. at 562-63, 801 P.2d at 1165-66, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15. The additional sites
included: Carpinteria Bluffs, More Mesa, West Devereaux, Naples, Dos Pueblos Can-
yon, El Capitan Ranch, and the Wallover property north of Highway 101. Each of
these sites was determined infeasible for various reasons: (1) the property was no
longer within the County's jurisdiction; (2) the property had previously been desig-
nated as "residential;" (3) the property contained an oil facility; or (4) the property
carried a high seismic rating. Id,
25. Id. at 563, 801 P.2d at 1166, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 564, 801 P.2d at 1167, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (quoting CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 14, § 15003(a) (1986)).
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vironment but also informed self government."28 The court's role in
reviewing an EIR is to determine its sufficiency as an informative
document, not whether the environmental conclusions reached
within it are sound.29 According to section 21168.5 of the Public Re-
sources Code, a court's inquiry "'shall extend only to whether there
was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is estab-
lished if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law
or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial ev-
idence.' "30 Furthermore, the court stated that it would "scrupu-
lously enforce" all CEQA requirements.31
Project alternatives that could possibly mitigate adverse effects to
the environment are the essential components of an adequate EIR.32
However, the court pointed out that section 21002 of the Public Re-
sources Code permits project approval when no feasible alternatives
or mitigating factors exist.3 3 Despite this code section, the court
found that all reasonable alternatives must be considered by the pub-
lic agency whose duty it is to evaluate and include any significant en-
vironmental questions in the EIR.34 The court concluded that
Hyatt's supplemental EIR had considered the only feasible off-site al-
ternative, Santa Barbara Shores, along with four on-site alternatives.
Consequently, the court held that the Board's decision to issue a final
EIR was not an abuse of discretion.35
Next, the court addressed the time period within which a public
group must present possible project alternatives to the CEQA in or-
der for such alternatives to be included within the EIR. The public
has a duty to inform the lead agency "'as soon as possible'" when
adverse environmental effects of a proposed development become
28. Id. (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
47 Cal. 3d 376, 390-91, 764 P.2d 728, 282-83, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430-31 (1988)).
29. Id,
30. Id. (quoting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21168.5 (West 1986)).
31. Id
32. Id at 565, 801 P.2d at 1168, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21002.1(a) (West 1986))..
33. Id. (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1986)). See Citizens for Qual-
ity Growth v. City of Mount Shasta, 198 Cal. App. 3d 433, 243 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1988)
(project approved despite harmful impact to wetlands where there were no mitigating
factors or feasible alternatives).
34. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 565-66, 801 P.2d at 1168, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (quoting
Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 197, 553 P.2d 537, 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377,
380 (1976)).
35. Id. at 566-67, 801 P.2d at 1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
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known.36 Through expeditious notification, the agency is able to
thoroughly review these potential impacts and determine their signif-
icance. The court noted that the Public Resources Code does not re-
quire the agency to respond to the public in writing when the public's
observations are submitted after the close of the comment period.3 7
Consequently, the court held that the six off-site project alternatives
proposed by the Citizens of Goleta did not have to be included within
the EIR, because the alternatives were made well after the expira-
tion of the comment period.38 The court further held that in the
event of such a delay, project alternatives are adequately addressed
in the administrative records. 39 Additionally, the court noted that
dilatory tactics could not be used to sabotage a particular project.40
Use of the administrative record is also helpful when seeking de-
tailed information about the reasons a recommended alternative was
deemed infeasible. Generally, an EIR should set forth the rationale
for each alternative's status, yet the court suggested that the adminis-
trative records were the appropriate source for more indepth discus-
sion.41 The court held that when evidence of infeasibility of an
alternative cannot be found in the EIR, "a court may look at the ad-
ministrative record as a whole to see whether an alternative deserved
greater attention in the [EIR]."42
The court next addressed the issue of whether a local coastal plan
may be used as the means for deciding whether a land site is a feasi-
ble alternative. A fundamental purpose of the County's general and
local coastal plans was to identify land which was suitable for sizable
resorts. The local coastal plan was a 235-page document which con-
sidered numerous environmental, social, and economic factors when
evaluating the land.43 In this decision, the local coastal plan could be
relied upon by the Board because the County had previously deter-
36. l at 567, 801 P.2d at 1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21003.1 (West 1986)). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15087, 15088, 15207 (1986).
37. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 567, 801 P.2d at 1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (citing CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15088(a) (1986)).
38. Id at 570, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
39. 1d. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
40. Id at 567-68, 801 P.2d at 1169-70, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418-19.
Hyatt suggested that the Citizens of Goleta intentionally withheld the six off-site al-
ternatives in order to defeat the project. The court cites federal authority to demon-
strate the widespread disdain for groups that purposefully try to impede development.
Id. at 567-68, 801 P.2d at 1169, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (citing Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 1221, 1230-31 (1st Cir. 1979)).
41. Id. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20.
42. Id. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 420 (quoting Beshear v. Alexan-
der, 655 F.2d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 1981)).
43. Id. at 572, 801 P.2d at 1172-73, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22. For a further explana-
tion of land use designations in this case, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Real Property § 61 (9th ed.
1987).
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mined which areas were appropriate for commercial development.44
Also, the court stated that regional land use policies could not be re-
considered in every EIR; to do so would thwart comprehensive
development.45
The Citizens of Goleta raised three additional arguments, which
the court summarily dismissed. First, the Citizens asserted that the
County must show that the local coastal plan "relate[s] to current
conditions" 46 in order for the plan to be a feasibility indicator. This
argument was without merit because local coastal plans must be up-
dated regularly.47 Second, it was contended that the six off-site alter-
natives could not be considered infeasible due to "inconsistent land-
use designations," when the proposed site itself required amend-
ments to the local plan.48 The court distinguished the proposed site
because it had been previously labeled a "white hole."49 Finally, the
Citizens argued that even though the developer did not own any of
the alternative sites, this factor should not automatically render
them infeasible.50 The court rejected this argument by deciding that
ownership of property directly correlates with the ability to swiftly
complete a project thereon. However, the court carefully explained
that situations could arise in which a private developer controls sev-
eral feasible alternative sites, thereby illustrating that private devel-
opers are not totally exempt from consideration of off-site
alternatives.51
44. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 573, 801 P.2d at 1173, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
45. Id. at 572-73, 801 P.2d at 1173, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
46. Id. at 573-74, 801 P.2d at 1173-74, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23. See also CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 30519.5 (West 1986) (noting that local coastal plan must be updated every
five years).
47. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 573-74, 801 P.2d at 1173-74, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
48. Id. at 574, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
49. Id.
50. Id,
51. Id. at 574-75, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423. The court stated that
when the developer is a public, rather than a private agency, off-site alternatives be-
come more feasible. This assertion is premised on the government's power of eminent
domain. Id. at 547, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423. See, e.g., Porter County
Chapter of Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 533 F.2d 1011, 1017
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976); Natural Resources Defense Council
Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1975); Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 403-04; 764 P.2d 278, 290-91, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 426, 438-39 (1988); Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89
Cal. App. 3d 274, 286-88, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585, 594-95 (1979).
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III. CONCLUSION
The Goleta II decision strongly reiterates the requirements of the
CEQA and the sufficiency of an EIR. The court stated that an EIR
must examine the potential environmental consequences of a pro-
posed project along with all reasonable alternatives. 52 Reliance upon
the local coastal plan and administrative record is permissible when
determining the feasibility of alternatives, particularly when the al-
ternatives have been suggested after the expiration of the comment
period.5 3
Use of these sources lightens the agency's burden by eliminating
some duplicative findings from the EIR. The result is that an EIR
will be more concise when analyzing feasibility. This may hamper
the public's access to the rationale behind an EIR finding because one
may have to examine several documents along with an EIR. How-
ever, this does not seem to be an onerous task when balanced against
the benefit of the agency's decreased workload. In reaction to Goleta
11, there may be an increased use of substitute authority to substanti-
ate EIR findings.
The court's concern for carrying out the legislative purpose of the
CEQA is quite clear from its opinion. However, the court maintains
the position that a private developer generally cannot be asked to
consider off-site alternatives which are not controlled by him.54
Ownership is a great indicator of feasibility; however, if a developer
is not required to consider off-site alternatives, a project could be ap-
proved which would negatively impact the environment, while a
harmless alternative may go unconsidered 55 This portion of the
court's decision is practical, but at the expense of environmental
protection.
Overall, Goleta II reemphasizes that a court is to rule on the suffi-
ciency of the EIR based on a "rule of reason," not on the validity of
its substance.56 The approach taken by the court illustrates its re-
52. Goleta II, 52 Cal. 3d at 565-66, 801 P.2d at 1168, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
53. Id. at 569-70, 573, 801 P.2d at 1170-71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20.
54. Id. at 574, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423. The court recognized that
"[o]ther circumstances may necessitate review of alternate properties." However, the
court failed to elaborate on which situations would warrant an examination of feasible
off-site alternatives. Id. at 575, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
55. An agency must consider possible cumulative impacts of a project may have on
the environment. See Whitman v. Board of Supervisors, 88 Cal. App. 3d 397, 406, 151
Cal. Rptr. 866, 870-71 (1979). "Cumulative impacts" has been defined as, "two or more
individual effects which, when considered together, are considerable or which com-
pound or increase other environmental impacts. The individual effects may be
changed resulting from a single project or a number of separate projects." CAL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15023.5 (1977).
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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gard for preserving the environment while at the same time calculat-
ing the development needs of a growing populace.
JODY L. GRAY
Ix. FAMILY LAW
Where a wife's petition for dissolution fails to request
child support, and the notice received by the husband
also lacks such a request, a default judgment ordering
the husband to pay such support is invalid as a denial of
due process under section 580 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure: In re Marriage of Lippel.
The California Supreme Court decision of In Re Marriage of Lip-
pel I overruled a longstanding but outdated line of cases which had
carved out an exception to section 580 of the California Civil Proce-
dure Code.2 In Lippel, the court reversed the denial of a motion to
vacate a prior judgment against Ronald Lippel, which had ordered
him to pay child support for his daughter Kristin.3 The supreme
court held: (1) that the plain language of section 580 must be fol-
lowed, limiting relief granted at a default hearing to that which was
prayed for;4 (2) that the line of cases, which carved out an exception
to section 580, beginning with Cohen v. Cohen,5 were no longer valid;
1. 51 Cal. 3d 1160, 801 P.2d 1041, 276 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1990). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Panelli, who was joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices
Broussard, Eagleson, Kennard and Arabian. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580 (Deering 1972). The statute provides in part: "The
relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall
have demanded in his complaint .. " Id. The Cohen exception allowed awards of
child and spousal support even when not requested. Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 P.
267 (1906).
3. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1163-65, 801 P.2d at 1043, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 292. Mr. Lippel
and his wife were divorced in 1971. Mrs. Lippel had filed a petition for dissolution
utilizing a statutorily authorized form. She checked several boxes on the form re-
questing specific relief, however, she left the box to request child support blank. Mr.
Lippel never filed an answer, and a default hearing was held in May 1971. Mrs. Lippel
was awarded custody of Kristin, and a support. order was entered requiring Ronald to
pay $100 per month. Apparently, Mrs. Lippel never mentioned this order to Ronald,
and the support was not paid for 16 years. In 1987, the City and County of San Fran-
cisco sought to have Ronald's wages assigned to the city as reimbursement for $18,200
in money paid to Mrs. Lippel by Aid To Families with Dependant Children. The court
granted the CCSF request and ordered that $300 per month be deducted from Mr. Lip-
pel's wages. Mr. Lippel filed this collateral challenge to the original order as a result.
4. Lip'pel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1167, 801 P.2d at 1043-44, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. See also
40 CAL. JUR. 3D Judgments § 31 (1985).
5. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1171, 801 P.2d at 1046, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 295 (citing Cohen
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and (3) that section 4700 of the California Civil Code, which gives
broad power to the courts to order support at any proceeding where
the care of a minor is at issue, does not allow such an order to be is-
sued in denial of the individual's constitutional rights.6
Mr. Lippel claimed that the default judgment was void under sec-
tion 580 and the fourteenth amendment,7 and as such was subject to
collateral attack.8 First, the court examined its most recent interpre-
tation of section 580, which limited awards in default hearings to the
relief demanded in the complaint.9 This limitation is based upon a
recognition that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to award relief not
requested in the prayer.'0 In applying this principle to the instant
case, the court held that Mrs. Lippel should not have been awarded
child support because when she filled out the petition for dissolution
she left the box requesting child support blank."
In spite of this precedent, the superior court denied Mr. Lippel's
motion to vacate, and the court of appeals reluctantly affirmed stat-
ing that they were bound by the Cohen line of cases.12 Cohen was
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 P. 267 (1906) (holding a judgment for support or alimony was
not void if awarded in connection with a prayer for general relief in a dissolution
proceeding)).
6. Id. at 1171, 801 P.2d at 1047, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 296. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4700(a) (Deering Supp. 1991) (operative until January 1, 1993)). Section 4700(a) pro-
vides in part: "In any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child
... the court may order either or both parents to pay any amount necessary for the
support .... " See generally 11 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Husband &
Wife §§ 175, 178 (3d ed. 1985).
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580 (Deering 1972) and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1166, 801 P.2d at 1042-43, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The
United States Supreme Court has held that it is a denial of due process for judgment
to be rendered against a defendant, unless he has received proper notice. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
California satisfies this requirement through section 580 of the Civil Procedure Code.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580 (Deering 1972). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 84 (3d ed. 1985); 16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law
§§ 827-838 (1979).
9. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1166-67, 801 P.2d at 1043-44, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. (cit-
ing Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal. 2d 805, 205 P.2d 657 (1949) (trial court lacked jurisdiction
to award marital property in a default proceeding when it had not been requested));
Greenup v. Rodman, 42 Cal. 3d 822, 824, 726 P.2d 1295, 1296, 231 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221
(1986) (concluding that "in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on
recovery").
10. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1167, 801 P.2d at 1044, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See generally
2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 246 (3d ed. 1985); Annotation,
Doctrine of Res Judicata As Applied To Default Judgments, 77 A.L.R.2D 1410 (1961 &
Supp. 1990).
11. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1167, 801 P.2d at 1044, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 293. "Angela's
petition simply did not request child support. In reliance on this petition, Ronald al-
lowed a default judgment to be entered against him." Id.
12. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1167, 801 P.2d at 1045, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (citing Bow-
man v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 2d 808, 178 P.2d 751 (1947); Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d
733, 72 P.2d 868 (1937); Karlslyst v. Frazier, 213 Cal. 377, 2 P.2d 362 (1931); Parker v.
Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 266 P. 283 (1928); Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 P. 267 (1906)).
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based upon the premise that a general prayer for relief in a petition
for dissolution constituted constructive notice of possible alimony and
child support awards because these awards were "germane to the
cause of action stated."13 The court noted, however, that the premise
of the Cohen cases was faulty under The Family Law Act of 1970,
which instituted a more specific petition form replacing a prayer for
general relief with a prayer requesting more specific relief.14 Accord-
ingly, with the new pleading form, there was no general prayer for
relief and thus no constructive notice.1 5
Finally, the court addressed the argument advanced by the City
and County of San Francisco that the trial court had jurisdiction to
award support under section 4700 of the California Civil Code. The
court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it noted that a
court may not order such support "at the expense of a person's fun-
damental and constitutional right to notice."16 Second, since trial
courts have power to put the support at issue and mandate notice to
the other party, there is still adequate protection for the rights of the
child.17
The state has recently taken an aggressive stand toward non-custo-
dial parents to insure that they do not shirk their responsibilities to
support their children. Although this decision will no doubt be seen
by some as a setback to this strategy,'8 the court was primarily con-
cerned with eliminating a procedural anomaly. Clearly, greater care
will be required by a petitioner and his or her attorney when filling
out the petition for dissolution. Unfortunately, this decision may ini-
tially provide a non-custodial parent with an easy escape from the
13. Cohen, 150 Cal. at 102, 88 P. at 269. Under Cohen, such judgments could be
attacked as erroneous on direct appeal, but could not be challenged collaterally. Id.
See also 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgment §§ 280-282 (3d ed. 1985).
14. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1169, 801 P.2d at 1045, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 294. (citing The
Family Law Act of 1970 codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5150 (Deering 1983 & Supp.
1991)).
15. Id. at 1170, 801 P.2d at 1046, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 295. The court specifically re-
jected an argument that a phrase in the act, requesting the judge to "render such judg-
ments ... or other orders as are appropriate," was a request for general relief. See also
5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 846 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990).
16. Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d at 1171, 801 P.2d at 1047, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
17. Id. at 1171-72, 801 P.2d at 1047-48, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97.
18. This is the primary concern in Justice Mosk's dissent. In fact he begins by re-
framing the issue as: "[M]ay a father avoid his statutory duty to support his child ...
merely because the mother neglected in divorce proceedings to specifically petition the
court to make an award of child support?" Id. at 1173-74, 801 P.2d at 1053-54, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 302-03 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In spite of the options outlined by the majority,
Mosk contends that their opinion would inequitably answer this question in the af-
firmative. Id.
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burden of child support. However, the supreme court made it clear
that this decision does not affect the rights of a child to pursue sup-
port, even when waived by the custodial parent.19 In addition, the
state may still pursue such parents, at least for future support, using
one of the techniques outlined by the majority.
KAREN M. EISENHAUER
X. INSURANCE LAW
In first party progressive loss cases, the one-year
limitation on actions begins to run upon the discovery of
the damage or when a reasonable person would have
discovered the loss, the one-year period is equitably tolled
between notification of the loss and the insurer's formal
denial of the claim, and the insurer currently covering
the risk upon the manifestation of the damage is solely
liable for the loss: Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v.
Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court' the
California Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision that
will dramatically alter property insurance liability and litigation in
California. Faced with a first-party case 2 involving successive insur-
ers and a progressive property loss that remained undiscovered for
several years, the court addressed three key issues: (1) at what point
does the one-year limitation period for initiating insurance actions
(the "one-year suit provision") begin to run, (2) whether the one-year
suit provision should be equitably tolled from the time the insured
notifies the insurance company of the damage until the company for-
mally denies the claim, and (3) in cases of successive insurers, which
insurer should be liable for a progressive property loss that remains
undiscovered over a length of time.3
Limiting its holding to first-party progressive loss cases, the court
19. Id. at 1172 n.4, 801 P.2d at 1047 n.4, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 296 n.4.
1. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Justices Mosk, Broussard,
Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard, and Arabian concurred.
2. A first-party case involves no third party claims. 51 Cal. 3d at 678, 768 P.2d at
1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389. "[I]f the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage
sustained by the insured, the claim is first party in nature. If the insured is seeking
coverage against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature."
Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2, 770 P.2d 704, 705
n.2, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 n.2 (1989).
3. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 678, 798 P.2d at 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
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adopted a "delayed discovery"4 rule, declaring that the one-year pro-
vision does not begin until a reasonable person would have discov-
ered the damage and realized his duty to notify the insurer.5 Next,
the court determined that the one-year suit provision should be equi-
tably tolled between the filing of the claim by the insured and the
insurer's formal denial of the claim.6 Finally, the court adopted the
manifestation theory of liability among successive insurers: where
loss is progressive and undiscovered over several policy periods, the
insurer covering the risk at the time the damage manifests is solely
liable for the claim.7
II. BACKGROUND
A. One-Year Suit Provision
1. Commencement of the Running of the Provision
In California, as in several other states,8 all fire insurance policies
contain a one-year limitation period for actions brought under the
policy.9 Although many state courts view the one-year suit provision
as valid, they do not agree as to when the beginning of the one-year
4. Id at 686-87, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395. The term "delayed discov-
ery" means the limitation period does not begin to run upon the actual occurrence of
the damage, but commences upon reasonable discovery of the loss. See id
5. Id at 687, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
6. Id at 678, 798 P.2d at 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
7. Id at 678-79, 798 P.2d at 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2832 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Cf.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 304 (McKinney Pamph. 1984) (two-year provision).
9. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 682, 798 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The
California Insurance Code requires all fire insurance policies to be written on the Cali-
fornia Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 2070-71 (Deering 1976
& Supp. 1991). The form provides: "No suit or action on this policy for recovery of any
claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity .. . unless commenced within
12 months next after inception of the loss." CAL. INS. CODE § 2071. The language of
this statute was based on a New York statute that was originally created to bar fraudu-
lent fire claims. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 798 P.2d at 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr.
at 392 (citing in disagreement Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17 N.Y.2d 239, 243, 217 N.E.2d 136,
138, 270 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414 (1966)). Later the statute's scope was expanded beyond fire
as other forms of property damage began to be insured. Id Although California In-
surance Code section 2071 is still referred to as a standard form fire insurance policy, it
is also a standard form for other types of property damage policies. For a discussion of
limitations upon actions, see W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 162
(3d ed. 1951); Denenberg and Tukel, The Twelve-Month Limitation Provision: The
"Formal Denial" Trap, 35 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 43 (1984).
California Insurance Code sections 2070-71 were upheld in C & H Foods Company v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (1984) ("Such a
provision has long been recognized in California.").
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period, termed the "inception of the loss,"10 occurs. Courts ini some
states have found the point to be when the actual damage occurred,
regardless of when the loss was discovered." These courts believe
that the language of the statute is plain and should be construed nar-
rowly to provide a period of exactly twelve months from the date of
the actual damage. 12
California courts, however, have not construed the statute so
strictly in cases involving non-fire-related property loss.13 In Zurn
Engineers v. Eagle Star Insurance Company,14 the court specifically
rejected the adoption of a strict interpretation of the one-year suit
provision, stating:
California does not follow the strict rule of construction of the phrase "incep-
tion of the loss." Rather, our law requires that the policy be read as a whole
so that, if the right to sue upon an insurance policy is postponed by action that
must be taken by the insured as a prerequisite to suit, the limitation period
does not commence to run until the insured has an opportunity to comply
with the conditions precedent to litigation.' 5
In several other California cases, courts have favored the "delayed
discovery" rule where the one-year suit provision begins to run when
the damage is discovered or would have been discovered by a reason-
able person.16  In Lawrence v. Western Mutual Insurance Com-
10. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (Deering 1976 & Supp: 1991). See generally Annotation,
Time Period For Bringing Action on Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy Provided
for by Statute, as Running from Time of Fire (When Loss Occurs) or from Time Loss
Is Payable, 95 A.L.R.2D 1023 (1983).
11. See, e.g., McGuire v. Continental Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 612, 197 N.W.2d 846
(1972); Naghten v. Maryland Casualty Co., 47 111. App. 2d 74, 197 N.E.2d 489 (1964);
Margulies v. Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 276 A.D. 695, 97 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1950).
The Naghten court stated: "We realize that ascertainment of a loss which has resulted
from a progressive latent condition is more difficult than the immediately obvious re-
sults of a fire. We do not believe, however, that the time of discovery of the loss can be
left completely to the whimsy of the insured." 47 Ill. App. 2d at 75, 197 N.E.2d at 490.
12. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Home Ins. Co., 203 Va. 502, 125 S.E.2d 201 (1962). The
Ramsey court declared that
[t]he limitation involved in the present case is not in the language of the in-
surance company. It is in the' language of the General Assembly and ex-
pressed in words which the statute requires to be inserted in the policy, word
for word, line for line, number for number. It says in plain, unambiguous
words that no suit shall be sustainable unless it is commenced within twelve
months next after the inception of the loss.
Id. at 506, 125 S.E.2d at 204. See also Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17 N.Y.2d 239, 217 N.E.2d
136, 270 N.Y.S.2d 412, (1966).
13. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 685, 798 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
14. 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1976).
15. Id. at 499, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (citing Case v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473, 23 P.
534 (1890)). However, as the Prudential-LMI court noted, Zurn involved a third-party
claim against an insurer and the holding was confined to the case's particular facts.
16. For a discussion of the relationship of an insured's discovery of the loss to the
commencement of the one-year suit provision, see Annotation, Property Insurance: In-
sured's Ignorance of Loss or Casualty, Cause of Damage, Coverage or Existence of Pol-
icy, or Identity of Insurer, as Affecting or Excusing Compliance with Requirements as
to Time for Giving Notice, Making Proof of Loss, or Bringing Action Against Insurer,
24 A.L.R.3D 1007 §§ 16-18 (1990).
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pany,17 an insured discovered through a 1983 soils report that his
property contained defects which existed before he purchased the
land in 1968. The insured waited until 1985 to bring the action and
the court deemed his claim untimely.B The court indicated that if
the insured had filed his claim within one year of receiving the re-
port and discovering the damage, the suit would not have been time
barred.19
In Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,20 an absentee
landlord discovered small cracks in a house he owned in 1979. In
1984, the insured noticed that the aforementioned cracks had grown
worse and that new cracks had appeared. After talking with neigh-
bors whose houses had suffered similar damage about September
1984, the insured realized he had a claim under his insurance pol-
icy.2 1 He filed a claim in January 1985.22 The Abari court declared
that "a cause of action under the discovery rule accrues when the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered all facts essential to the
cause of action .... -23 The court determined this point to be the
time when the cracks were discovered, not when the insured realized
the legal significance of the damage.24 Therefore, the insured's claim
was not timely, since it was not filed until six years after the discov-
ery of the cracks.25
2. Equitable Tolling of the Provision
Courts in various jurisdictions have reached inconsistent conclu-
sions upon the question of whether the one-year suit provision should
be tolled during the period between notification of the damage and
formal denial of the claim by the insurer.26 Some courts have de-
clared that the one-year period cannot be tolled.27 As one commenta-
17. 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988).
18. Id. at 573, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
19. Id. at 572, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
20. 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1988).
21. Id. at 533, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
22. Id. at 533, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
23. Id at 535, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (emphasis omitted) (citing April Enterprises,
Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 826, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (1983)).
24. Id. The court declared, "'It is the occurrence of some . . . cognizable event
rather than knowledge of its legal significance that starts the running of the statute of
limitations.'" Id. (quoting McGee v. Weinberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804, 159 Cal. Rptr.
86, 90 (1979)).
25. Id.
26. See generally Comment, Civil Procedure - Statutes of Limitations - Tolling
Provisions in Standard Fire Insurance Policies, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1471.(1983)).
27. Id. at 1477.
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tor noted, "[c]ases which have arisen under the present Michigan
statute, and its New York counterpart, have almost unanimously
held that there is no tolling period implicit in the statute."28 Other
courts have declared that the one-year period is tolled until the in-
surer formally denies the insured's claim.29 For example, in Peloso v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Company,30 the plaintiff promptly notified
his insurance company of the loss he suffered when his building was
destroyed by fire.31 The insurer did not formally deny the claim un-
til nine months later.32 Although the plaintiff did not file suit until
approximately nine months after the formal denial, the court found
the claim to be timely because the one-year suit provision was tolled
during the period between notification of the loss and formal denial
by the insurer.3 3 The court reasoned that because this period is pro-
vided for the insurer's benefit, to enable the company to investigate
the claim and pursue its rights, it should not be used to disadvantage
the insured.3 4 The court believed it was preserving the intent of the
statute by tolling the period, and leaving the insured twelve full
months in which to pursue his claim.35
The California courts have treated this issue in a variety of ways.3 6
In Bollinger v. National Fire Insurance Company,3 7 the insured filed
suit on a claim prior to the expiration of the one-year suit provision,
yet because the insurer had not taken action on the claim, the court
dismissed the suit as premature. Although the insured's second at-
tempt at filing came after expiration of the one-year provision, the
court found that the claim was timely due to both equitable tolling
and insurer procedural defaults.38 Additionally, some California
28. Id.
29. See Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 688, 798
P.2d 1230, 1239, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 396 (1990).
30. 56 N.J. 514, 267 A.2d 498 (1970)).
31. Id. at 517, 267 A.2d at 499.
32. Id. at 518, 267 A.2d at 500.
33. Id. at 521, 267 A.2d at 502.
34. Id. at 520, 267 A.2d at 501.
35. Peloso, 56 N.J. at 521, 267 A.2d at 501-02. The court stated,
The fair resolution of the statutory incongruity is to allow the period of limi-
tation to run from the date of the casualty but to toll it from the time an in-
sured gives notice until liability is formally declined. In this manner, the
literal language of the limitation provision is given effect; the insured is not
penalized for the time consumed by the company while it pursues its contrac-
tual and statutory rights... and the central idea of the limitation provision is
preserved since an insured will have only 12 months to institute suit.
Id. at 521, 267 A.2d at 501-02.
36. See Tebbets v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 155 Cal. 137, 99 P. 501 (1909); Case v.
Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473, 23 P. 534 (1890).
37. 25 Cal. 2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (1944).
38. Id. at 410-11, 154 P.2d at 405-06. The Prudential-LMI court noted that "[u]nder
such circumstances ... the insurer had a duty, arising from its obligation of good faith
to the insured, to inform the insured of its intention to rely on a technical defense that
would otherwise result in forfeiture of policy benefits." Prudential-LMI Commercial
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courts have recently found certain suits brought after expiration of
the one-year provision to be timely, based on the equitable doctrines
of estoppel and waiver.3 9
B. Progressive Loss and Successive Insurers
Several California cases have addressed the issue of which insurer
should be held liable when progressive property loss stretches over
multiple policy periods.40 In a 1962 first-party property loss case,
Snapp v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,41 the insured's
home was damaged by the movement of an unstable landfill. State
Farm was the insurer when the loss was ascertained, but the damage
continued into the next insurer's policy period. The court refused to
find State Farm liable for only the damage that occurred up to the
expiration of the policy.42 Instead, the court held that "the date of
'materialization' of a loss determines which carrier must provide in-
demnity for a loss suffered by the insured, and the carrier insuring
the risk at the time the damage is first discovered is liable for the en-
tire lOSS.''43
In California Union Insurance Company v. Landmark Insurance
Company,4 4 a third-party liability case decided in 1983, the insured's
swimming pool began leaking during Landmark's period of insurance
coverage. Although repairs were attempted during that policy pe-
riod, the cause of the leak was not discovered and the damage contin-
ued into California Union's policy coverage. The court held both
Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 674, 689, 798 P.2d 1230, 1240, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 397
(1990) (citing Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399, 410-11, 154 P.2d 399,
406 (1944)).
39. See Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America, 3 Cal. App. 3d 446, 83 Cal. Rptr. 509
(1970). For a general discussion of estoppel and waiver, see 18A G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 75:182-:195 (2d ed. 1983); 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE § 523 (3d ed. 1985).
40. See generally Lynch, Handling Continuing Damage Issues, 9 Cal. Law., Sept.
1989, at 90.
41. 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962).
42. Id. at 831-32, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
43. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 696, 798
P.2d 1230, 1244, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 401 (1990) (citing Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 831-32, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (1962)). The Snapp court
declared:
Once the contingent event insured against has occurred during the period cov-
ered, the liability of the carrier becomes contractual rather than potential
only, and the sole issue remaining is the extent of its obligation, and it is im-
material that this may not be fully ascertained at the end of the policy period.
Snapp, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 832, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (emphasis added).
44. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
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insurers jointly and severally liable, stating this to be "a 'one occur-
rence' case, involving continuous, progressive and deteriorating
damage."45
In 1988, Home Insurance Company v. Landmark Insurance Com-
pany,46 a first-party property loss case, involved the cracking and
chipping of a hotel facade. The damage was discovered during
Home's policy period, but continued into Landmark's period of cover-
age. The court followed the Snapp rule, determining that "as be-
tween two first-party insurers, one of which is on the risk on the date
of the first manifestation of property damage, and the other is on the
risk after the date of the first manifestation of damage, the first in-
surer must pay the entire claim."47 Thus, Home was held solely lia-
ble for the damage to the hotel.48
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Prudential-LMI, the plaintiffs insured their apartment building
with four successive insurance companies between 1971 and 1986.
The term of the defendant's all-risk homeowners policy ran from Oc-
tober 27, 1977 to October 27, 1980. Prudential's policy specifically ex-
cluded coverage of loss "caused by, resulting from, contributed to or
aggravated by any earth movement." 49 Adopting several provisions
from the "California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy,"50 Pru-
dential's policy required the insured to give written notice to the
company immediately following damage to the property, and to pro-
vide proof of the damage within sixty days of the loss. In addition,
the agreement mandated that any action brought upon the policy had
to be commenced within twelve months after "inception of the
loss."51
In November 1985, the plaintiffs discovered cracks in the founda-
tion and floor of their building. In December 1985, the plaintiffs' bro-
ker reported the damage to Prudential and all other insurance
45. 1& at 468-69, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464-65.
46. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1988).
47. 1ld at 1393, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
48. Id. at 1396, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
49. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 679, 798
P.2d 1230, 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr, 387, 390 (1990).
50. Section 2071 of the California Insurance Code, entitled "California Standard
Form Fire Insurance Policy," provides in pertinent part that "[t]he insured shall give
written notice to this company of any loss without unnecessary delay .... and within
60 days after the loss, unless such time is extended in writing by this company, the
insured shall render to this company a proof of loss .... " CAL. INS. CODE § 2071
(Deering 1976 & Supp. 1991). Prudential's policy contained identical provisions. Pru-
dential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 679, 798 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
51. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 680, 798 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 390. This
one-year suit provision is also part of the California Insurance Code. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 2071 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1991).
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companies that had issued policies to plaintiffs during their owner-
ship period.52 Prudential conducted a claim investigation in 1987. In
August 1987, just before the insurer formally denied the claim based
on the policy's earth movement exclusion, the plaintiffs filed suit
against Prudential and the other insurers alleging breach of contract,
bad faith, breach of fiduciary duties and negligence.53
At trial, Prudential moved for summary judgment,54 arguing that
the plaintiffs had not proven that any loss occurred during Pruden-
tial's coverage period, and that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred
because it was not brought within one year of the loss.5 5 The court
denied the motion, asserting that triable issues still remained.56 Pru-
dential then requested a writ of mandate from the court of appeal on
the sole basis that the plaintiffs' claim was not timely. The court of
appeal issued the writ, directing the lower court to grant the defend-
ant summary judgment.57 Adopting a "delayed discovery" rule,58 the
court of appeal declared that the time limit on this type of action be-
gins to run when "the damage [to property is] sufficient to put a rea-
sonable person on notice of the possibility of a defect."59
Nevertheless, the court found the plaintiffs' claim untimely.60 In
dicta, the court of appeal further noted that equity required the ap-
portionment of damages among insurers when damage is progressive
and undiscovered over several policy periods.S1 Both parties sought
review from this decision.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve three is-
sues: (1) at what point does the statutorily-mandated 62 one-year pe-
riod of limitation commence running in cases of progressive property
52. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 680, 798 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
53. Id, at 680-81, 798 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
54. In the alternative, Prudential requested summary adjudication of 16 issues em-
anating from the complaint. Id at 681, 798 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
55. 1d. at 681, 798 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The plaintiffs' action was
commenced 20 months after their claim was filed. Id,
56. Id, According to the court, these issues concerned "whether the earth move-
ment exclusion applied, whether the damage occurred during the policy period, and
when the crack first appeared." Id.
57. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 389, 413,
260 Cal. Rptr. 85, 99 (1989).
58. For a discussion of the delayed discovery rule, see supra note 4.
59. Prudential-LMI, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99.
60. Id at 412-13, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 99. The court stated that the plaintiffs "failed to
bring their action on their claim within the contractual limitations period of 12 months
after a reasonable person would have been placed on notice of possible defects in the
property." Id
61. Id. at 408, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
62. Pursuant to California Insurance Code Section 2071, the one-year suit provi-
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loss; (2) whether this limitation period should be equitably tolled
during the interval between the notification of the loss and the in-
surer's formal denial of the claim; and (3) which insurer should in-
demnify the insured where there are successive insurers, the loss is
progressive, and the damage is not discovered until well after it
begins.63
IV. TREATMENT
A. California Insurance Code Section 2071: The One-Year Suit
Provision
The Prudential-LMI court began its discussion by affirming the va-
lidity of the one-year suit provision in Prudential's insurance policy.
The court noted the provision was statutorily mandated, 64 and thus
was "consistent with public policy."65 The court declared the statute
should not be construed strictly against the insurer.6 Rather, the
court sought to determine the point that the legislature intended to
be the beginning of the one-year suit provision, when the insured
does not immediately discover the damage. 67
B. Delayed Discovery and Inception of the Loss
The Prudential-LMI court adopted a "delayed discovery" rule for
determining when the one-year suit provision begins to run.68 Agree-
ing with the rationale in Abari, Lawrence, and Zurn,69 the court de-
clared that the twelve-month period did not begin to run when the
actual damage occurred; instead, it commenced when the insured dis-
covered or reasonably should have discovered the loss.70 The court
stated:
The insured's suit on the policy will be deemed timely if it is filed within one
year after "inception of the loss," defined as that point in time when apprecia-
ble damage occurs and is or should be known to the insured, such that a rea-
sonable insured would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has
been triggered.7 1
However, the court declared that only an insured who is "diligent in
the face of discovered facts" may utilize this discovery rule.72 Addi-
sion is contained in all fire insurance policies. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (Deering 1976 &
Supp. 1991).
63. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 678, 798
P.2d 1230, 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389.
64. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
65. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 684, 798 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 686-87, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
69. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
70. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 686-87, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 687, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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tionally, the court stressed that the standard of conduct necessary to
fulfill the insured's duty of diligence may vary depending on the na-
ture and degree of the damage sustained.7 3 A greater duty of prompt
notification is imposed on the insured in cases of extreme or unusual
loss than in cases concerning more typical damage.74
The court further announced that determining when the "incep-
tion of the loss" occurred is a question for the trier of fact.75 An af-
firmative defense asserting the unreasonableness of the insured's
time of discovery must be shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.76 Applying these rules, the court declared that questions re-
mained concerning when the "inception of the loss" had occurred
and, therefore, the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their claim
to explain why the time of discovery was reasonable. 77
C. Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
The Prudential-LMI court determined that the one-year suit provi-
sion should be equitably tolled during the period between the in-
sured's notification of loss and the insurer's formal denial of the
claim.7 8 Following the rationale of Peloso,79 the court concluded that
the legislature intended the insured to have twelve full months to in-
stitute an action, not including the period given for the insurer's ben-
efit.80 The court believed it was acting consistently with a trend in
other states toward equitable tolling of the one-year suit provision
where the insurer's rights have been fully protected by prompt notice
of loss.81
The court held that several policy considerations favored imposing
an equitable tolling rule.8 2 First, while the defendant Prudential ar-
gued that tolling the one-year suit provision would frustrate the stat-
ute's goal of eliminating stale claims, the court pointed out that the
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 687, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id at 691, 798 P.2d at 1241, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
79. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
80. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 691, 798 P.2d at 1241, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398. This
intent "can be inferred from the fact the period provided by section 2071 is considera-
bly shorter than the usual four years for ordinary contracts . . . and ten years for an
action against developers for property damage caused by latent defects." Id. (citations
omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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statute's goal was to provide for an early trial and for a timely inves-
tigation.8 3 The statute was not intended to forfeit the insured's rights
by providing the insurer with a technical defense in the face of the
insured's prompt notice of loss.8 4
Second, the court determined that equitable tolling of the one-year
suit provision "present[ed] several advantages in eliminating the un-
fair'results that often occur in progressive property damage cases."85
Third, where insureds are not required to file suit before the insurer
has acted on a claim, insurers are forced to investigate claims, rather
than wait until the one-year period has elapsed in an attempt to util-
ize this technical defense.8 6 Fourth, the court believes this rule will
streamline litigation by encouraging settlements and by reducing bad
faith suits brought when insurers deny claims following expiration of
the one-year period.87
Fifth, the longer the insured waits to notify the insurer, the less
time he will have after formal denial of the claim to initiate litiga-
tion.88 Finally, the court declared that the equitable tolling rule is
necessary because any action by the insured is premature until the
insurer has denied the claim.8 9 If, as in the case at hand, the insurer
does not formally deny the claim until after the expiration of the
one-year period, a "plaintiff's suit would have been untimely before
the insurer denied coverage." 90 For these reasons, the court deter-
mined that the rule of equitable tolling should be applied to the one-
year provision.9 1
Applying the rule of equitable tolling to the facts of Prudential-
LMI, the court held that if the plaintiff's delayed discovery of the
loss was reasonable, then because the plaintiff had notified the in-
surer within one month of the discovery of the loss, the plaintiff
should have had eleven months after denial of the claim to institute
suit.92 Thus, the plaintiff's suit was timely.93
83. Id. Prompt notice provides the insurer with the opportunity to investigate the
claim while the evidence is still fresh in order to prepare its defense.
84. Id
85. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 692, 798 P.2d at 1241, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
86. Id. "Although an insurer is not required to pay a claim that is not covered or
to advise its insureds concerning what legal arguments to make, good faith and fair
dealing require an insurer to investigate claims diligently before denying liability." Id.
87. Id. Without the equitable tolling rule, such bad faith suits would be the in-
sured's only hope of recovery. Id.
88. Id. at 692, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
89. Id
90. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
91. Id. at 693, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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E. Progressive Loss Rule
Finally, the court adopted the manifestation theory of liability in
progressive loss cases.9 In situations involving progressive property
loss, where the damage remains undiscovered over several insurers'
policy periods, the insurer who is covering the risk at the time of the
manifestation of the damage is solely liable for the loss. 95 The court
relied on the holdings and rationale in Snapp and Home Insurance,96
and distinguished the California Union97 decision because it was a
third-party liability case and it addressed different concerns.9 8 The
Prudential-LMI court specifically left open the question of whether
the manifestation theory of liability should be applied in third-party
progressive loss cases.9
The court believed that by adopting the manifestation rule, the in-
sured's expectations are best preserved because he could look to his
current insurer for coverage of a manifested loss.1o Additionally,
the court reasoned that this rule helps insurance companies deter-
mine the extent of their liability because a company will be liable
only for damage that manifests itself during its coverage period.101
The court also determined that the date of the "inception of the
loss" was also the date of the "manifestation of the loss."102 The
court noted that the date of these events, if uncertain, is a question
for the fact-finder.103 However, if the date is clear, an insurer who
covered the loss prior or subsequent to the manifestation of the dam-
age may obtain summary judgment of the claim against the com-
pany.1 04 Because the date of the manifestation was not conclusive in
Prudential-LMI, and because all the successive insurers had been
joined in the litigation, the court refused to determine when the dam-
age manifested, and thus, whether Prudential could be held liable for
the damage. x05
94. Id. at 698, 798 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
95. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 698, 798 P.2d at 124
96. See supra notes 41-43 and 46-48 and accompanyin
97. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
98. Prudential-LMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 698, 798 P.2d at 124
99. Id. at 698, 798 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
100. Id at 699, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. PrudentialLMI, 51 Cal. 3d at 699, 798 P.2d at 124
104. Id.
105. Id. at 700, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
6, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
g text.
6, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
7, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
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V. IMPACT
Prudential-LMI will have a radical effect on first-party progressive
loss litigation. Practically speaking, it will greatly streamline pro-
ceedings by reducing the number of issues presented in progressive
property loss cases. 106 Parties no longer need to litigate whether the
actual occurrence of the damage or the discovery of the loss triggers
the one-year suit provision. Instead, they will deliberate upon the
date of the "inception of the loss."107 Courts need not debate allocat-
ing liability among successive insurers of progressive loss. There will
be fewer parties to these suits because the manifestation rule limits
liability to the insurer covering the risk at the time the damage is
manifested.108 Additionally, bad faith suits, brought when the in-
surer has postponed denial of an insured's claim until the one-year
suit provision has expired, will become less frequent.109
Homeowners will greatly benefit from Prudential-LMI. First, by
adopting the delayed discovery rule, homeowners' rights under the
policy are protected until the time when a reasonable person would
have discovered the damage.11o An insured's one-year suit period can
no longer expire before he could reasonably be expected to discover
the loss. Second, the equitable tolling period requires the insurer to
investigate the claim. The insured is no longer forced to file suit on a
claim that is premature because it lacks formal denial, in order to
preserve his rights under the one-year provision. Third, under the
manifestation rule, the homeowner can know with certainty the in-
surer to whom he can look for indemnity.
Insurers appear to be those most detrimentally affected by Pruden-
tial-LMI."' Both the delayed discovery rule and the rule of equita-
ble tolling work against insurers' interests. The liability of the
insurer at the manifestation of the damage will not be apportioned
among all the insurers who insured the property during the progres-
sive loss. Some aspects of Prudential-LMI, however, may prove bene-
ficial to insurers. For example the adoption of the manifestation rule
provides greater certainty when an insurer is assessing its potential
liability.
By not declaring coverage to be fixed when the damage occurs and
106. Pasich, "Continuous Loss" Coverage Depends on Policy, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 9,
1990, at 7, col. 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 692, 798
P.2d 1230, 1241, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398 (1990).
110. See Tilner, Ruling on Property Damage Benefits Insurers, L.A. Daily J., Dec.
3, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
111. See Carrizosa, Lucas Opinions Humble Mighty Insurers, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 28,
1990, at 7, col. 1.
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thus not due under an older policy, the court has enabled insurers in
many cases to avoid liability on damage caused by earth movement
because newer policies often include broad earth movement
exclusions.11 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has radically changed insurance law
through its decision in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Su-
perior Court. It is important to remember, however, that this hold-
ing is specifically limited to first-party progressive property loss. The
question of liability apportionment among successive insurers in
third-party progressive damage cases remains unsettled. Neverthe-
less, insurance companies may seek to impose aspects of this holding
on third-party cases.1 13 To be consistent with its decision in Pruden-
tial-LMI, the court should reject these efforts.
MARY KAY ROGERS
XI. LABOR LAW
The wrongful termination claims of a policy-making or
confidential union employee, who is not a member of the
union, are preempted by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act's underlying purpose of
insuring the responsiveness of elected union officials to
the will of the membership: Screen Extras Guild v.
Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Screen Extras Guild v. Superior Court,1 the California Supreme
Court ruled that summary judgment must be granted for the defend-
ant, Screen Extras Guild, on the wrongful discharge claim of a for-
mer nonmember employee. The court held that the state law
remedies sought were preempted by the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)2 because recognition of the claims
112. Tilner, supra note 110, at 7, col. 2.
113. Pasich, supra note 106, at 7, col. 3.
1. 51 Cal. 3d 1017, 800 P.2d 873, 275 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1990). Justice Panelli wrote
the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk and
Kennard. Justice Eagleson wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Broussard.
Justice Arabian wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
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would contravene the underlying purpose of the Act-to promote
democratic control of union management. Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeal's decision that refused to issue a
writ of mandate to the superior court.3 The supreme court remanded
to the court of appeal, directing them to grant the Guild's motion for
summary judgment.4 The California Supreme Court, relying primar-
ily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Finnegan v.
Leu,5 held (1) that elected union officials must be free to exercise un-
limited discretion when making employment decisions regarding con-
fidential or policy-making employees,6 and (2) that recognition of the
state claims filed by the plaintiff, Ms. Smith, would contravene the
purpose of the Act and, therefore, the state claims are preempted by
the federal statute.7
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
Justice Panelli began his majority opinion with a general discus-
sion of preemption. 8 He contended that the cases in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the supremacy clause man-
dates preemption may be divided into two categories-substantive
preemption and jurisdictional preemption.9  According to Justice
Panelli, substantive preemption prohibits state regulation of conduct
protected by the federal government, and jurisdictional preemption
prohibits state action in an area which is the primary jurisdiction of
Congress and federal regulatory bodies.0 The key to this distinction,
3. Screen Extras Guild v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1989).
4. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1033, 800 P.2d at 883, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 405. The
court of appeal originally denied review. The supreme court reviewed this denial and
directed the court of appeal to issue an extraordinary writ and review the superior
court's decision. The court of appeal noted that the supreme court had not directed it
to grant the relief sought but merely to grant review, which it did by affirming the
superior court's decision. Screen Extras Guild v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244
(Ct. App. 1989).,
5. 56 U.S. 431 (1982).
6. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1031, 800 P.2d at 882, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
7. Id. at 1030-31, 800 P.2d at 881, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
8. Id at 1022, 800 P.2d at 875, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 397. Justice Panelli cited the gen-
eral rule that "state action is preempted wherever it 'stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'" Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491 (1984) (quot-
ing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941))).
9. Id. at 1022-23, 800 P.2d at 875-76, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
10. Both Justice Panelli, for the majority, and Justice Arabian, in his dissent, cited
Lawrence Tribe's treatise, American Constitutional Law, to support conflicting de-
lineations of~the categories of preemption. Justice Arabian maintained that there are
actually three categories of preemption: express, implied and conflict preemption.
Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1039, 800 P.2d at 887, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (Arabian, J.,
dissenting). However, Justice Panelli contended that regardless of the name or
number of categories, the test to be applied in this particular case remains unchanged.
Id. at 1023 n.3, 800 P.2d at 875 n.3, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 398 n.3.
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in the view of the court, is the test to be applied to determine
whether preemption is warranted. In the case of jurisdictional pre-
emption, a balancing test is warranted.' In the instant case, there
was no federal jurisdiction over Ms. Smith's claims because she was
not actually a member of the union. Therefore, the court held that
this was not a case of jurisdictional preemption and, thus, the proper
inquiry for a preemption analysis was "whether there is an actual
conflict between permitting Smith to pursue her state law causes of
action and federal labor policy as embodied in the LMRDA."12
The LMRDA was enacted in 1959 as a response to congressional
concern over widespread corruption in union management. 13 In or-
der to eliminate the corrupt activities, Congress sought to make the
union management more responsive to the will of the membership.
The specific provisions intended to accomplish this goal are referred
to generally as the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organiza-
tions."14 The question for the court was whether subjecting union of-
ficials to wrongful discharge suits by confidential or policy-making
employees was in actual conflict with the desired responsiveness pro-
moted by this "Bill of Rights."15
11. Id, at 1023, 800 P.2d at 876, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 398. Justice Panelli insisted that
under these circumstances "preemption involves balancing the competing federal and
state interests at stake." Id&
12. Id, In applying the "actual conflict" test, Justice Panelli arrived at the same
test that Justice Arabian used, although under a different analysis. See generally 7 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 7 (9th ed. 1988).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) outlines the purpose of the Act, stating:
The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to protect employees' rights to organize,
choose their own representatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage
in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection; ... and that in order
to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce it is essential that labor
organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of
responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organi-
zations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations.
29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1988). Section 411 contains most of the enumerated pro-
tections including:
(1) - every member of a union has equal rights within the organization;
(2) - every member has freedom of speech and assembly with other mem-
bers;
(3) - dues cannot be raised except through specifically provided procedures;
(4) - members' rights to sue may not be limited, even if the union is the
defendant;
(5) - disciplinary action may not be imposed without proper procedural
protection.
See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). See also, 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 54
(1979) (discussing the scope of the LMRDA).
15. Screen Extras, 51 Cal, 3d at 1024, 800 P.2d at 876, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 399. The
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The court relied primarily on the view of the LMRDA expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Finnegan v. Leu.16 The
Supreme Court in Finnegan stated that "the Act's overriding objec-
tive was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and
responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open,
periodic elections."17 Therefore, the Court found it essential that
elected officials be free to appoint confidential and policy-making em-
ployees willing to implement policies consistent with the views which
led to their election.18 Allowing relief to union members who were
discharged after opposing the newly elected president would under-
mine this purpose.19
The majority in Screen Extras found that this reasoning applied to
Ms. Smith's situation as well. Although Finnegan involved an at-
tempt to invoke the LMRDA rather than possible preemption of
state law claims, the issue of the extent to which elected union offi-
cials may be free to choose their staff was common to both cases.
Therefore, the court held that the claims against the Guild must be
preempted to secure the ability of union officials to terminate policy-
making employees at will.20
The court recognized, but distinguished, a contrary holding by the
Ninth Circuit in Bloom v. General Truck Drivers.21 The court deter-
mined that the Bloom decision was limited to the specific facts of that
case: the employee was allegedly discharged for his failure to engage
in illegal activity. The court in Bloom noted that such action "is not
court specifically noted that it made no finding as to the rights of nonconfidential or
nonpolicymaking employees to bring state labor law claims. Id. at 1032 n.11, 800 P.2d at
882 n.11, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.11.
16. 456 U.S. 431 (1982). Finnegan involved a claim by discharged business agents,
who were also members of the union for which they worked, that their discharge was
in violation of the "Bill of Rights." The business agents had been discharged by a
newly elected union president who had prevailed over the candidate supported by the
discharged employees.
17. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441. See also 48 AM. JuR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations
§ 55 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
18. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441. "Nothing in the act evinces a congressional intent
to alter the traditional pattern which would permit a union president under these cir-
cumstances to appoint agents of his choice to carry out his policies." Id. at 442.
19. Id at 442; cf id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (limiting the denial of
protection for discharged union members/employees to those members of a president's
staff "who will be instrumental in evolving the president's administrative policies").
20. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1024, 800 P.2d at 877, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
"[Clourts have recognized that the ability of elected union officials to select their own
administrators is an integral part of ensuring that union administrations are respon-
sive to the will of union members." Id.
21. 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). Bloom involved a claim by a former union busi-
ness agent that he had been fired in retaliation for his refusal to falsify the minutes of
an executive board meeting. While the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of
* the union, it specifically held that the LMRDA did not preempt the plaintiff's claim.
Id. at 1362.
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the kind sanctioned by the [LMRDA]."22 Therefore, the Bloom deci-
sion, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, made no deter-
mination about whether a claim for wrongful termination, based
upon less extreme grounds, would be preempted. In fact, the Bloom
court distinguished, rather than overruled, another case relied on by
the California Supreme Court, Tyra v. Kearney.23 In the only other
consideration of the issue by California courts, Tyra held that "re-
placement of business agents by elected union officials is sanctioned
by the LMRDA."24
The California Supreme Court was persuaded that the reasoning of
Tyra applied to Ms. Smith's claims. Ms. Smith asserted that her
claim was distinguishable from that in Tyra, because rather than be-
ing discharged for having supported the opposing candidate in an
election, hers was a "garden-variety wrongful termination" suit.25
The court rejected this view stating, "[H]ow are we to distinguish
that kind of discharge from one where it is alleged that a confidential
or policy-making employee worked inefficiently or dishonestly in re-
sponse to, or created obstacles to the implementation of, union poli-
cies, adopted by elected union officials, which he or she opposed?"26
Because of the inherent difficulty in making this determination, the
court foresaw increased litigation which "would surely have a chil-
ling effect on all discharges." 27 According to the majority, this chil-
ling effect constituted an "actual conflict" with the federal
legislation. Finally, the court addressed and dismissed Ms. Smith's
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.
Although her claims were technically unrelated to the subject matter
of the LMRDA, because they grew out of Ms. Smith's discharge, the
court ruled that they were preempted as well.28
Justice Eagleson's dissent, in which Justice Broussard joined, fo-
22. Id. at 1362. In fact, the court found that "the state cause of action actually ad-
vances the purpose of the Act." Id,
23. 153 Cal. App. 3d 921, 200 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1984).
24. Id, at 927, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 719. "[A] subsequent state claim would allow an-
other forum to restrict the exercise of the right to terminate which Finnegan found
'an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of
the union election.'" Id (quoting Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441).
25. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1027, 800 P.2d at 879, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 401. Smith
specifically pointed to the lapse of time between the president's election and her termi-
nation as support for her assertion that she was not fired for political reasons. Id.
26. Id. at 1027-28, 800 P.2d at 879, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
27. Id. at 1028, 800 P.2d at 880, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
28. Id. at 1032, 800 P.2d at 883, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 405. The court also stated that
Smith's claims may not have been barred if "significant additional tortious activity had
been alleged against SEG or Brown." Id.
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cused primarily on the other portions of the LMRDA which specifi-
cally evidence an intent not to preempt state law claims.29 Justice
Eagleson noted that Finnegan did not involve preemption and, there-
fore, did not consider the effect of these'provisions.3 0 He then em-
phasized the presumption of at-will employment in California law.31
Recovery for discharge is allowed only if "the termination contra-
vened a valid express or implied agreement for job security, stemmed
from a pernicious form of discrimination, or violated some other
clear and fundamental public policy."3 2 None of these categories pro-
hibit termination motivated by a need to insure implementation of
administrative policies. Therefore, recognition of the state remedies,
in Eagleson's view, does not impermissibly interfere with the policy
behind the LMRDA. The response to these arguments by the major-
ity was simple: the LMRDA protects union members only. There-
fore, section 413 only saves state law remedies for union members.
Because Ms. Smith was not a member of the union she did not fall
within the jurisdiction of the LMRDA, including the saving
provisions.33
Justice Arabian wrote a separate dissent .in which he conceded that
preemption by the LMRDA is possible under some circumstances,
but not those presented in this case. While Justice Arabian divided
the types of preemption differently than Justice Pannelli did, Justice
Arabian agreed that the test to be applied to the facts at bar was
whether Ms. Smith's claims were in "actual conflict" with the federal
legislation. 34 However, he insisted that this inquiry "is essentially a
question of statutory construction." 35 He then discussed the savings
29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1988). Section 413 provides: "Nothing in this title [29
U.S.C. §§ 411-15] shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organi-
zation under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal or under
the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization." Id.
30. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1034, 800 P.2d at 884, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 406 (Eagle-
son, J., dissenting).
31. See 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Agency and Employment
§ 165 (9th ed. 1987).
32. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,940 (Deering 1990); see generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Agency and Employment §§ 166-77 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1991).
33. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1031 n.10, 800 P.2d at 881 n.10, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 403
n.10. "Just as Smith is not entitled to the substantive protections of the LMRDA, she
cannot enjoy its savings clauses." Id.
34. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1039, 800 P.2d at 887, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (Ara-
bian, J., dissenting)! Justice Arabian asserted that 'preemption may be "express"-
where Congress has specifically defined the extent of preemption, "implied"-where
the statute implies that congress intended state law to be preempted, or "conflict" -
where state law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal purpose. Id
See also, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25 (2d ed. 1988).
35. Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1042, 800 P.2d at 889, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (Ara-
bian, J., dissenting). "The intent of Congress is the 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption
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clauses of the statute, as well as the applicable case law. Justice Ara-
bian concluded that the majority erred in rejecting the distinction
made by the plaintiff between discharges relating to the implementa-
tion of policy and "garden-variety wrongful termination."36 He
agreed with the court of appeal that these cases are outside the dis-
cretion which Congress intended to preserve for elected union offi-
cials. 3 7  Therefore, Justice Arabian would have limited the
preemptive effect of the LMRDA to those cases where newly elected
officials remove policy-making staff members so that they may be re-
placed by employees who support the programs upon which their
election was based.
III. CONCLUSION
According to Justice Arabian, this decision will leave policy-mak-
ing union employees completely unprotected from arbitrary termina-
tion by elected union officials.3s However, the majority's acceptance
of the holding in Bloom implies that retaliatory discharges are not in-
tended to be preempted by the LMRDA. Bloom held that "the kind
of discharge alleged, retaliation for refusal to commit a crime and
breach of trust, is not the kind sanctioned by the [LMRDA], or by
the courts in Finnegan and Tyra." 39 Because the majority did not
contradict this holding, it would appear that terminations which
would violate public policy survive the Screen Extras holding.40 Fur-
thermore, this case has limited effect because there are repeated ref-
erences in the opinion which limit the holding to nonmember
employees like Ms. Smith.41
analysis." Id (citing Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986)).
36. I& at 1051, 800 P.2d at 895, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 417. "This case has nothing to do
with [union] democracy ... this is a garden variety 'wrongful termination' case which
just happens to be brought against a union .... IML (quoting Screen Extras Guild v.
Superior Ct., 257 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1989)).
37. Screen Extras, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 245. "Union officials are not elected to breach
contracts or commit torts and, if they do so, the fact they were 'democratically elected'
is beside the point." Id (emphasis added).
38. Justice Arabian dramatically ended his dissent by noting, "In earlier times it
was said that 'Heaven will protect the working girl.' With today's decision, union em-
ployees may find that heavenly intervention is indeed their last best hope of protec-
tion." Screen Extras, 51 Cal. 3d at 1055, 800 P.2d at 898, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
39. Bloom, 783 F.2d at 1362.
40. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211; see generally 2 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Agency and Employment §§ 167-70 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1991).
41. See supra notes 12 and 33 and accompanying text.
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As a direct result of the court's decision in Screen Extras, Califor-
nia's policy-making union employees are left with far less protection
than any other employees in the state. In fact, with respect to hiring
decisions, the Screen Extras opinion gives greater freedom from in-
terference to elected union representatives than has been given to
the President of the United States.4 2
KAREN M. EISENHAUER
XII. PROPERTY LAW
A bank's improper setoff against a depositor's account in
partial satisfaction of the depositor's debt without first
foreclosing its security interest in the depositor's
property results in a waiver of the bank's security
interest, but not a waiver of the underlying debt: Security
Pacific National Bank v. Wozab
I. INTRODUCTION
In Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozabl the California
Supreme Court determined the effect of a bank's improper setoff of a
debtor's deposit accounts against the balance owed on the debtor's ob-
ligation upon both the bank's security interest in the debt and the
status of the underlying debt.2 The defendant, Anton Wozab, was the
president and majority shareholder of a corporation which had a line
of credit with Security Pacific exceeding $1 million.3 Additionally,
Wozab had a personal savings account and a demand deposit account
with the bank.4 After the bank expressed concern over the financial
stability of the corporation, Wozab pledged a deed of trust on his per-
sonal residence as security for the line of credit.5 When it became ap-
parent to the bank that the corporation would probably file for
bankruptcy, the bank setoff Wozab's personal accounts, which
amounted to approximately $3,000, against the amount owed on the*
debt.6 The bank took this action without first attempting to foreclose
42. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that
Congress could limit the ability of the President to remove executive branch officials
who performed quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions).
1. 51 Cal. 3d 991, 800 P.2d 557, 275 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1990). Justice Eagleson wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli and Arabian
concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion in
which Justices Mosk and Kennard concurred.
2. Id. at 996, 800 P.2d at 559, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
3. Id. Wozab had executed personal guaranties promising to pay the underlying
debt if the corporation failed to do so. Id.
4. Id The corporation also had separate demand deposit accounts with the bank.
Id,
5. Id
6. Id The bank also set off over $100,000 of the corporation's deposit accounts,
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its security interest in Wozab's residence. 7
When Wozab challenged the setoff, the bank transferred the deed
of trust to Wozab's residence back to Wozab. Then, the bank filed an
action asserting that Wozab was personally liable based on written
guaranties, which he had executed prior to pledging his residence,8
for the underlying debt.s Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment, with Wozab arguing that the bank's improper setoff of his
deposit accounts amounted to both a waiver of the security interest in
his residence and a waiver of the balance owed on the underlying
debt.10 Although the trial court admitted the unfairness of allowing
Wozab to escape liability for a debt of almost $1 million, it felt bound
by precedent established in Bank of America v. Daily," compelling it
to grant Wozab's motion for summary judgment.' 2 The court of ap-
peal affirmed, and the supreme court granted review.' 3
The supreme court agreed that when a bank improperly sets off a
debtor's accounts against an obligation of the debtor, it loses its secur-
ity interest in the debtor's property.14 However, the court refused to
approve the additional "Draconian sanction" advocated by Wozab and
the lower courts which would require the bank to forfeit its right to
collect on the underlying debt.15
II. TREATMENT
The appropriate remedy for an improper setoff was discussed in
Bank of America v. Daily.16 There, as in the Wozab case, a bank set-
but that portion of the setoff was not at issue on appeal of the case. Id at 995, 996 n.5,
800 P.2d at 559 & n.5, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203 & n.5. This left a balance due on the under-
lying debt of over $900,000. Id at 995, 800 P.2d at 559, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
7. Id at 995-96, 800 P.2d at 559, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
8. See supra note 3.
9. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 996, 800 P.2d at 559, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
10. Id,
11. 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984). For a discussion of the Daily
case, see infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
12. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 996, 800 P.2d at 559, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
13. Id
14. Id at 1001-02, 800 P.2d at 563, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 207. In doing so, the court gave
credence to the "one-action rule" found at CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 726(a) (West Supp.
1991). For an explanation of the one-action rule, see infra note 18 and accompanying
text.
15. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1002, 800 P.2d at 563, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 207. See infra
notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
. 16. The court of appeal in Daily based its decision on the holding in the seminal
supreme court case of McKean v. German-American Savings Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 P.
656 (1897).
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off a debtor's accounts against a debt owed the bank instead of fore-
closing on a security interest which it held in the debtor's real
property.17 The court of appeal held that the setoff was a violation of
the "one action rule" codified at section 726 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure.' 8 As such, the court of appeal determined that the
bank, by taking action to setoff the depositor's accounts,19 had waived
its security interest in the debtor's property.20 However, as the
supreme court pointed out in Wozab, the bank in Daily made no ef-
fort to collect the underlying debt.21 Therefore, the court of appeal's
comments in Daily regarding the proper remedy for the debtor as to
the underlying debt constituted mere dicta.22 Hence, the Wozab case
involved an issue of first impression,23 and the lower courts had im-
properly determined that they were bound by any alleged holding on
the issue in Daily.
Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme court
determined that the proper solution in the case of an improper setoff
was to prevent the bank from foreclosing its security interest,24 but
17. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 770, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
18. Id. at 773, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 560. The one-action rule provides, in pertinent
part: "There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or the enforce-
ment of any right secured by mortgage upon real property or an estate for years
therein, which action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter ...."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West Supp. 1991). See generally 3 B. WrrKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Security Transactions in Real Property § 111 (9th ed. 1987);
27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 200 (1987 and Supp. 1991).
19. While the bank's setoff was not a judicial "action" within the meaning in-
tended by the drafters of section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the setoff still
amounted to a violation of the section because the rule not only intends to protect a
debtor from more than one lawsuit, but also intends that a bank take action to fore-
close on any security interest before suing on the underlying debt. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d
at 998-99, 800 P.2d at 560-62, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 204-06. See also 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Security Transactions in Real Property § 115(3) (9th ed. 1987).
Thus the "one-action rule" embodies a "security first rule" as well. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d
at 999, 800 P.2d at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 206. To the extent the court of appeal in Daily
interpreted the term "action" in section 726 to include a bank's setoff of a depositor's
accounts, the supreme court in Wozab disapproved of the decision. Id. at 999 n.7, 800
P.2d at 562 n.7, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 206 n.7.
20. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 773, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
21. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1003, 800 P.2d at 564, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
22. Id. at 1003, 800 P.2d at 565, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 209. The court in Daily had
quoted a treatise which provides: "The classic sanction against the creditor who fails
to exhaust all his security for the same debt in a single action is harsh, yet it follows
inescapably from the availability of but one action to the creditor-he waives the bal-
ance of the security and he waives any claim to the unpaid balance of the debt." HET-
LAND, J., CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS, Antideficiency
Legislation § 6.18 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1970).
23. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1003, 800 P.2d at 564, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
24. Thus, protection would be afforded to the debtor from multiple lawsuits as in-
tended by the one action rule. In effect, the debtor would be protected from having to
sue the bank to recover the setoff funds while still remaining vulnerable to a later suit
by the bank seeking to foreclose on its security interest. Id. at 1002, 800 P.2d at 563,
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to allow the bank to still collect on the underlying debt.25 The court
felt this presented the most equitable solution in the instant case
since Wozab voluntarily accepted the reconveyance of the deed of
trust to his residence.2 6 "By doing so, [Wozab] voluntarily relin-
quished the protection of the security-first rule."27 The court op-
posed the option of allowing a debtor the opportunity to reclaim clear
title to his or her property, unencumbered by the bank's security in-
terest, as well as the chance to claim that the bank could not obtain a
personal judgment against the debtor.28 Such a result, the court
opined, would be "a gross injustice to the bank and a corresponding
windfall to the [debtors]."2 9 Yet, depositors are still afforded some
measure of protection under the court's holding since banks are de-
terred from infringing upon depositors through a setoff of their ac-
counts, because if banks took such action, they would lose "their
preferred position as secured creditors" and would be "reduced to the
275 Cal. Rptr. at 207. See generally 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 201 (1987 & Supp.
1991).
It is important to note that the court did not address the issue of the effect upon a
bank's security interest if the bank were to immediately return the setoff funds, as op-
posed to retaining them, as the bank did in Wozab. However, the court indicated that
if such a case were before it, requiring the bank to forfeit its security interest might be
an excessive remedy. Rather, the court felt that, should it be faced with such a case, it
would probably be adequate merely to require the bank to pay compensatory damages
to the depositor, if any damages actually occurred. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1001 n.8, 800
P.2d at 563 n.8, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 207 n.8.
25. Id, at 1004, 800 P.2d at 565, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (citing Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.
2d 263, 268, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943)). However, the court noted that if the debtor pleads
the bank's security interest as an affirmative defense, the bank will be forced to fore-
close on the security before seeking a judgment against the debtor personally. Id, at
1004 n.9, 800 P.2d at 565 n.9, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 209 n.9; see also 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Security Transactions in Real Property § 119 (9th ed. 1987).
26. Instead, Wozab could have required the bank to foreclose on its security inter-
est in the deed of trust. See supra note 25.
27. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1005, 800 P.2d at 566, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 210. For an expla-
nation of the security-first rule, see supra note 19.
28. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1005, 800 P.2d at 566, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 210. The court
noted that "[a]cquiesence in error takes away the right of objecting to it." Id. (citing
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3516 (West 1970)).
29. Id. See also Mertens, California's Foreclosure Statutes: Some Proposals for Re-
form, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 533, 555 (1986) (advocating against the unfairness of
such a result).
The court also noted that Wozab had willingly executed personal guaranties for the
amount of the underlying debt. Therefore, the court felt that Wozab should be sub-
jected to personal liability in any event. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1005, 800 P.2d at 566, 275
Cal. Rptr. at 210. See also Rabin, The Sequel to Bank of America v. Daily: Security
Pac. Nat'7 Bank v. Wozab, 12 REAL PROP. L. REP. 204, 210 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1989) (point-
ing out that depriving the bank of the balance of the underlying debt would be an ex-
cessively punitive remedy).
1209
status of unsecured creditors-a drastic sanction in the
marketplace." 30
Justice Broussard concurred that Security Pacific had acted im-
properly by setting off Wozab's personal accounts against the corpo-
ration's credit line.31 However, he dissented from the majority's
conclusion that the forfeiture of the security interest provided an ad-
equate remedy.3 2 He felt that such a ruling allowed banks to circum-
vent the statutory intent behind section 726 of the Code of Civil
Procedure33 of which, according to Justice Broussard, the security-
first rule was the most important of all protections afforded debt-
ors.34 Under that rule, Justice Broussard contended that the bank
had no other right of action other than foreclosing on the security.35
Furthermore, he argued that the only remedy which would have the
effect necessary to sufficiently protect debtors was one which would
have a powerful deterring effect upon banks-one which would re-
quire the forfeiture of the underlying debt.36
III. CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the Wozab decision that the supreme court
wished to avoid excessively penalizing banks for setting off deposi-
tor's accounts. However, the court acknowledged that such a practice
30. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1004, 800 P.2d at 565, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (citing Com-
ment, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, 12 REAL PROP. L. REP. 184, 186 (Cont. Ed. Bar
1989)).
31. Id. at 1006-07, 800 P.2d at 567, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
32. Id. at 1007, 800 P.2d at 567, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting). According to Justice Broussard, under such a remedy, certain dangers to
debtors and their other creditors would not be prevented. For example,
[b]y exercising such a setoff, a bank not only deprives the debtor of the imme-
diate possession of funds to which the debtor is then entitled, but the bank
may obtain funds of the debtor to which the bank would never be entitled or
to which other creditors have an equal or greater claim.
Id. at 1010, 800 P.2d at 569, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
34. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1008, 800 P.2d at 568, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Broussard quoted the precedent-setting case re-
garding a bank's ability to set off depositors' funds thus:
The reason of the rule that gives to banks the right to appropriate a deposit to
the payment of the depositer's (sic] matured indebtedness does not apply
where the bank has security for that indebtedness .... The lien given on the
mortgaged premises... was intended to be in lieu and exclusive of all implied
liens .... The difficulty with [the bank's] argument is that it ignores the force
and effect of section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 1009, 800 P.2d at 568-69, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting McKean v. German-American Savings Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 339-41,
50 P. 656, 659 (1897)).
35. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra note 34.
36. Id. at 1010-12, 800 P.2d at 569-71, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 213-15 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
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was wrongful and upheld what it felt was an appropriate sanction-
forfeiture of the security interest. Debtors must be careful, however,
in the case of an improper setoff to plead the affirmative defense of
the security-first rule to avoid potential personal liability for the re-
mainder of the underlying debt.37
SELINA KATHERINE HEWITTr
XIII. SALES LAW
A provision in a sales contract which imposes an
eighteen percent annual interest fee for late payments
does not violate the California usury law: Southwest
Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corporation.
In Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corporation,1
the California Supreme Court resolved a twelve year conflict among
the courts of appeal regarding the application of the usury law2 to
certain types of sales contracts.3 The court declared that commercial
37. See Business Wire, Firm Picks Top Real Estate Cases for the Year; Environ-
mental Issues Dominate Legal Decisions on Real Estate in 1990, Jan. 4, 1991. See also
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
1. 51 Cal. 3d 701, 798 P.2d 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1990). Gosh Construction Cor-
poration [hereinafter Gosh] purchased pipe from Southwest Concrete Products [here-
inafter Southwest]. When Gosh refused to pay for the pipes, Southwest brought a
breach of contract suit against Gosh. Gosh subsequently cross-complained, asserting
that the late fee provision in the contract violated the usury law. The California
Supreme Court granted review in order to determine whether or not the late pay-
ments clause violated the state usury law. Justice Panelli authored the opinion of the
court and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Eagleson, Kennard and Ara-
bian. Justice Mosk, who was joined by Justice Broussard, wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
2. CAL. CONST. art XV, § 1(2). This subsection provides that for a loan or for-
bearance of money, the maximum interest rate is the higher of 10% per year or 5% per
year plus the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco rate in effect on certain dates.
Id. For an indepth discussion of the usury law, see 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Consumer Bor-
rower and Protection Laws § 381 (rev. ed. 1985); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Contracts § 465 (9th ed. 1987); Comment, A Comprehensive View of the Califor-
nia Usury Law, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 166 (1974).
3. The split among the circuits began in 1978 with Crestwood Lumber Co. v. Citi-
zens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Cal. App. 3d 819, 824-25, 148 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132 (1978),
where the first district found that an assessment of a finance charge constituted a for-
bearance subject to the usury law. Id. at 824-25, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 132. Since Crestwood,
other districts have analyzed similar transactions differently. See, e.g., Fox v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, 94 Cal. App. 2d 867, 880, 156 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902 (1979) (where the
second district contended that retail credit agreements were not subject to the usury
law); Mark McDowell Corp. v. LSM 128, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1427, 1431, 263 Cal. Rptr. 310,
313 (1989) (where the fourth district believed that a subcontractor's late charges of
18% violated the usury law); and O'Connor v. Televideo Sys., 218 Cal. App. 3d 709, 718,
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sales contracts imposing eighteen percent annual interest rates on
late payments are not subject to the usury law,4 reasoning that the
usury law applies only to loans or forbearances. 5 Since both parties
conceded that the transaction was not a loan,6 the court questioned
its classification as a forbeardnce. 7 Initially, it reinforced the rule re-
quiring examination of the substance over the form of the transac-
tion when making the threshold determination of an agreement's
classification as a loan or forbearance.8 After reviewing the nature of
the late charge provision, the court concluded that the agreement
was not a forbearance subject to the usury law.9 It reached its find-
ing by pointing out that unlike a true forbearance, which is designed
to give the buyer further time for payment, a late charge provision is
'merely an additional assessment for a payment not made by the due
date.10
After finding that a late charge clause is not a forbearance subject
to the usury law, the supreme court went one step further by man-
dating the application of two exceptions to the usury law.11 The deci-
sion upheld the "time-price" doctrine, which holds that the usury law
is not applicable when a seller agrees to sell goods at a higher price
for credit than for cash.' 2 The court also relied on the well-settled
"debtor's voluntary act" exception' which recites that a usurious
transaction must be usurious at its inception and cannot become so
simply because the buyer subsequently defaults on his payments.' 3
267 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242 (1990) (where the sixth district refused to find an 18% late
charge assessment to a manufacturer usurious).
4. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 709, 798 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
5. Id. at 705, 798 P.2d at 1249, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 406. See also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1912 (West 1985) (defining "forbearance"); Calimpco v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429,
440, 224 P.2d 421, 429 (1950) (defining "loan" for purposes of the usury law).
6. In his concurrence and dissent, Justice Mosk emphasized that Gosh contended
that the transaction was a forbearance and not a loan. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d
at 710, 798 P.2d at 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
7. Id. at 705, 798 P.2d at 1249, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
8. Id. See generally Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 44, 577 P.2d 200, 204,
145 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978); Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 989, 458
P.2d 185, 189, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1969).
9. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 708, 798 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 705, 798 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
12. Id. See generally Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 563, 261 P. 1017, 1021 (1927)
(establishing that an offer to sell at a higher rate for credit than for cash does not con-
stitute usury); Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 45-46, 577 P.2d 200, 205, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (pointing out that the time-price doctrine, or bona fide credit sale, was
an exception to the usury law); Comment, supra note 2, at 216 (concluding that the
time-price doctrine exempts installment sales contracts from the usury laws); and 13
CAL. JUR. 3D Consumer Borrower and Protection Laws § 374 (rev. ed. 1989) (noting
that a higher credit price is not sufficient to subject the transaction to the usury law).
13. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 706, 798 P.2d at 1250, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
This rule has been utilized by many authorities. See, e.g., Penziner v. West Am. Fin.
Co., 133 Cal. App. 578, 590, 24 P.2d 501, 506 (1933) (stating that excessive interest
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The court emphasized this latter exception and criticized Crestwood
Lumber v. Citizens Savings and Loan Association ' 4 for not address-
ing the initial intent of the seller in ruling that a late charge provi-
sion is subject to the usury law.' 5 The Southwest Concrete court
applied the exceptions to the agreement and found that a general late
charge clause is not usurious. In its final analysis, the court refused
to identify the charges as liquidated damages subject to the provisions
of California Civil Code section 1671.16
In Southwest Concrete, the supreme court focused less on the
threshold finding of a loan or forbearance than on the exceptions to
the usury law.17 The elements of a usurious transaction are as fol-
lows: (1) a loan or forbearance; (2) which is absolutely repayable; (3)
requiring payment at a rate in excess of the statutory maximum; and
(4) a willful intent to exact a usurious rate of interest.' 8 Thus, as
Justice Mosk pointed out in his concurrence and dissent, the essence
of a usurious transaction is forbearance-if there is no forbearance,
there can be no usury implications.19 Using this rationale, it follows
within the borrower's control is not usurious); First Am. Title Ins. & Trust v. Cook, 12
Cal. App. 3d 592, 596, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647 (1970) (averring that late charges in the
event of a default are not interest payments, but are penalties for nonperformance);
Boerner, 21 Cal. 3d at 54, 577 P.2d at 211, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (holding that usurious
intent must be determined at the inception of the transaction).
14. 83 Cal. App. 3d 819, 148 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1978). In Crestwood, the court con-
cluded that because the finance charge was added to the price after the maturity of the
debt, it was a forbearance. Id. at 825, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
15. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 708, 798 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
See also O'Connor v. Televideo Sys., Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 709, 716, 267 Cal. Rptr. 237,
241 (1990) (criticizing Crestwood's failure to address the issue of intent).
16. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 709, 798 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
17. This observation was made in Justice Mosk's concurrence and dissent. He ar-
gued that the time-price exception and the debtor's act rule were not applicable since
the transaction was not a forbearance. He concluded that the transaction was merely
an "ordinary single payment credit sale of goods by a wholesaler," which rendered the
usury exceptions inappropriate. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 716, 798 P.2d at 1257,
274 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Comment, supra note 2, at 174 (outlining the elements of a usurious transac-
tion). See, e.g., Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 927, 528 P.2d
357, 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541, 549 (1974) (where the court set forth the elements of a
usurious transaction, but noted that once the forbearance factor is met, the critical is-
sue is the willful intent of the parties).
19. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 710, 798 P.2d at 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 410
(Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally, O'Connor, 218 Cal.
App. 3d at 717, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (explaining that if late charge provisions were for-
bearances, "then the buyer could conceivably forbear ad infinitum . . .") 45 AM. JUR.
2D Interest and Usury § 117 (1969); 13 CAL. JUR. 2D Consumer Borrower and Protec-
tion Laws § 389 (rev. ed. 1989); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts
§ 117 (1987).
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that even without applying the exceptions to the usury law, as the
court did, an agreement to pay eighteen percent per year in late
charges does not constitute a forbearance and is not subject to the
usury law. However, although the court failed to clearly state that
the classification of a transaction as a "loan" or "forbearance" is the
threshold determination for a usurious agreement, lower courts will
likely find that typical commercial sales agreements do not constitute
forbearances and are not subject to the usury law.20
Unlike the court's decisions in previous cases involving contracts
with usurious characteristics, the court chose to look at the contrac-
tual language rather than the relative bargaining strength of the par-
ties.21 In doing so, it objectively examined the terms of the
agreement instead of looking paternalistically at the parties to the
transaction.22 In essence, the court has sent a message to lower
courts to look only at the substance of the transaction to determine
whether it is a loan or forbearance. Subjective factors, such as the
bargaining strength and intent of the parties, can be subsequently ex-
amined when applying the exceptions to the usury law.23
While the court may have resolved the application of the usury law
to certain types of transactions, it left open the issue of whether a
nonusurious agreement could be an invalid liquidated damages provi-
sion subject to section 1671 of the California Civil Code.24 Previous
20. The majority pointed out that there was no need to apply the provisions 'of the
Unruh Act, which governs finance charges in retail sales agreements such as revolving
charge agreements. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 707, 798 P.2d at 1251, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 408. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 1801-1810.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)
(Unruh Act); Fox v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 867, 873, 880, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 897, 902 (1979) (addressing the applicability of the Unruh Act and the usury
law to revolving charge accounts).
21. In fact, there was no mention of the relative bargaining strength of the parties
in either the court's decision or in Justice Mosk's concurrence and dissent. Other
cases, however, have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d
37, 53, 577 P.2d 200, 210, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978) (noting that the bargaining
strength of the parties bears no significance in determining whether a transaction is
usurious). But see O'Connor, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (which em-
phasized the relatively equal bargaining power of the parties in determining that the
transaction was not usurious).
22. See Wooten v. Coerber, 213 Cal. App. 2d 142, 148, 28 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1963)
(declaring that the usury laws were designed to "protect the indigent, who are helpless
to protect themselves in a practical sense"); Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New
Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 151, 158 (1988) (explaining that the usury
laws are designed to protect uninformed consumers).
23. Since the transaction at bar was not found to be a forbearance, there was little
'need to look at the intent of the parties. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 711, 798
P.2d at 1254, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, the court made no mention of the parties' bargaining strength when analyz-
ing usurious intent.
24. Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d at 709, 798 P.2d at 1252, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 409. In
his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk indicated his discomfort with leav-
ing open the liquidated damages issue, but concluded that it could not be properly re-
viewed since it was an issue brought forth by amicus curiae, rather than by either of
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cases addressing the usury law have at least questioned the validity
of late charges as liquidated damages provisions.25 In fact, in the
highly controversial Crestwood Lumber case, the court of appeal
found a transaction imposing an eighteen percent annual rate of in-
terest to be both usurious and an invalid liquidated damages provi-
sion.26 The reluctance of the Southwest Concrete court to analyze
this issue could cause another split among lower courts regarding the
treatment of non-usurious late charges. Such a split may ultimately
lead to a confusion similar to the pre-Southwest Concrete line of cases
that questioned the application of the usury law to late charge
clauses. The validity of late charges as liquidated damages provisions
will become a larger issue in the future because charges that do not
violate the usury law pursuant to Southwest Concrete, may, nonethe-
less, violate the liquidated damages law.
By finding that an agreement imposing an 18% annual interest rate
for late payments is not a forbearance subject to the usury law, the
court has established more stringent guidelines for proving a transac-
tion usurious. Now, even if a transaction is not initially classified as a
loan or forbearance subject to the usury law, it must be additionally
shown that the transaction falls within an exception to the usury law,
specifically, the "time-price" doctrine exception or the "debtor's vol-
untary act" exception. In light of the strong presumption in favor of
sellers of goods and services, it is likely that there will be a decrease
the parties to the action. Id. at 716-17, 798 P.2d at 1257, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (Mosk, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
California Civil Code section 1671(b) states that "a provision in a contract liquidating
the damages for the breach of contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate
the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circum-
stances." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b) (West 1985). For a complete history and explana-
tion of the liquidated damages law, see 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Contracts § 503 (9th ed. 1987).
25. See generally Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 738,
511 P.2d 1197, 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (1973) (where the supreme court admon-
ished lower courts to examine late charges as liquidated damages provisions subject to
section 1671 of the California Civil Code); Fox v. Federated Dep't Stores, 94 Cal. App.
3d 867, 885, 156 Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (1979) (applying the liquidated damages statute to
the transaction and finding it to be valid); O'Connor v. Televideo Sys., Inc., 218 Cal.
App. 3d 709, 718, 267 Cal. Rptr. 237, 243 (1990) (contending that a nonusurious transac-
tion between suppliers met the statutory standards of reasonableness set forth in sec-
tion 1671 of the California Civil Code).
26. Crestwood Lumber, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 826-27, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (1978). But
see Loomis, Crestwood Lumber Company v. Citizens Savings & Loan Association: The
Usury Law and Liquidated Damages in Sale of Goods Transactions, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 553, 565-66 (1980) (hypothesizing that the Crestwood court actually meant
that the liquidated damages law applies only if a transaction is not usurious).
1215
in the number of claims and cross-claims by buyers who default on
their payments and then attempt to seek judicial relief from their
debt. However, since the court elected not to address the application
of California Civil Code section 1671 to otherwise nonusurious trans-
actions, a dissatisfied' buyer may n. ow assert that the late charge pro-
visions in the contract were unreasonable liquidated damages
provisions. Therefore, in Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Con-
struction Corporation, the court's resolution of the usury law impli-
cations of a contract's late charge clause has opened the door to a
new line of litigation based on its classification as a liquidated dam-
ages provision.
SusAN RESLEY
Ivx. TORT LAW
A complaint that a physician failed to disclose research
and economic interests in a patient's cells before
obtaining the patient's consent'to medical procedures by
which cells were extracted for commercial purposes states
a cause of action for breach of the physician's ftduciary
duty, but not for conversion: Moore v. Regents of the
University of California
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California' was anxiously awaited by medical re-
searchers and biotechnology companies because it was the first case
to address the legal issues surrounding the rights and duties of physi-
cians and researchers who seek to use human tissues for commercial
purposes.2 In establishing the relevant legal principles governing this
burgeoning field of medical technology, the court declared that a
physician must obtain a patient's informed consent before removing
the patient's cells3 for research unrelated to the patient's health.4 In
1. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1388 (1991).
2. L.A. Times, July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at
C8, col. 4; Wash. Post, July 10, 1990, at A3.
3. The term "cells" is used broadly in this Note to include blood cells, bone mar-
row, organs, or body tissues. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128 n.6, 793 P.2d at 483 n.6, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 150 n.6 (noting that the term "cells" in the court's discussion refers to "all
of the cells taken from Moore's body, including blood cells, bone marrow, spleen,
etc.").
4. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Justice Panelli
wrote the majority opinion for the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Ea-
gleson and Kennard concurred. A separate concurring opinion was written by Justice
Arabian. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Jus-
tice Mosk also dissented separately.
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order to meet the informed consent requirements, a physician must
provide full disclosure of any research or economic interests in a pa-
tient's cells.5 If a physician fails to obtain the requisite informed con-
sent, an aggrieved patient may bring an action for breach of the
physician's fiduciary duty of disclosure.6
Despite this holding, however, the court declined to establish a
cause of action for conversion for patients whose cells are removed
for research purposes without their consent. 7 The court based its rul-
ing on the propositions that: (1) a patient retains no ownership inter-
est in excised cells;s (2) allowing a cause of action for conversion
would chill valuable medical research;9 and (3) a patient's interests
are adequately protected by the requirment of informed consent.1 0
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although thirteen causes of action were brought by the plaintiff in
Moore,il the court addressed only two: the causes of action alleging
lack of informed consent and conversion.l2 A brief discussion of
these two common law tort actions in the area of medical research
provides a background for analyzing the ultimate decision as to each
cause of action.
A. Informed Consent Requirements
In general, a physician must obtain a patient's informed consent
before proceeding with any manner of treatment.13 For such consent
to be effective, "it must have been ... given after the patient... re-
ceived a fair and reasonable explanation of the contemplated treat-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 142-43, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
8. Id. at 136-37, 793 P.2d at 488-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
9. Id. at 143-44, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
10. Id. at 143-44, 147; 793 P.2d at 494, 496-97; 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161, 163-64.
11. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. For a list of the causes of action,
see Mcore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128 n.4, 793 P.2d at 482 n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.4.
12. Id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
13. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 187 (1981) (explain-
ing that a patient must be aware of all dangers and risks of his contemplated treat-
ment); 31 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 487 (1982). See generally Annotation,
Malpractice: Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards of Disease or
Treatment, 79 A.L.R.2D 1028 (1961); Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General
Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88
A.L.R.3D 1008 (1978); 15 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 711 (1978) (discussing a physi-
cian's duty to obtain informed consent to new medical techniques and medical
research).
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ment or procedure and the potential dangers."14 If a physician
obtains a patient's supposed "informed consent" to an operation, but
the patient has not been provided with the full disclosure necessary
to make a truly informed decision, the physician can be sued for neg-
ligence.15 To properly fulfill his or her duty, a physician must reveal
any facts which are necessary to an intelligent decision by the
patient.16
In the area of medical research, a physician might desire to use a
patient as the subject of an experiment or innovative medical tech-
nique.17 In fact, in some cases, the research is for the sole benefit of
the researcher and provides no medical benefits to the patient.'8 Re-
gardless of which party benefits, in any situation involving research
or experimentation, although never expressly stated by a court
before Moore, the American Medical Association has mandated that a
researcher must obtain informed consent. 19 Federal and California
14. 31 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 487, 497 (1982) (footnote omitted). To prop-
erly obtain informed consent, the patient must also be told (1) who will be performing
the procedure upon him, and (2) the nature, purpose, benefits, and risks of any alter-
native procedures, including the alternative of doing nothing. A. ROSOFF, INFORMED
CONSENT 41-51 (1981).
15. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240-41, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972). See generally 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions §§ 152-154 (1977)
(discussing physician's disclosure obligation).
This duty to disclose arises because the physician is considered to bear a fiduciary
relationship to his or her patient. Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 804, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 67, 77 (1969) (citing Bauman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 176 P.2d
745, 749 (1947)). Fiduciaries are charged with providing full disclosure to their princi-
pals. Id. Cf. Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Extending Operation
or Treatment Beyond that Expressly Authorized, 56 A.L.R.2D 695 (1957).
16. Berkey, 1 Cal. App. 3d at 803-04, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (quoting Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)). The
test, as articulated by the California Supreme Court, requires that information must be
divulged to the patient if it would be material to his or her decision. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at
245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. But cf 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and
Institutions § 153 (1977) (describing four situations where the duty to obtain informed
consent does not attach).
17. See generally 15 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 711, 722 (1978) (discussing the
need to acquire informed consent for medical research, as well as for treatment).
18. Id. at 726-27 (noting that the Nazi atrocities were an extreme situation).
19. Id. at 730, 743-44. See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AS-
SOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 14 (1960).
A successful plaintiff who has sued his physician for the breach of the fiduciary duty
of full disclosure is entitled to damage awards for any of the following possible losses
which the plaintiff is able to prove:
[a]ctual loss of income[,] ... [d]ecrease in prospective earning capacity[,] ...
[plast and future medical expenses[,] ... [d]isfigurement or other damage to
plaintiff's body[,J ... [s]hortening of plaintiff's life expectancy[,] ... [diamage
to family life and enjoyment of life[,I... [p]ast and future pain and suffering[,]
... [p]ast and future fright, anxiety, and mental anguish[,] ... [a]ppropriate
wrongful death damages, where patient has died as result of surgery to which
informed consent was not given[,] ... [and plunitive damages, where action is
grounded in assault and battery and surgeon's conduct indicated a reckless
disregard for and complete indifference to the patient's welfare.
15 AM. JUR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 2D 711, 745 (1978).
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law also require that the patient be informed of "the purpose of the
research and a description of any benefits that might accrue to the
subject . *..."20 "[Flederal law further requires a description of any
benefits that might accrue to parties other than the subject." 21
An important exception to the rule requiring informed consent to
surgical procedures occurs when the physician is faced with an emer-
gency.22 In such a case, the physician's action in performing an opera-
tion without the requisite consent is justified under the
circumstances. 23 Likewise, if a physician can prove that the patient
would have undertaken the recommended procedure, regardless of
whether he or she was informed of all the attendant risks, the physi-
cian will not be held liable.2 4 In such cases, the causation element of
a negligence action is deemed to be lacking.25 Thus, when the merits
of the Moore case are finally resolved, the physician of plaintiff, John
Moore, cannot be held liable in damages for negligence if the court
decides that Mr. Moore would have undergone the surgical proce-
dures, regardless of whether or not he was fully informed of the
consequences.2
6
B. The Tort of Conversion
Conversion involves "the wrongful exercise of dominion over [the]
personal property of another."27 The California Supreme Court rec-
ognizes conversion as "a tort that protects against interference with
possessory and ownership interests in personal property."28 As such,
20. Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 75 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (1989) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 24172(a), (d) (West 1984)).
21. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a)(1), (3) (1988)). It is interesting to note that
federal law prohibits the patient from waiving any of his legal rights in a consent form.
Id.
22. A legitimate emergency arises when immediate action is necessary to save the
patient's life or health. 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 154 (1977).
23. Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 781, 208 P.2d 68, 71 (1949) (explaining
that an immediate, life threatening condition can make such consent "impracticable").
24. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16.
25. Id.
26. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 131 n.9, 793 P.2d at 484 n.9, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151 n.9
(noting that disclosure of 'remote' risks and insignificant research interests on the part
of a physician are not required).
27. B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 610 (9th ed. 1989) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted). See also 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Conversion § 1 (1974); 18 AM.
JUR. 2D Conversion § 1 (1985).
28. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 134, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 222A(1) (1965) (stating that conver-
sion is "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously
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that which is the subject of a conversion must have the status of
property. 29 Otherwise, the conversion cause of action is inapplicable
to an allegedly aggrieved plaintiff's case. Thus, to succeed in a case
against a physician and/or researcher for the conversion and com-
mercial exploitation of human cells, the human subject must show
that he held a property interest in the cells at issue.30 A plaintiff
who successfully challenges a defendant's conversion of his or her
property interest is entitled to recover the fair market value of the
thing converted.S1
Questions surrounding whether rights in the human body consti-
tute property rights or some other interest have generated very little
debate until recently.3 2 This is because, prior to the recent birth of
biotechnology,33 no market for human body parts existed.34 Tradi-
tionally, the dispute over whether the human body could be charac-
terized as property arose only in the context of corpses.3 5 The
general common law rule, which was adopted in American jurisdic-
tions from English precedent, recognized no property rights in dead
bodies.36 However, one exception to the general rule recognized the
interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required
to pay the other the full value of the chattel").
29. Black's Law Dictionary defines property, in the traditional sense, as: "the un-
restricted and exclusive right to (dispose of] a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in
every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering
with it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979). More generally, property is
defined as a bundle of rights in an object. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 3-4 (C. Macpherson ed. 1978).
30. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136-37, 793 P.2d at 488-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
31. Murphy v. Wilson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 132, 135-36, 314 P.2d 507, 509 (1957) (apply-
ing the theory to an action against a lender for foreclosure of real property). See also
14 CAL. JUR. 3D Conversion § 38 (1974). For a discussion outlining the inherent
problems in determining the value of body materials, see Note, supra note 20, at 1379-
80.
32. Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical Re-
search: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 630
(1989).
33. The term "biotechnology" refers to:
any industrial process in which microorganisms... are used .... More com-
monly, the term biotechnology is used for those industrial processes in which
modern genetic engineering techniques have been used to construct novel
strains of organisms which have new applications; for example bacterial
strains have been constructed ... which can produce human insulin, growth
hormone[s], or interferons on a commercial scale.
SINGLETON & SAINSBURY, DICTIONARY OF MICROBIOLOGY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
113 (2d ed. 1987).
34. Note, supra note 32, at 630. "Before the advent of biotechnology, once a tissue
was severed from a living human being's body, it either could be preserved for scien-
tific research and used as a teaching aid or a subject of dissection, or it simply would be
discarded and would ultimately decompose." Id. at 630 n.15. Basically, then, such body
parts were "monetarily worthless." Id. at 630.
35. Id.
36. Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California
and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499, 502-03 (1990). This com-
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quasi-property rights granted to family, friends and close relatives,
and allowed them to claim a corpse for the limited purpose of bur-
ial.37 Despite this exception, no commercial property interests in
dead bodies were recognized.38
Modern courts have generally moved away from quasi-property la-
bels in favor of allowing recovery to grieving family members for
mental anguish associated with a defendant's treatment of a corpse.3 9
Nevertheless, at least where the state seeks to assert an interest in
obtaining an organ for donation, several courts still recognize family
members' quasi-property rights in corpses.40 This limited property
right allows the families "to prevent removal of body parts unless the
state asserts a counterveiling [sic] compelling state interest."41
In contrast, living bodies were often characterized as a form of
property at common law. For example, under English common law,
a debtor could be attached as payment for a debt.42 Further, a wo-
mon law notion evolved out of a reaction to the grotesque practices occurring in Eng-
land when cadavers were allowed to be sold to medical schools., Id. at 501. Apparently,
certain characters were exhuming recently buried bodies, while other, more merciless
characters were actually murdering unsuspecting victims, all for profit. Id. at 501-02.
In response, the British Parliament promulgated the Anatomy Act of 1932 which pro-
hibited the theft in and/or trade of cadavers. Id. at 502.
37. Id. at 503 n.42 (citing P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 159 (2d ed. 1950)
(defining the "quasi-property" right)). See, e.g., Gray v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 Cal. App.
2d 240, 246, 68 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1937) (recognizing that, in an action for wrongful per-
formance of an autopsy, the wife had the quasi-property right of possession of her hus-
band's dead body for burial purposes).
38. Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69
TEx. L. REv. 209, 227 (1990). Even in modern times, courts are reluctant to recognize
full property interests in corpses. For example, one court has refused to allow corpses
to be the subject of attachment or repossession as security for debts. Morgan v. Rich-
mond, 336 So. 2d 342, 343 (La. Ct. App. 1976). Another court has refused to recognize a
property interest in corpses by declining to hold a custodian of a corpse liable as a
bailee for the misplacement of the body. Brooks v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 325 So.
2d 479, 479-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976).
39. Note, supra note 38, at 227-28. See also Galvin v. McGilley Memorial Chapels,
746 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that quasi-property rights were ficti-
tious labels used to protect next of kin from emotional distress); Strachan v. John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 531, 538 A.2d 346, 350 (1988) (remarking that
the traditional recognition of quasi-property rights in dead corpses was actually a con-
venient way of allowing causes of action for wrongful infliction of emotional distress);
Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 33 Ohio App. 3d 31, 35-36, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434-35
(1986) (holding family entitled to award of damages for emotional distress due to de-
fendant's action in digging up grave of grandmother and rejecting theory of quasi-prop-
erty rights in dead bodies).
40. Note, supra note 38, at 229 (citing several courts' decisions).
41. Id.
42. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 144
(1977).
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man's body was considered to be the property of her husband.43 Slav-
ery was an even more graphic example of the recognition of property
rights in human beings in that slaves were considered their owners'
property.44
More recently, with the growth of biotechnological science, living
individuals have begun to assert property interests in their own body
parts.45 Tissue samples extracted from patients are generally used
only in research and experiments. 46 Occasionally, however, an ex-
periment yields results which have the potential of being converted
into a commercial product.47 In these situations, courts have been
wary of using property law to protect interests in body parts.48 For
example, in Mokry v. University of Texas Health Science Center,49
the plaintiff, whose eyeball was surgically removed and negligently
washed down a drain, received a favorable ruling on his ability to re-
cover for his mental anguish.5 0 However, the court did not address
whether the plaintiff possessed a property interest in the eyeball.
Other courts have held that physicians and surgeons are not liable as
bailees for the protection of body parts removed from their
patients. 51
Only two courts, in fact, have come close to recognizing that indi-
viduals possess a property interest in their body parts. The first was
Venner v. State,5 2 where, rather than establishing that an individual
has property rights in waste materials produced by his body, the
court simply refused to hold that a person has no such property
rights in waste materials in the absence of some attempt to establish
ownership.5 3 In the second case, United States v. Garber,54 the Fifth
Circuit implied that body parts might constitute a form of property,
43. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 16-17 (1975). As such, a man charged
with raping a woman was tried for a property crime against the woman's husband. Id,
at 17.
44. R. Scorr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 26-27 (1981).
45. Id. at 3. "Dead or alive, the human body now has an intrinsic value. To be
precise, that value inheres not in the body as an entity but in its component parts." Id.
46. Note, supra note 32, at 631.
47. Id. Such products include various vaccines, insulin, antibiotics, hormones, and
cancer treatments. Id. at 628.
48. Id at 632-33.
49. 529 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
50. Id. at 805.
51. See, e.g., Browning v. Norton-Children's Hospital, 504 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky.
1974) (holding that a surgeon has no duty to "take a dismembered part of a human
body into his care and custody").
52. 30 Md. App. 599, 354 A.2d 483 (1976), aff'd, 279 Md. 47, 367 A.2d 949, cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
53. Id. at 626-27, 354 A.2d at 498-99. In Venner, the defendant was hospitalized af-
ter swallowing twenty-one balloons containing marijuana. Id. at 602, 354 A.2d at 486.
The police obtained the balloons from the defendant's excrement and used them as ev-
idence at his trial. Id, at 601-02, 354 A.2d at 485-86.
54. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
1222
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
based on its holding that the proceeds from the sale of body parts
may be taxable income.55 However, the court declined to conclu-
sively determine whether the sale of body parts amounted to a sale of
"tangible property" or a service performed for compensation.5 6 Fur-
thermore, the court never determined whether the defendant's prof-
its were taxable, reasoning that the case was "an inappropriate
vehicle for pioneering interpretations of tax law."'57 The issue arose
once again when John Moore, in Moore v. Regents of the University
of California, claimed that his property interest in his cells was un-
lawfully converted to the commercial benefit of his physician, re-
searchers, and the biotechnology companies involved.58
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Moore, a 44-year-old Seattle businessman,5 9 was diagnosed
with hairy-cell leukemia6 o in 1976.61 He sought treatment at the
Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles, 62
where Dr. David Golde, his treating physician, confirmed the diagno-
sis.63 As is common practice with hairy-cell leukemia patients, Dr.
Golde recommended that Moore's spleen be removed to arrest the
55. Id. at 100. In Garber, the defendant was convicted for wilfully evading pay-
ment of income taxes. Id. at 93. The defendant had received approximately $80,000
per year for selling her blood plasma, and she had not paid taxes on these proceeds.
Id. at 94 n.1.
56. Id, at 97.
57. Id. at 100. The dissent, however, vehemently argued that the defendant's pro-
ceeds were taxable because the sale of blood plasma amounted .to a sale of property.
Id. at 103-04 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
58. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126-28, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
59. L.A. Times, July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
60. Hairy-cell leukemia, or leukemic reticuloendotheliosis, is a rare form of cancer
characterized by the presence of abnormal mononuclear cells in the blood, bone mar-
row, and other tissues. Golomb, Diagnosis and Treatment of Hairy Cell Leukemia, in
1 NEOPLASTIC DISEASES OF THE BLOOD 121 (P. Wiernik, G. Canellos, R. Kyle, C. Schif-
fer ed. 1985). Other characteristics include destruction of normal blood cells, enlarge-
ment of the spleen, and infiltration of the bone marrow, spleen, and lymph nodes by
tumor cells. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 2476 (S. Landau
ed. 1986).
61. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. Since the
supreme court's only purpose on review was to rule on the defendants' demurrers, the
only facts before the court were those stated in the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 125,
793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The court, therefore, assumed that the facts, as
pleaded, were true. Id,
62. Id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
63. Id. This he did after "'withdr[awing] extensive amounts of blood, bone mar-
row aspirate, and other bodily substances.'" Id.
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disease's progression.64 The spleen was removed in October 1976 at
the UCLA Medical Center.6 5
Unbeknownst to Moore and before his operation, Dr. Golde and
Shirley Quan, a researcher hired by the Regents of the University of
California,66 had planned to transfer portions of the spleen to a sepa-
rate research lab for testing which was unrelated to Moore's medical
treatment.67 They had determined previously, and confirmed during
this research, that Moore's cells were unique.66 Apparently, the cells
possessed a potential for great commercial value69 contingent upon
their development into a cell-line that would lead to the production
of valuable pharmaceuticals used in the treatment of various dis-
eases. 70 Their plans for commercial exploitation of the cell-line were
never revealed to Moore.71 In fact, Dr. Golde and Shirley Quan spe-
cifically told Moore that the tissue had no commercial or financial
value.72
Through a genetic engineering process, the defendants were able to
develop the planned cell-line. 73 During the development process,
Moore was directed to return to the medical center several times be-
tween November 1976 and September 1983 for further treatment.74
In actuality, the visits were not medically necessary, but were
designed to allow the researchers to withdraw blood and other bodily
64. Id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
65. Id. Moore signed a written consent form authorizing the operation. Id
66. Ld. at 125, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
67. Id at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. It is important to note that
although Dr. Golde and his research assistant were interested in obtaining portions of
the spleen for their own personal reasons, the splenectomy did serve a therapeutic
purpose as well. Id. at 133 n.11, 793 P.2d at 486 n.11, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153 n.11. In fact,
"Moore had a grossly enlarged spleen and... its excision improved his condition." Id.
68. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 715, 249 Cal. Rptr.
494, 498 (1988), deleted by, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). These cells were unique because they overproduced cer-
tain lymphokines, which was a characteristic necessary to produce a valuable cell-line.
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127 n.2, 793 P.2d at 481-82 n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49 n.2; see infra
note 143 and accompanying text.
69. The value was estimated to catapult to over three billion dollars by 1990.
Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500. Moreover, Dr. Golde and the Re-
gents of the University of California were paid several hundred thousand dollars dur-
ing the process of developing a commercially exploitable cell-line from Moore's cells.
Id. These payments were due under contracts entered into with firms who planned to
market the cell-line following development. Id.; Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 793 P.2d
at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
70. Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 718, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
73. Id. at 717, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498. A cell-line is developed through the combina-
tion of segments of DNA from human cells with the cells of a microorganism to pro-
duce recombinant DNA. Id at 715 n.3, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498 n.3. This genetic
engineering process produces cells which divide and can maintain a continuous culture
for an indefinite period of time. Id.
74. Id. at 718, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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substances needed for the development of the cell-line.75
During a visit in April of 1983, the researchers asked Moore to sign
a consent form allowing them to conduct research on his cells. 76
Moore signed the consent form, still unaware of the researchers' eco-
nomic interests in his cells.77 He was asked to sign another consent
form in September of 1983.78 Although Moore agreed to further re-
moval of his body tissues, he expressly forbade the researchers from
obtaining any commercial rights in a cell-line which might be devel-
oped through their research.79 Despite this express lack of consent
the defendants continued to commercially exploit Moore's cell line.80
The Regents of the University of California applied for a patent on
the cell-line in 1981.81 By agreement, any profits resulting from the
patent were to be shared by the Regents, Golde, and Quan.8 2 The
patent issued in 1984.83
When Moore eventually discovered that Golde and Quan had mis-
represented their actions, he brought suit against Golde, Quan, and
the Regents, seeking damages for conversion of his spleen.8 4 How-
ever, the Superior Court of California sustained the defendants' de-
murrers on the issue of conversion and dismissed the case.8 5 The
75. Id.
76. Id, at 718-19, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500. In reality, the research had been ongoing
since 1976. Id, at 718, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500.
77. Id at 719, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
78. Id. at 719, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
79. Id, It is important to note that Moore, at that point, still had no idea of the
ongoing research or economic intentions harbored by Golde and Quan in developing a
marketable cell line from his body tissues. Id It appears from the facts, however, that
he was beginning to develop his own suspicions.
80. Id. at 719, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501. In fact, the researchers changed the name of
the cell-line from "Moore" to "RLC" to avoid exposing their scheme. Id, at 718, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 500.
81. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
82. 1d at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
83. See Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (Appendix A to the
court of appeal's opinion containing a copy of the patent).
84. Id. at 715, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01. He also attempted to sue the biotechnology
companies who had compensated Dr. Golde and the Regents for their development of
the cell-line, but was unable to successfully challenge a demurrer brought by the com-
panies in superior court. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128, 793 P.2d at 482-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
149-50.
85. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128, 793 P.2d at 482-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50; see gener-
ally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C513755 (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1988).
Although Moore brought thirteen causes of action against all of the defendants, the
superior court considered only the conversion cause of action. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128,
793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
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California Court of Appeal reversed.86
The court of appeal reasoned that Moore's cells amounted to his
personal property over which he alone had an "'unrestricted right to
its use, enjoyment and disposition.' "87 As such, the court of appeal
held that Moore could sustain a cause of action against the defend-
ants for conversion.8 8 Furthermore, the court of appeal rejected the
defendants' argument that Moore had abandoned his spleen.8 9
The Supreme Court of California then granted review to deter-
mine whether John Moore had, in fact, properly stated a cause of ac-
tion against the defendants for commercially exploiting his cells
without his permission.90
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The Informed Consent Cause of Action
The majority initially reiterated three well known principles re-
lated to the requirement of informed consent: (1) a competent adult
has the right to decide whether to undergo medical treatment; (2) for
a patient's consent to be effective, it must be informed; and (3) the
physician's duty of obtaining the patient's consent includes the duty
of first disclosing all material facts related to the patient's decision. 91
With these principles in mind, the majority easily concluded that a
physician's personal interests in a patient's cells must be disclosed to
avoid potential liablility for breach of the physician's fiduciary duty.92
The majority reasoned that any "reasonable patient would want to
86. Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 722, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
87. Id. at 725, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504 (quoting 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1984)).
f88. Id. at 728, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The court characterized the defendants' asser-
tion that they could claim a property right in Moore's tissue, while Moore could not, as
one which was "fraught with irony." Id.
89. Id. at 732-33, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The court cautioned that "intense moral,
religious and ethical concerns" accompanied the concept of selling body parts without
consent, so that an inference of abandonment, even with a diseased organ, was "inap-
propriate." Id.
90. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 124-25, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
91. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 242-46, 502 P.2d 1, 9-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-15 (1972)). See generally Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Pa-
tient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3D 1008 (1978).
92. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Quoting Cobbs,
the court stated that "'[tihe scope of the physician's communication to the patient...
must be measured by the patient's need, and that need is whatever information is ma-
terial to the decision.'" Id. (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515, (1972)).
The majority noted an important exception to its holding: when a physician's per-
sonal interests are so insignificant in comparison to other facts necessary to the pa-
tient's decision, disclosure will not be required. Id. at 131 n.9, 793 P.2d at 484 n.9, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 151 n.9.
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know whether a physician has an economic interest that might affect
the physician's professional judgment."93 They wanted to prevent
conflicts of interest which might arise from affecting the mode of a
patient's treatment without the patient's express consent.94
The majority admitted that requiring disclosure of personal inter-
ests in a patient's cells may complicate the treatment process in that
patients might focus on the economics involved, rather than implica-
tions for their health.9s However, they deemed it important that the
patient, and not the doctor, has the ultimate discretion to determine
which method of treatment conforms with his or her best interests.96
In evaluating the specific facts alleged in Moore's complaint, the
majority held that Moore had adequately stated a cause of action
against Dr. Golde for either breach of the fiduciary duty owed to him,
or failure to obtain informed consent. 97 First, Moore alleged that
prior to his splenectomy, Dr. Golde failed to inform him of his intent
to obtain a portion of the spleen for purposes of researching its
unique physical characteristics. 98 Second, he asserted that upon re-
questing postoperative blood samples, Dr. Golde assured Moore that
he had no financial interest in his cells, which amounted to a conceal-
ment of an economic interest.99 This interest clearly existed in light
of Dr. Golde's attempt to obtain a patent on the developed cell-
93. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. They noted that the California
Legislature had already indicated a desire to protect patients from conflicts of interest
in physician-patient relationships as evidenced the enactment of by two statutes: Sec-
tion 24173(c)(9) of the Health and Safety Code which requires a physician to disclose
the funding source of any experiment he or she plans to conduct on the patient and
section 654.2 of the Business and Profession Code, which mandates that physicians dis-
close any proprietary interest they hold in organizations to which they refer their pa-
tients. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFE'Y CODE § 24173(c)(9) (West 1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 654.2 (West 1990).
94. The majority noted that medical treatment decisions should be made by
"weighing the benefits to the patient against the risks to the patient" Moore, 51 Cal.
3d at 130, 793 P.2d at 484, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (emphasis in original). The court feared
that when a physician has research interests in a patient's cells, he or she might "be
tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure or test that offers marginal, or no,
benefits to the patient." Id (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 131, 793 P.2d at 484-85, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52. An exception might be
available to a physician concerned only with the health of a patient; the physician has
the option to withhold certain information which has the potential of severely upset-
ting a patient. However, the majority ruled that such an exception was inapplicable to
a case where a physician's conflicting research interests are also involved. Id. at 131
n.9, 793 P.2d at 484 n.9, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151 n.9.
97. Id. at 132-33, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
98. I& at 132, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
99. Id. at 132-33, 793 P.2d at 485-86, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
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line.100 The majority ruled that, in both instances, Dr. Golde had an
obligation to disclose his personal interest in the procedures before
undertaking them.101
As to the remaining defendants, the Regents and Shirley Quan, the
majority held that they owed no fiduciary duty to Moore since they
were not physicians.102 Additionally, the court ruled that they did
not owe a duty of obtaining his informed consent to the procedures
undertaken.10s
2. The Conversion Cause of Action
The majority considered Moore's argument that he had a right to
share in the profits resulting from the cell-line developed by Dr.
Golde and Shirley Quan. Moore claimed that he continued to main-
tain an ownership interest in his cells, even after their excision from
his body, and as such, the defendants were liable for conversion of
those cells.104 Moore's argument seemed doomed from the start,
however, as the majority was quick to note, "[n]o court... has ever
in a reported decision imposed conversion liability for the use of
human cells in medical research."105 After a discussion of relevant
statutory law and policy considerations, the court concluded that, in
100. Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
101. Id. at 132-33, 793 P.2d at 485-86, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53. The majority rejected
the superior court's holding which explained that in order for a plaintiff to properly
state a cause of action for breach of the physician's fiduciary duty, the plaintiff had to
allege that the procedure lacked a therapeutic purpose. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 486, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 153. Rather, the majority held that even if a certain procedure possessed
a therapeutic purpose, the physician involved still owed a duty to disclose any accom-
panying research or economic interests, as the physician's alternative interests could
conflict with and materially affect the patient's decision. Id.
102. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153. However, they left open the
possibility for the superior court, on remand, to determine whether the Regents or
Shirley Quan could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 134
n.14, 793 P.2d at 487 n.14, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.14.
Additionally, the majority noted that Moore was free to amend his complaint, on re-
mand, to add the biotechnology companies as secondarily liable for Golde's actions. Id.
at 134, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154; see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 133, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153 (explaining that
the only way a duty could be found is under a respondeat superior theory). Cf. infra
notes 137-140 and accompanying text; Annotation, Liability of One Physician or Sur-
geon for Malpractice of Another, .85 A.L.R.2D 889 (1962).
104. Moore, 51,Cal. 3d at 134-35, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. If Moore had
succeeded on his conversion claim, the defendants could have faced potential liability
up to the amount of the cells' fair market value. See supra notes 31 and 70 and accom-
panying text. See generally Annotation, Transfer of-Possession of Personal Property
with Owner's Consent, Obtained by Fraud, as Conversion, 95 A.L.R. 615 (1935).
105. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. In a footnote,
the majority stated that the lack of precedent on the subject could not be explained by
the recent birth of biotechnology since the development of human cell-lines had been
common since the early 1950s. Id. at 135 n.15, 793 P.2d at 487 n.15, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154
n.15 (citation omitted).
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Moore's case, it would be improper to impose coversion liability.106
Initially, the majority pointed to the lack of precedent to support
Moore's ownership claim.107 They reasoned that no such precedent
existed 0 8 because courts have recognized that issues regarding
human tissues, organs, and cells are better resolved by state legisla-
tures, in order to attain favorable policy goals, than by courts apply-
ing property law.'0 9 The court pointed out that California statutes
already "drastically limit[] any continuing interest of a patient in ex-
106. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
107. Id, at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. The majority also seemed to
find it important that Moore attempted to allege an ownership interest in genetic code
materials extracted from his body which were common to all human beings. Id. at 138-
39, 793 P.2d at 490, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157. Moore's materials were unique because they
were easier to identify in Moore's cells. Id. at 127 n.2, 793 P.2d at 481 n.2, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 148 n.2.
108. Id. at 137, 793 P.2d at 489, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The majority rejected the
court of appeal's conclusion that invasion of privacy cases were similar. Id. at 138, 793
P.2d at 489-90, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57. 'The tort of invasion of "privacy involves the
wrongful publicity of a person's unique likeness. Id. The majority emphasized that
the holdings in those cases were "irrelevent to the issue of conversion" of genetic
materials because they were not based on property law which is the basis of the tort of
conversion. Id. Also, the majority felt that individual privacy interests could be ade-
quately protected "without accepting the extremely problematic conclusion that inter-
ference with those interests amounts to a conversion of personal property." Id, at 140,
793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
Moreover, the court asserted that wrongful publicity requires a unique characteristic
of a person, like that person's name or facial image, to be the subject of exploitation.
Id at 138, 793 P.2d at 490, 271 P.2d at 156-57. That situation was not present in Moore's
case where the stated purpose of the patent was to "manufacture lymphokines" which
do not possess unique characteristics in different individuals. Id. at 138 n.29, 793 P.2d
at 490 n.29, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.29.
Finally, the court rejected any analogy to the Maryland case of Venner v. State,
where, by negative inference, the Maryland Court of Appeal concluded that an individ-
ual may have a property interest in his or her excrement. Venner v. State, 30 Md.
App. 599, 626-27, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (1976), off'd, 279 Md: 47, 367 A.2d 949, cert denied,
431 U.S. 932 (1977); see also supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. The Moore court
distinguished Venner since it involved an issue of criminal procedure, rather than a
civil dispute over which party was entitled to the profits derived from property.
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 138 n.28, 793 P.2d at 489 n.28, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156 n.28. The court
emphasized that policy considerations in the two cases were markedly different. Id.
109. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 137, 142, 793 P.2d at 489, 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156, 160.
The majority reasoned that "'[l]egislatures, in making such policy decisions, have the
ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings at
which all interested parties [may] present evidence and express their views." Id. at
147, 793 P.2d at 496, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47
Cal. 3d 654, 694 n.31, 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 235 n.31 (1988)). They
pointed to the legislature's previous actions in promulgating statutes which already
partially regulate the field of medical research on human tissues. See infra notes 110-
114 and accompanying text. See also Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 137 nn.21-27, 793 P.2d at 489
nn.21-27, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156 nn.21-27.
1229
cised cells."11O The majority advocated deference to those particular
statutes which address the proper methods of disposition of human
body parts."' One such statute permits a competent individual to do-
nate all or part of his or her body for medical research or transplant
purposes, but prohibits that individual from receiving compensation
for the donation.112 Another statute requires that "recognizable ana-
tomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infec-
tious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of
by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the
state ... to protect the public health and safety.""l 3 While the pri-
mary object of the latter statute is to protect the public health and
safety, the majority emphasized that the secondary effect of the stat-
ute, which was to severely limit a patient's control over surgically re-
moved body parts and to provide for their ultimate destruction,
mandated a conclusion that the legislature did not intend to promote
property interests in the excised body parts.114 They pointed out that
such interests would be inconsistent with the obvious purpose of the
statute because the statute blatantly prohibits many of the ownership
rights traditionally associated with personal property."l5
Additionally, the majority felt that Moore's claim was faulty since
the Regents' patented cell-line and the products developed from it
were not originally Moore's property, thus, they could not be the sub-
ject of a conversion action."i6 The majority asserted that "the pat-
ented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells
taken from Moore's body."117 While the "primary cells" taken from
Moore's body were factually his cells, their makeup changed signifi-
cantly while the cell-line was in the process of development.118 In
fact, the majority noted that "naturally occurring organisms," such as
Moore's originally extracted cells, are not patentable.119 They rea-
soned that only organisms which are the product of human invention
and manipulation are patentable. 120 The majority concluded that the
cell-line for which the Regents obtained a patent could not logically
110. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 1.37, 793 P.2d at 489, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156. For an examina-
tion of statutes applicable in other jurisdictions, see Note, supra note 38, at 221-25.
111. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140, 793 P.2d at 491-92, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59.
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7151, 7153, 7155 (West Supp. 1991).
113. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1991).
114. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140-41, 793 P.2d at 491-92, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59.
115. Id. at 140-41, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
116. Id. at 141, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
117. 1&
118. Id. at 141 n.35, 793 P.2d at 492 n.35, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159 n.35.
119. Id. at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (citing Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980)).
120. Id at 142, 793 P.2d at 492-93, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159-60. The majority reasoned
that it is the "inventive effort" in creating the cell-line "that patent law rewards, not
the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials." Id. (emphasis in original).
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be a product of Moore's body.121 Thus, whether or not "property" is
the appropriate legal label to attach to body parts, Moore's actual
body parts were not the same items which were subject to commer-
cial exploitation and alleged to have been converted in this case.
Next, the majority examined two competing policy considerations
relevant to Moore's conversion cause of action. First, they sought to
maintain protection' of patients' rights to determine what medical
procedures to undertake.122 However, they felt that patients were al-
ready sufficiently protected by the tort doctrines creating physicians'
fiduciary duties and mandating informed consent.123 Second, the ma-
jority determined that important and valuable medical research
should not be chilled by imposing conversion liability on physicians
and researchers.124 The majority expressly wished to prevent creat-
ing a cause of action which would be "'detrimental to both academic
researchers and the infant biotechnology industry.' "125 That indus-
try has already produced various treatments for "leukemia, cancer,
diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant rejection, emphy-
121. I&
122. Id at 139-40, 143, 793 P.2d at 491, 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158, 160.
123. I& The majority concluded that "[1liability based upon existing disclosure obli-
gations, rather than an unprecedented extension of the conversion theory, protects pa-
tients' rights of privacy and autonomy without unnecessarily hindering research." Id,
at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
Furthermore, they advocated against expanding the tort of conversion, with its strict
liability standard, to avoid facilitating the punishment of innocent researchers who
were not responsible for the failure to obtain informed consent to the research. Id,
124. Id at 135, 143, 793 P.2d at 487-88, 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154, 160. The court
stated:
[Wihat Moore is asking us to do is to impose a tort duty on scientists to inves-
tigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in research.
To impose such a duty, which would affect medical research of importance to
all of society, implicates policy concerns far removed from the traditional,
two-party ownership disputes in which the law of conversion arose.
Id at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr: at 154 (footnote omitted).
125. I. at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF
HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 27 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. CONGRESS]). Such a chill could
be easily foreseen, the majority noted, in that:
"[b]iological materials are routinely distributed to other researchers for exper-
imental purposes, and scientists who obtain cell lines or other specimen-de-
rived products, such as gene clones, from the original researcher could also be
sued under certain legal theories [such as conversion]. Furthermore, the un-
certainty could 'affect product developments as well as research. Since inven-
tions containing human tissues and cells may be patented and licensed for
commercial use, companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manu-
facturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about clear title exists."
I& at 143, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 125,
at 27.
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sema, osteoporosis, ulcers, anemia, infertility, and gynecological tu-
mors."126 The majority reasoned that these areas of medical research
would be significantly threatened by uncertainty as to whether pa-
tients retain legal title in removed body parts.12 7
Access to existing raw materials for research would also be hin-
dered, according to the majority, since many cell-lines are currently
stored in the American Type Culture Collection and by the National
Institutes of Health and the American Cancer Society.128 These or-
ganizations store existing cell-lines for distribution to any medical re-
searcher who asks for a sample.12 9 Indeed, as the majority expressed,
an organization's willingness to distribute existing cell-lines, possibly
crucial to the development of new disease inhibitors,13o would be di-
minished if conversion liability could be imposed.131
Based on these considerations, the majority found that the best so-
lution was to remand Moore's case for consideration as to whether
Dr. Golde had, in fact, breached his fiduciary duty of disclosure, but
sustain the defendants' demurrers to the conversion cause of
action. 3 2
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Arabian wrote separately in an effort to emphasize the ma-
jority's conclusion that the legislature, rather than the supreme
court, could best determine whether a conversion action should lie
with regard to commercially developed human cells. 3 3 He expressed
favor for a proposed legislative solution which would involve the cre-
ation of a licensing scheme that would mandate a fixed rate of profit
126. Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (citing Note, supra note 32, at
628 n.1).
127. Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
128. Id.
129. Id at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. The majority advo-
cated the maintenance of the present system used by tissue banks. Id Under that sys-
tem, "'many firms have access to the tissue so the probability of efficient use of those
tissues increases.'" Id, at 145 n.39, 793 P.2d at 495 n.39, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.39 (quot-
ing U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 125, at 52; Note, supra note 32, at 635).
130. Most medical products for human treatment developed by biotechnology com-
panies are created from human cell lines. Id. at 145, 793 P.2d at 495, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
162 (citing U.S. CoNGREs, supra note 125, at 56).
131. Id. at 145, 793 P.2d at 495, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162. Likewise, researchers would
be deterred from asking for access to the cell-lines where potential liability could be
foreseen. See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at C8, col. 4 (pointing out that once litigation
began in Moore's case, "researchers throughout the country immediately stopped using
the cell-line").
132. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. 'The majority
also sustained the demurrers of the other defendants, with leave to amend the causes
of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
133. Id at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J., concurring). See
supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
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sharing between researchers and medical patients.1 34 He explained
that such an arrangement would serve the moral principles involved
by preventing an unlimited free market in body cells,135 yet guaran-
tee the source of the cells some measure of compensation to which he
or she might rightfully be due. 3 6
Justice Broussard also wrote separately to concur in the portion of
the majority's opinion which held that Moore had properly alleged a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Dr. Golde.i 37
However, Justice Broussard was willing to go one step further and
hold that Moore had properly pled the same cause of action against
all defendants, including Shirley Quan, the Regents, and the biotech-
nology companies involved.138 He reasoned that because all of the
named defendants were involved in the "commercial venture" at the
time the covert postoperative procedures were being performed on
Moore, it would be improper to absolve them of liability based on the
134. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 149-50, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J.,
concurring). One commentator has advocated this solution in Danforth, Cells, Salesi
and Royalties: The Patient's Right to A Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
179, 198-201 (1988). All of the majority justices seemed open to this idea, as the same
article was cited as a potential solution in the majority opinion. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d
at 147, 793 P.2d at 496, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163. In contrast, another commentator cited by
the majority, advocates prohibiting the sale of tissues to be used in medical research,
just as organs to be used for transplant purposes cannot be sold. See id. (citing Note,
supra note 32, at 643-45). Congress has prohibited the sale of human organs for trans-
plant purposes in 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. IV 1986), which provides:
(a) PROHIBITION. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly ac-
quire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable considera-
tion for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.
(b) PENALTIES. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
Id,
135. Justice Arabian criticized Moore's request that the court establish an individ-
ual right to sell body cells for profit. He articulated that Moore "entreats us to regard
the human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized so-
ciety--as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the
sacred with the profane. He asks much." Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., concurring). See generally Hansmann, The Economics
and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 57 (1989)
(which outlines the problems associated with organ sales).
136. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 149-50, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
137. Id. at 150, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
138. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 151-52, 793 P.2d at 499-500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Contra supra notes 102-03 and ac-
companying text.
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pleadings and without further discovery.13 9
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Broussard agreed in principle with the majority's opinion
regarding the informed consent cause of action, but challenged the
majority opinion on the conversion cause of action as unfocused.140
He claimed that the majority failed to make an important distinction
between cases where the commercial value of cells is discovered
before they are removed from a patient's body and cases where the
commercial value is discovered months or years after the cells are re-
moved.141 The latter situation is the more common one when a pa-
tient is asked to consent to medical research. 4 2 However, as Justice
Broussard pointed out, Dr. Golde realized that Moore's cells had
unique commercial value before they were ever extracted.143 Brous-
sard agreed that, in the more common situation, a patient retains no
ownership interest in his excised cells.144 However, he thought it was
"clear under California law" that in the unusual instance where the
value of the cells is determined before removal, the patient has the
legal right to determine how the cells will be put to use after
removal.145
Furthermore, Justice Broussard contended that a conversion action
139. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 152, 793 P.2d at 499-500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, he conceded that the ad-
ditional defendants could properly move for summary judgment if the evidence
obtained in discovery revealed that those defendants played no part in the continuing
breach of fiduciary duty. I& at 152, 793 P.2d at 500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 151, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
141. I& at 153, 793 P.2d at 500-01, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68 (Broussard, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id.
143. Id at 150, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
144. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 151, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He pointed to the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as the controlling statutory authority for a patient's
right to determine what uses can be made of his or her cells after extraction. Id at
154, 793 P.2d at 501, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The Act provides that an organ donor can donate an organ to a hospital
or physician for research purposes, that the donor has the right to specify a certain
donee of the organ, and that the donor has the power to limit the donated organ's use
to specific purposes. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150.5(a), 7153(a)(1), (b) (West
Supp. 1991).
While Broussard agreed with the majority that section 7054.4 of the Health and
Safety Code severly restricts a patient's control over cells removed from his or her
body, he maintained that the statute provided no basis for the conclusion that a pa-
tient's physician possesses any greater right to determine the proper use of such cells.
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 156, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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could be maintained if this right is wrongfully interfered with by a
physician.l46 Because this distinction was not made by the majority,
he contested their decision as incorrectly based on a factual setting
not before the court.1 4 7 He stated that "[b]ecause plaintiff alleges
that defendants wrongfully interfered with his right to determine,
prior to the removal of his body parts, how those parts would be used
after removal, I conclude that the complaint states a cause of action
under traditional, common law conversion principles."148
While Justice Broussard agreed that the cell-line which was even-
tually patented was distinct from the cells taken from Moore's body,
he maintained that Moore was still entitled to economic recovery for
the damage suffered from the loss of the right to control the use of
his own cells.149 Similarly, he dismissed the majority's reliance on
the fact that Moore's cells were not unique.150 He asserted that the
uniqueness of the cells affected only the amount of damages Moore
would be entitled to under a conversion action, not his ability to
maintain the action at all.'5'
Additionally, Justice Broussard contended, in contrast to the ma-
jority decision, that the informed consent cause of action was insuffi-
cient to protect an aggrieved plaintiff.152 He posited that, even if the
same remedy were available to a plaintiff under an informed consent
cause of action as under a conversion action, such provision would
provide no. protection to a plaintiff who had no claim for breach of
146. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 157, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Idi at 151, 793 P.2d at 499, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). He claimed that the majority justices strayed by focusing
on the potential liability of physicians who would be conducting research on "existing
cell repositories." Id (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added).
148. Id. at 153, 793 P.2d at 501, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
149. Id, at 157, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). This conclusion would preclude, of course, any economic
recovery based on the value of products derived from the patented cell-line. Id.
(Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Broussard asserted,
however, that "the fact that plaintiff may not be entitled to all of the damages which
his complaint seeks does not justify denying his right to maintain any conversion ac-
tion at all." I& (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brous-
sard stated that "ordinary property, as well as unique property, is... protected against
conversion." Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id, at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text,
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fiduciary duty.53 He hypothesized that this could occur if a patient's
informed consent was obtained to undertake a specific research pro-
ject, but some other entity later stole the cells and undertook a dif-
ferent project. I5 4
Finally, Justice Broussard attacked the majority's unstated, though
inferrable, purpose 15s of preventing the sale of human tissues for
profit. 5 6 He pointed out that while the majority opinion would pre-
vent the source of tissue from benefitting economically, it still al-
lowed researchers, who obtain tissue through wrongful means, to
exploit the cells commercially to their full potential. 5 7 Therefore,
Justice Broussard would allow a plaintiff in Moore's situation to
maintain a cause of action for conversion. 15 8
Justice Mosk also separately challenged the majority's holding
with regard to the conversion cause of action by contesting six of its
major premises.159 First, Justice Mosk found it unremarkable, in
contrast to the majority justices, that no California precedent sup-
ported Moore's claims.160 Instead, he found it significant that no
such precedent rejected those claims.'16 He found Moore's case to be
merely one of first impression 6 2 in which the court had the author-
ity to decide under its power to interpret the ever evolving common
law.' 63
Second, Justice Mosk doubted the majority's conclusion that Cali-
fornia statutory law interpretation mandated that patients could hold
no property interest in their cells.'l4 Specifically, Justice Mosk ar-
153. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. Id (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. See supra note 135 and accompanying.text. Justice Arabian articulated these
unstated concerns in his concurrence. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., concurring).
156. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 159-60, 793 P.2d at 505-06, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
158. Id, (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
159. 1I at 160-61, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
160. Id, at 161, 793 P.2d at 506-07, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard agreed with this point. Id. at 156, 793 P.2d at 502, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
169 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id at 161, 793 P.2d at 506-07, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
162. 1i at 162, 793 P.2d at 507, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
163. Id, (Mosk, J., dissenting). He emphasized that the majority opinion acknowl-
edged that "the law of conversion is a creature of the common law." Id at 161, 793
P.2d at 507, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard expressed a
similar conclusion. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 155, 793 P.2d at 502, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 169
(Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id at 165, 793 P.2d at 509, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (Mosk, J., dissenting). He em-
phasized that "the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of property." Id.
at 165, 793 P.2d at 509, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 176. For example, "some types of personal
property may be sold but not given away, while others may be given away but not sold,
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gued that, just because certain statutes165 appear to severely limit a
patient's control over excised cells, there was no basis to conclude
that the minimal rights a patient retained could not be classified as a
property interest.'6
Third, while conceding that Moore's cells might be distinguishable
from the cells which were eventually patented, Justice Mosk con-
cluded that the majority reached an unfair result by focusing on the
fact that a patent was obtained.167 Instead, Justice Mosk argued that
"a patent is not a license to defraud"168 and advocated that the de-
fendants should be held responsible for their conversion of Moore's
original tissue samples before the patent was obtained.169 Moreover,
he asserted that Moore should recover a portion of the profits flow-
ing from the patent because access to his cells was so crucial to the
development of the commercial product.170
Fourth, Justice Mosk challenged the majority's policy goal of
preventing a chill within the field of medical research.171 He main-
tained that researchers and biotechnology companies who use and
distribute cell-lines could undertake an unburdensome record keep-
ing process.172 He noted that these records could be referenced to de-
termine the extent of consent granted by any cell source as to future
and still others may neither be given away nor sold." Id, at 166, 793 P.2d at 510, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
165. Justice Mosk specifically referred to section 7054.4 of the Health and Safety
Code, which the majority held "eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to
property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or
'ownership' for purposes of conversion law." Id at 140, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr.
at 159. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
166. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 166, 793 P.2d at 510, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
167. Id at 167-69, 793 P.2d at 511-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
168. Id at 168, 793 P.2d at 512, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
169. Id. at 168, 793 P.2d at 511-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
170. Id, (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk suggested an analogy to the case of a
"joint inventor." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Under federal law, a "joint inventor" is
protected from scientists excluding him from sharing profits obtained under a patent if
he "contribute[d] in a substantial way to a product's development." Id at 169, 793 P.2d
at 512, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988)). He
noted that patients who serve as the source of biological materials contribute in the
same substantial way as a joint inventor because, without the source, the product could
never. be developed. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also Danforth, supra note 134, at
197 (making the same analogy).
171. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 170, 793 P.2d at 513, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id at 172, 793 P.2d at 514, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Mosk
opined that the record keeping process would impose no real additional burden on re-
searchers since they commonly keep extensive. records regarding cell sources anyway.
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research or commercial uses of his or her cells.173 He posited that
the court could then allow for potential conversion liability to a pa-
tient's cells without significantly inhibiting the field of medical sci-
ence.174 Thus, Justice Mosk argued that policy goals supporting
fairness and prohibiting unjust enrichment far outweighed any al-
leged policy of promoting medical research. 17s
Fifth, Justice Mosk opposed the notion expressed by the majority
that the legislature should decide the validity of a conversion cause of
action in body cells.176 He did not contend that the legislature was
not competent to decide the issue.177 Rather, he felt that since the
issue had not yet been resolved by the legislature, in the meantime,
the court should not abdicate its own responsibility of interpreting
and enforcing the common law.178 He believed that a reluctance by
the court was especially inappropriate in the present case, "when the
rapid expansion of biotechnological science and industry makes reso-
lution of these issues an increasingly pressing need."179
Sixth, Justice Mosk argued that the informed consent cause of ac-
tion was inadequate to protect a patient in a situation such as
Moore's.180 He pointed out that a patient in that situation faces an
exceptionally difficult burden of proof.' 8 ' Initially, the patient would
have to show that, even if he or she had been adequately informed of
the physician's personal interests in his or her cells, the patient
would not have granted consent to a possibly life-saving procedure.182
Next, the patient would have to show that, even under an objective
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality, 34
UCLA L. REV. 207, 241 (1986)).
173. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Contra Biotechnology Newswatch, July 16, 1990, at 1
(quoting executive director of the Association of Biotechnology Companies as asserting
that such a record keeping process would impose "'major complications in research,
and delays in getting important products to market' ").
175. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 793 P.2d at 516-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (citing Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human
Tissue for Commercial Purposes, in IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJEcTS RESEARCH 5
(Jan/Feb 1986); Comment, Toward a Right of Commerciality, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207,
229 (1986)).
176. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 176, 793 P.2d at 517, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
177. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 178, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also
Martin & Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells: Toward an
Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH.
L.J. 211, 222 (1989) (explaining that causation is difficult to prove).
181. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972)). See supra notes 24-26 and ac-
companying text.
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standard, a reasonable person in his or her position would have with-
held consent.'8 3 Justice Mosk contended that a jury would not likely
believe that a patient, much less a reasonable person, faced with a
life threatening disease would refuse to have his or her diseased cells
extracted just because the physician harbored research or economic
interests in those cells.184 Thus, he asserted that even-though the in-
formed consent cause of action would be available as an option to
these plaintiffs, it might not provide an especially viable avenue for
recovery. Hence, Justice Mosk concluded that the informed consent
cause of action is "not an adequate substitute.., for the conversion
cause of action."' 8 5
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The California Supreme Court's holding in Moore will undoubtedly
prevent the evils which might result if property interests are recog-
nized in body parts.'8 6 The idea of selling body parts in the free mar-
ketplace is distasteful at best. 8 7 Furthermore, as counsel for UCLA
asserted in this case, the recognition of property interests in human
cells could potentially deter valuable medical research and possibly
"'sound[] the death knell to the university physician-scientist.' "188
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how much protection is ac-
183. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). Justice Mosk noted that the purpose of the objective standard was to avoid
reliance on "the 20/20 vision of hindsight" to determine if a breach of fiduciary duty
occurred. I& (Mosk, J., dissenting). It would only be natural for a plaintiff, after filing
a claim, to claim that he, subjectively, would never have consented to the medical pro-
cedure had he been further informed. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). The requirement of
meeting an additional objective standard would avoid a decision based solely on the
plaintiff's self-serving statements. I& at 179-80, 793 P.2d at 519-20, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
186-87 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
184. Id at 180, 793 P.2d at 520, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 182, 793 P.2d at 521, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Mosk, J., dissenting). At least
one bioethicist, Dr. Arthur Caplan, would agree with this proposition. Dr. Caplan
stated, "Mr. Moore will have a harder time receiving compensation for a breach of in-
formed consent than he would have if he had proved a property interest. He may be
able to prove he was wronged, but it will be harder to prove he was harmed." N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1990, at C8, col. 4.
186. See supra note 135. Contra Swerdlow & Cate, Why Transplants Don't Hap-
pen; Organ and Tissue Transplants, ATLANTIC MONMLY, October 1990, at 99 (advocat-
ing that allowing a market to exist in body parts will benefit society in that organ
shortages will be reduced while the quality of organs available for transplant will be
improved).
187. See Note, supra note 32, at 632-42 (describing the negative results which might
occur if an individual were permitted to sell his or her body parts for profit).
188. National Law Journal, July 23, 1990, at 6.
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corded a patient who finds himself the subject of undisclosed medical
research. At a minimum, the Moore case establishes that physicians
are required to provide information regarding their personal interests
in a patient's cells in addition to disclosing medical risks. 8 9 The ma-
jority asserted that patients will receive adequate protection under
this doctrine of informed consent.190 However, in reality, it may be
very difficult for a plaintiff to recover under such a theory.191 Specif-
ically, it will be difficult for the plaintiff to show that the failure on
the part of his or her physician to disclose information regarding re-
search or economic interests caused the plaintiff any actual harm.192
Nonetheless, a patient who succeeds in his or her informed consent
cause of action, has a potential for greater damages than under a con-
version cause of action.193 This is because a physician could be liable
for punitive damages under an informed consent action,194 which are
not as easily recoverable under a conversion action.195 Furthermore,
it might be difficult to prove the value of the cells alleged to have
been converted under a conversion action because of the tenuous con-
nection between the original cells and any later developed cell-
line. 9 6 Thus, the actual protections afforded an aggrieved plaintiff
189. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. "'This decision
will probably force researchers to talk more to patients--which is not a bad idea-and
improve the general public's understanding of medical research and what it's all
about.'" L.A. Times, July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 2 (quoting Cynthia Fruchtman, an attor-
ney and genetic engineering expert).
190. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text. Clearly, then, an ethical phy-
sician will not be able to make a "secret profit" off of a patient's cells. See Wash. Post,
July 10, 1990, at A3. However, it is not a certainty that a patient will necessarily be
able to share in any of these profits through a damage award. See N.Y. Times, July 10,
1990, at C8, col. 4.
192. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
193. National Law Journal, July 23, 1990, at 6.
194. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 153, 793 P.2d at 500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also 15 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS 711,
744-45 (1978).
195. While good faith is not a defense to a conversion action, mere negligence on
the part of defendant will not suffice to establish conversion liability. 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Conversion § 2 (1985). Conversion is an intentional tort. Id. As such, plaintiffs will
bear a greater burden establishing intent under conversion than they will by establish-
ing the mere negligence required to prove the breach of a physician's fiduciary duty to
obtain informed consent. See id. §§ 1-3; 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Conversion §§ 15, 31 (1974); 36
CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 152 (1977). Likewise, it will be harder
for plaintiffs to prove the malice, fraud, or oppression, beyond the intent requirement,
necessary to qualify for punitive damages under a conversion action. In contrast,
under an informed consent action, the plaintiff need only prove intent to qualify for an
award of punitive damages. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 114 (1985); 14 CAL. JUR.
3D Conversion § 48 (1974); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 149 (1977);
15 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 711, 744-45 (1978); see generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 611 (9th ed. 1988) (specifying remedies normally available
in a conversion action).
196. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text. Indeed, the majority articu-
lated that the greatest contribution to the value of a cell-line patent comes from the
1240
[Vol. 18: 1049, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
under an informed consent versus a conversion action can only be
tested over time as plaintiffs ask courts to award them some level of
damages under claims alleging failure to obtain informed consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Moore case shows that the California Supreme Court is not en-
tirely insensitive to the rights of patients to determine whether cells
from their body will be removed and what can be done with those
cells following extraction. If a physician removes a patient's cells
without fully disclosing his research or economic interests, the pa-
tient can attempt to recover damages under a claim that the physi-
cian breached his or her fiduciary duty to the patient. The focus of
that cause of action is the actual damages incurred by the patient as a
result of not being informed, rather than the commercial value of
any product which is later developed.
The court, however, refused to extend the potential liability of
physicians under conversion causes of action. There, the focus of the
cause of action is the value of the thing converted. Because drugs
from human cell-lines often have great commercial value, a sympa-
thetic jury might concentrate on the dollars which a patient allegedly
"missed out on" rather than determining whether the patient in-
curred any actual harm.
In Moore, for example, the value of the product which was devel-
oped from the patented cell-line is now worth over three billion dol-
lars.197 However, a reasonable person in Moore's position in October
1976 when his diseased spleen threatened his life, -would probably
choose to have his spleen removed, regardless of any personal inter-
ests on the part of the physician. This is the scenario on which the
supreme court wants triers of fact to concentrate.
At the time of this writing, the Moore case has been remanded to
the superior court for a determination of the informed consent cause
of action which survived against Dr. Golde.198 Dr. Golde wants that
work of medical researchers and biotechnology companies, rather than from any value
inherent to the source cells. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 492-93, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 159-60; see also id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. See supra note 69.
198. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164; N.Y. Times, July
10, 1990, at C8, col. 4. A petition for certiorari was filed in December 1990 and denied
without comment in March 1991. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120,
793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S.
Dec. 28, 1990) (No. 90-1037), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). Moore's lawyer did not
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court to focus on the fact that he saved Moore's life.199 In contrast,
Moore wants the court to focus on the high level of anxiety he exper-
ienced on subsequent visits to the medical center under the unin-
formed belief that they were medically necessary.2 00
SELINA KATHERINE HEWITr
express surprise at the Court's ruling. L.A. Daily News, March 26, 1991, at 4, col. 2.
He noted that "the conservative [C]ourt is reluctant to make groundbreaking decisions
in new areas of law." I&i
As to Moore's informed consent cause of action, Moore's lawyer claimed, "If Mr.
Moore had been informed that the physician stood to gain financially from the use of
his organs before consenting to the surgery, maybe he would have wanted another
opinion. He was deprived of his right to give informed consent." I&
199. U.S.A. Today, July 11, 1990, at 2A.
200. Id,
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